OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE

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TRADE POLICY STAFF COMMITTEE

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FTAA MARKET ACCESS

PUBLIC HEARING

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MONDAY,

SEPTEMBER 9, 2002

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The public hearing was held in Conference Rooms 1 and 2, USTR Annex, 1724 F Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., at 10:00 a.m., Carmen Suro-Bredie, Chairperson, presiding.

PRESENT:

CARMEN SURO-BREDIE, Chairperson, USTR

REGINA VARGO, USTR

BARBARA CHATTIN, USTR

KIMBERLY CLAMAN, USTR

WILLIAM CLATANOFF, USTR

PRESENT (Continued):

JONATHAN FRITZ, USTR

BENNETT HARMAN, USTR

RUSSELL SMITH, USTR

GLORIA BLUE, Executive Secretary

ALSO PRESENT:

OMAR KARAWA, Department of Agriculture

ANDREA MALITO, Department of Commerce

MICHELLE CARRILLO, Department of Commerce

JANIE HESTER, Department of Labor

BETSY WHITE, Department of Labor

BARBARA BOWIE-WHITMAN, Department of State

KAREN BROWN, Department of State

BARBARA McLEOD, Environmental Protection Agency

DAN LEAHY, U.S. International Trade Commission

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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 1 2 (10:03 a.m.)3 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: The hearing will 4 come to order. This hearing is being conducted by the 5 Trade Policy Staff Committee, known as the TPSC, an 6 7 interagency body chaired by the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. 8 9 addition In to USTR, there are 10 representatives from the Department of Agriculture, 11 Labor, Interior, State, Treasury, Commerce, 12 Environmental Protection Agency, and the U.S. 13 International Trade Commission. 14 Many members of the FTAA negotiating teams 15 will be present. 16 The subject of this hearing the 17 proposed negotiation of a free trade area of 18 The TPSC is seeking public comment on the Americas. 19 effects of the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff 20 barriers to trade and other market liberalization 21 free trade of the Americas' the area among

participating countries and any other matter relevant

to the FTAA agreement.

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On December 11th, 1994, the 34 democratically elected leaders in the Hemisphere met in Miami, Florida for the first Summit of the America. They agreed to conclude negotiations on the free trade area of the Americas by the year 2005 and to achieve concrete progress toward that objective by the end of the 20th Century.

Since that time, the 34 Western Hemisphere ministers responsible for trade have met on several occasions. The work of nine negotiating groups began in September 1998. In anticipation of that activity, the TPSC published a notice in the Federal Register requesting public comments, and then there's the citation in the written record, 63 FR 128, July 6th, 1998, on what should be the U.S. positions and objectives with respect to each of the negotiating groups.

This notice also stated that USTR would seek additional public comment separately on other issues related to the FTAA, including the economic effects of the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff

barriers to trade among FTAA participating countries.

In April 2001, the 34 trade ministers met in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and mandated that the market access negotiations be initiated no later than May 15th, 2002. The ministers also decided to make public the FTAA preliminary draft consolidated text, which has been posted on the FTAA Web site at www.ftaa-alca.org.

The TPSC subsequently issued a notice inviting public comments on the draft text, and then there's the citation, 66 FR 36,614, July 12th, 2001.

On April 22nd, 2001, the 34 leaders of the Summit of the Americas met in Ouebec City and confirmed that the negotiation of the FTAA agreement would conclude no later than January of 2005. As provided in the regulations of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, 16 CFR, Part 203, the Chairman of the TPSC has invited written comments and/or oral testimony of interested parties at a public hearing. Comments and testimony may address the reduction or elimination of tariffs or non-tariff barriers on any articles provided for in the harmonized tariff schedule of the

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United States that are products of an FTA country, any concession which should be sought by the United States, or any other matter relevant to the FTAA.

The TPSC invites comments and testimony on all of these matters, and in light of the schedule for presenting market access offers, in particular, seeks comments and testimony addressed to economic benefits and costs to U.S. producers and consumers of the elimination of tariffs on trade between the United States and the 33 other FTAA countries, and in the case of articles for which immediate elimination of tariffs is not recommended, the recommended staging schedule for such elimination.

Also, existing non-tariff barriers to trading goods between the United States and the 33 other FTAA countries and the economic benefits and costs of removing these barriers.

Third, existing barriers to trade in services and government procurement between the United States and the 33 other FTAA countries, and the economic benefits and costs of removing such barriers.

Also, economic benefits and costs to U.S.

producers and consumers of strengthening the protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in FTAA countries and improving market access for products subject to RPR protection.

Finally, existing restrictions on investment flows between the United States and the 33 other FTAA countries and the economic benefits and costs of eliminating any such restrictions.

Persons who submitted comments pursuant to a previous request for public comments concerning the FTAA should not resubmit those comments. A hearing is being held on September 9th, today and tomorrow in Rooms 1 and 2 at 1724 F Street. Interested persons, including persons who participate in the hearing may submit written comments by noon September 23rd, 2002. This is a firm deadline.

Written comments may include rebuttal points demonstrating errors of fact or analysis not pointed out in the hearing. The first page of written comments must specify the subject matter, including as applicable the product or products with HTSUS numbers or service sectors.

1	I would now like to introduce the panel
2	members, including Regina Vargo, Assistant U.S. Trade
3	Representative for the Americas. After these
4	introductions, we will hear from the first witness, a
5	statement by Mr. Mitchell Cooper, counsel for the
6	Rubber and Plastic Footwear Manufacturers Association.
7	Regina, please.
8	MS. VARGO: Thank you, Carmen, and thank
9	you all very much for showing up here today.
10	Carmen, before we do the introduction of
11	the panel members, Carmen asked if I would come by and
12	give you a brief update.
13	Can you all hear me over the air
14	conditioning?
15	Give you a brief update on where we are in
16	the FTAA negotiations, which I think are moving
17	forward strongly and are on track.
18	We had two principal mandates for this
19	period leading up to the next ministerial, which will
20	be held in Quito, Ecuador on November the 1st. One
21	mandate was to keep working on the text.
22	The second mandate was to launch the

market access negotiations by May 15th.

As I mentioned, I think we're very much on track for both of these elements. On the text, the negotiating groups have produced a second version of their text in their respective areas, and the Vice Ministers have made a recommendation to ministers that they be released to the public as they were at the last ministerial.

Now the text is, of course, if you will, the obligations of the agreement.

The second mandate we had related to the launching of the market access component of the talks, which means, in essence, what's going to be covered and schedules where necessary to dictate, say, the elimination of tariffs, et cetera.

This market access part of the talk relates to five different areas: agricultural goods, industrial goods, services, investment, and government procurement.

And so far we've made initial decisions about how we're going to conduct those negotiations or what we call the methods and modalities so that these

talks can move forward.

A couple of points that I thought I'd highlight. First of all, we have agreed that there will be no a priori exclusions.

We've also agreed for the schedule for the initiation and exchange of offers. We've agreed that in all five areas this relates to that initial offers will be made in the period between December 15th of this year and February 15th of 2003; that requests for improvements to those offers will be made between February 16th and June 15th; and then beginning on July 15th we'll begin an iterative process of continuing to revise and improve offers.

For the tariff talks, we've agreed that base rates will be notified between August the 15th and October the 15th, and in fact, the U.S. was the first country to notify its base tariffs. We did that on August the 16th.

This September each of these five groups is meeting. They are going to be meeting to discuss in their groups kind of the format that they'll be using for the exchange of offers, and I would note in

that regard I think we've managed to have our key 1 2 negotiators here to listen to your comments, but I 3 think it's government procurement and services that are meeting this week. 4 So we won't have all of our negotiators 5 6 here, and I wanted you to understand the reason why. 7 They're busy meeting on the FTAA. Also in September we're going to have a 8 9 new group begin meeting, an ad hoc group that will begin the very detailed work necessary on rules of 10 11 origin, and that group will be in proximity with the 12 market access group, which is its parent. Another, I think, significant element of 13 14 the Quito Ministerial this time will be taking a 15 closer look at technical assistance for the smaller 16 economies, and those economies at lower levels of 17 development. And, in particular, we're working on a 18 19 hemispheric cooperation program, and Ambassador 20 Zoellick will be traveling to the CARICOM countries.

He leaves tomorrow and will be meeting with the trade

ministers of CARICOM on Wednesday to talk further

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about this idea.

Procedurally there will be two big developments I'd like to note. One is you're all used to hearing about the negotiations taking place in Panama. Well, come next spring, the Secretariat will move to Puebla, Mexico. So that will be the next site for all of the individual negotiating groups and committees to meet at.

Vice ministerials and ministerial meetings rotate, but the other groups meet routinely at the same place.

Also, Brazil and the U.S. will begin a cochairmanship of the FTA process for the final 26 month
phase that will begin after Quito, and we've been
working very closely with Brazil to figure out how
we're going to do this, but I would just note for you
that we haven't -- we've decided not to just take 26
months and divide them into just two 13 month
segments. We're going to try to do this as a true cochairmanship, and so we're working at the issues like
how we plan to handle communications and things of
that nature.

1	Finally, I'd like to note that we expect
2	the Quito Ministerial to have an Americas Business
3	Forum and a Civil Society Forum, and I would urge any
4	of those of you here who are interested to try to
5	participate in those events.
6	So with that as a brief overview, I'd like
7	to be able to leave the maximum amount of time to have
8	us hear from you. So let me suggest that the panel
9	members introduce themselves, and why don't we begin
10	down at this end?
11	MR. KARAWA: My name is Omar Karawa from
12	the Department of Agriculture.
13	MR. HARMAN: Bennett Harman, Office of the
14	U.S. Trade Representative.
15	MR. LEAHY: Dan Leahy, U.S. International
16	Trade Commission.
17	MS. VARGO: Regina Vargo, USTR.
18	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Carmen Suro-
19	Bredie, USTR, and the Chair.
20	MS. BOWIE-WHITMAN: Barbara Bowie-Whitman,
21	State.
22	MS. CARRILLO: Michelle Carrillo,

1	Department of Commerce.
2	MS. WHITE: Betsy White, Department of
3	Labor.
4	MR. CLATANOFF: Bud Clatanoff, USTR.
5	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: So if the first
6	witness could approach the chair, please.
7	MS. VARGO: Excuse me, Mitch. I'm going
8	to have to depart.
9	MR. COOPER: You're going to leave?
10	MS. VARGO: But I will read it all.
11	MR. COOPER: I'll try to finish by the
12	time you get to the door.
13	MS. VARGO: You won't be doing the folks
14	a service if you do that.
15	Thank you all very much.
16	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Could I ask the
17	panel members to reintroduce themselves? Because
18	otherwise the transcription will be incorrect.
19	THE REPORTER: All I need to know is the
20	new gentleman and I'll be fine.
21	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Okay. Can you
22	introduce yourself?

1	MR. SMITH: Russell Smith. I'm with the
2	FTAA Office at USTR.
3	MS. MALITO: And Andrea Malito. I'm with
4	the Commerce Department.
5	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you.
6	So if we could hear then from the first
7	witness, Mitchell Cooper.
8	MR. COOPER: Thank you, Madame Chair.
9	This committee already has an extensive
10	record of the import sensitivity of the domestic
11	rubber footwear industry, and this brief testimony in
12	behalf of the Rubber and Plastic Footwear
13	Manufacturers Association will supplement that record.
14	Since my previous testimony before this
15	committee on the potential effect of FTAA tariff cuts
16	and since my submission to the ITC on this subject,
17	the domestic rubber footwear industry has shrunk in
18	size from some 7,000 production employees to
19	approximately 3,000.
20	This shrinkage was caused in large part by
21	the decision of Congress, which had been the largest
22	domestic producer for fabric upper, rubber soled

footwear, and of Lacrosse, which had been the largest domestic producer of waterproof footwear to shift their production from this country to facilities overseas.

The imports of fabric upper rubber soled footwear now take approximately 95 percent of our market, while imports of waterproofed footwear now take approximately 60 percent.

There are 26 harmonized system numbers which cover the products of the rubber footwear industry. The Senate version of the recently reenacted Andean trade preference bill exempted those 26 categories from immediate duty free treatment for the Andean countries and accorded them instead a 15 year phase-out.

In an effort to win support of the House, however, the principal Senate sponsors of this phaseout agreed to a narrowing of the list to those categories which constitute the core rubber footwear items currently manufactured in this country.

This compromise was reached with the full agreement of the Rubber and Plastic Footwear

Manufacturers Association, the American Apparel and Footwear Association, which is the spokesman for non-rubber footwear, and the Footwear Distributors and Retailers of America, the spokesman for domestic retailers.

While the rubber footwear amendment failed in conference committee, it is the intention of the Rubber and Plastic Footwear Manufacturers Association to seek an exclusion of its core products from the Andean Trade Preference Act based on rubber footwear's import sensitivity.

And at this point I really should interrupt myself to make a correction on some mathematics. The Andean trade preference amendment, which went to the conference committee, listed initially 16 core items. Those were the items which we believed were then being produced by the domestic rubber footwear industry.

Since that time, an additional company, waterproof manufacturer, has joined the RPFMA. It's called Onguard Industries. It is the inheritor of the remnants of the old Barter plant in Maryland, and that

company pointed out one additional item which should 1 2 be included. 3 And just the other day, very recently, I received word from New Balance that they intend in an 4 inner city factory in Boston to produce one more item 5 that was not previously on the list. 6 So instead of 7 26, we were talking about 16. Instead of 16, we're now talking about 18, and those items are all listed 8 9 on the bottom of the testimony which I have submitted 10 this morning. 11 If the testimony that you have does not 12 include all 18, I will certainly supplement it. 13 We've experienced recently a dramatic 14 example of why a full exception rather than an extended phase-out, such as the 15 years in NAFTA, is 15 16 essential to this industry. 17 And I should point out that 18 sensitivity is even more acute with respect to such 19 FTAA partners as Brazil, Argentina, and Chile than was 20 case certainly with respect to the Andean 21 countries. 22 And in the current negotiation with Chile,

is also seek a full exemption for FMAindustry's core items, but as I just said, we recently experienced a dramatic example of why exception, despite what Ms. Vargo has indicated is the agreement, temporary -- all agreements are temporary, of course, until they are final documents tentative agreement that there should be no exclusions.

Let me point out an example of why an exclusion is necessary for this industry. Tingley Rubber Corporation of South Plainfield, New Jersey, which has had a manufacturing presence in this country for about 100 years, recently shifted its operations, except for military contracts, from New Jersey to Mexico, and it did so for the simple reason that with only about seven years to run in the NAFTA duty phaseout, tariffs on rubber footwear from Mexico have been lowered to the point that Tingley has found it necessary to shift its production to Mexico in order to survive against foreign competition.

What remains of this industry is convinced that it can survive, provided there is no further

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whittling of its tariff production, and by now, 1 2 should be abundantly clear to all of you that the 3 elimination of duties in rubber footwear would be accompanied by the elimination of domestic rubber 4 footwear employment without any counterbalancing 5 6 benefit to consumers, since the products of this 7 industry, wherever their source, will retail for what customers are willing to pay. 8 9 Both the Trade Representative and the 10 Secretary of Commerce have taken note of the unique 11 sensitivity of this industry to imports, and we hope 12 committee will conclude that this that this 13 sensitivity justifies an exemption for at least the 18 14 core categories whose HTS numbers are listed in my 15 testimony, which are essential to the survival of this 16 industry. 17 I welcome your questions. Thank you. 18 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr. 19 Cooper. 20 I'll turn to Mr. Harman, who will be 21 asking the questions for the panel. 22 Thank you, Mr. Cooper. MR. HARMAN:

One question. If you could speak to the 1 2 competitive dynamic represented by trade with the 3 hemispheric trade partners as opposed to China, in the categories that the 4 parties, such as U.S. currently manufactures. 5 Well, particularly with 6 MR. COOPER: 7 countries like Brazil. MR. HARMAN: 8 Yes. 9 Perhaps to a lesser extent MR. COOPER: 10 Argentina. Who knows what's going on in Argentina 11 these days? Chile. There is enormous capacity and a 12 great deal of manufacture of rubber footwear. 13 Wage rates in those countries are, I need hardly point out, substantially lower than in the 14 15 United States. The duties on the products of which we 16 are speaking are very high certainly compared to other 17 duties, including duties even on non-rubber footwear. 18 Any elimination of these duties whether by 19 phaseout of a reasonable period of time or whatever is 20 bound to present an increased incentive to those 21 countries to increase their production of rubber

footwear and the shipment of that production to this

1	country.
2	So we are terribly concerned about what
3	the potential is.
4	MR. HARMAN: And secondly, could you speak
5	to the strategies that the U.S. companies have
6	developed to remain competitive?
7	MR. COOPER: Yeah.
8	MR. HARMAN: Such as brand name, product
9	quality, differentiation in size, et cetera?
10	MR. COOPER: Well, you've mentioned some.
11	Brand name, quality, differentiation in sizes.
12	Look. The companies that are still here,
13	we're talking about roughly five manufacturers. The
14	other members of the RPFMA, numbering about 15, are
15	suppliers to those manufacturers who are dependent on
16	their success for their own success as suppliers.
17	Given the existing tariff structure, these
18	companies are here and hopefully are here to stay.
19	There's only one fabric upper rubber sole producer of
20	any significance left in this country, and that's New
21	Balance.
22	New Balance is a successful company. It's

successful because it has wherever it can develop labor saving devices. It has a wonderful work force. It has an imaginative managerial force. It functions with three plants in Maine, two in Massachusetts, and a plant in California which they don't own, but which manufactures exclusively for them.

And their hope, frankly, given the tariff structure and provided that there is no further erosion in that structure, their hope is to continue to grow. They're now number four in the world in the production of athletic footwear not just because of domestic manufacturing, and this is what's important for you to understand.

Every one of the companies that I represent imports as well as manufactures in this country, and every morning they wake up and wonder if they're going to introduce a new line or continue to produce an existing line. Should they do it here or should they do it abroad?

Thus far, thus far, the balance of interest in each of these companies remains in favor of domestic production. So, again, take a company

1	like New Balance, which imports from all over the
2	world, has licensing agreements abroad for shipments
3	abroad, not back to this country, but nonetheless has
4	been able to cut the mustard in the United States
5	because of its quality, because of shortness of
6	shipment lines, et cetera.
7	So, you know, there's every reason to
8	believe that they've survived thus far, and they will
9	continue to survive. Bear in mind none of these
10	companies expects to go out of business. If you don't
11	want them in the United States, they'll go overseas,
12	and it's up to you in very large part as to where it
13	is this stuff is going to be produced
14	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Does the panel
15	have any further questions?
16	(No response.)
17	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: In that case,
18	thank you very much, Mr. Cooper.
19	MR. COOPER: Thank you. Thank you for
20	your attention.
21	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: It's my pleasure
22	to introduce the next witness, Thea Lee, Assistant

Director for International Economics of the AFL-CIO. 1 2 Ms. Lee. 3 MS. LEE: Good morning. Thank you so much for the opportunity to come and present the views of 4 AFL-CIO on behalf of our 13 million working men and 5 6 women members. 7 The free trade areas of the Americas is a very important issue for the American labor movement, 8 9 and indeed, for the labor movement of the entire 10 hemisphere, and we've been following the issue pretty 11 closely since 1995, the first Summit of the Americans, 12 when the discussions got underway. 13 But we very much welcome the opportunity 14 to day to come and present our views, and I've 15 submitted my full testimony. So I'll just summarize 16 some of the key issues from our point of view. 17 Clearly how the Western Hemisphere chooses 18 to integrate the economies and the countries will have 19 huge impact on jobs and wages and 20 conditions, but also on public policy, the scope of 21 government regulation of public health and the

environment and social safety nets throughout the

hemisphere, and that certainly has been our experience with the North American Free Trade Agreement.

These agreements are much more than trade liberalization. They go to the very heart of the role of government, the role of democratic decision making processes, and the kind of input from working people and community activists is very, very important to the ultimate legitimacy and credibility of whatever the product is in 2005 or later.

These agreements are often just sold as market access agreements that we're going to lower tariffs between the countries and that has to be good for everybody.

They do, of course, lower tariffs, but they do much more, and that's, I think, what we've learned from eight years of NAFTA, that what the free trade area of the Americas will do, just as NAFTA did, is to establish an entire framework of competition and what kind of rules will govern trade within the hemisphere, what kinds of competition are acceptable and what kinds of competition are not acceptable.

And it's very important to us that we

begin to see the issues of trade competition as more than just commercial disputes. It's not just about whether a particular company has market access or has a market advantage or doesn't, but really much broader than that; that certain kinds of competition, in particular, competition which violates the core labor standards that the international community has agreed to, are destructive, destructive not just to working people in the United States, but destructive to the entire fabric of the development process in the hemisphere and the democratic process.

And the same is true, of course, for environmental measures, and as I said before, I think that the way in which these trade agreements or economic integration agreements change the role of government is very important. It's something that we shouldn't neglect. We should give as much attention to it as we can; that how governments are able to regulate public health and the environment and social safety nets is important to people living here.

And the people living here in the United States or people living in Brazil or Argentina or

Costa Rica or Dominican Republic believe that most of the decisions that they're making about domestic regulation are going to be made through electing representatives, who will then make decisions which are thought out and sometimes very contentious, bitter, domestic political debates about the proper level of environmental regulation, the proper level of the minimum wage, the proper way of regulating union organizing.

But those domestic disputes should be resolved, in our view by parties that are elected, and we don't have an elected government for the entire hemisphere, and therefore, I think we should be very cautious as to how we change th balance of power between the role of government and the role of a trade dispute body; that these bitter domestic disputes should not be resolved out of the public eye in a trade tribunal with three people behind closed doors, where the proceedings aren't made public.

I don't think that's what people in the hemisphere are expecting their policy making process to be changing as a result of signing what's called a

free trade agreement. And I think that's certainly one of the key issues that we've grappled with, and I think you'll hear more about that over the course of the day, about the FTAA.

Let me just go over some of the key issues from our point of view. The first one obviously is the protection of workers' rights, and this is not a new issue probably to anybody at the table, but that it is our view that the free trade area of the Americas must include enforceable workers' rights in the core of the agreement, certainly nothing less than what's in the Jordan free trade agreement, that is, a commitment to honor the core labor standards of the ILO, freedom of association, the right to organize and bargain collectively, and the prohibitions against child labor, force labor, and discrimination employment.

But also, an enforceable commitment that countries will, in fact, effectively enforce their domestic labor and environmental laws; that this is an important combination, one, the commitment to the international core labor standards and, on the other

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hand, the commitment to enforced domestic labor laws, which as we all know are much more detailed and much more concrete than the international standards, but it's often a struggle just to enforce domestic laws, even in the United States of America, even in the richest countries, but certainly in the poorest countries.

And we do believe that it's important within the context of an international trade agreement to be able to bolster the obligation to enforce domestic laws and to live up to international obligations.

Certainly, and I think, again, this is an issue that's come up in the past, but that if, in fact, the free trade area of the Americas doesn't include enforceable workers' rights, we will, in fact, be stepping backwards from the kind of protection we have in current law with respect to virtually all of Latin American countries; that we have a variety of trade relationships in Latin America that do include enforceable commitments to honor workers' rights.

Certainly the GSP is the most important,

and that affects virtually all of the countries with the exception of Mexico and Canada. The Caribbean Basin agreement and the Andean pact have some workers' We're very troubled by what we rights provisions. perceive from the outside as the course of the FTAA negotiations that from everything we can see, there has been no formal discussion of workers' rights within the context of the FTAA to date. There's no working group. There's no chapter. There's no study group to address workers' rights issues. There's no language in the draft text that's been made available, even that bracketed text with however many hundreds of thousands of brackets. There's not even a bracket on workers' rights, with the exception of a very weak provision in the investment chapter that doesn't go much beyond what was in the NAFTA environmental chapter.

So we'd be very troubled by a course of negotiations that would take us to a place where the FTAA would grant additional market access and yet step backward in the very important area of workers' rights.

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And I guess I'm running short on time. So I'll just signal that the other issues that we consider very important, the investment chapter of the free trade area of the Americas. This has been tremendously controversial under the NAFTA, and we think very, very troubling, the idea of investor to state dispute resolution over very important issues of environmental and public health regulation we find extremely troubling.

The provision of services and whether, in fact, the FTAA will support or undermine the provision of public services, particularly public health and education, but even postal services, other areas where there is often a blurry line between the public and the private provision of services.

We don't believe that it would be an appropriate role for the FTAA to tilt that balance in favor of privatization away from public provision of services in key areas.

Government procurement in our view must take into account some of the social issues, as well as the commercial issues. Protection of workers'

1	rights, human rights are legitimate areas that should
2	be considered under government procurement, and the
3	development concerns of our sisters and brothers in
4	the hemisphere are very important to us, particularly
5	of debt relief.
6	We do believe it's appropriate in the
7	context of a free trade area of the Americas to
8	address debt relief and to give debt relief to some of
9	the developing countries so that they can provide
10	those basic health and education and infrastructure to
11	their people.
12	And let me end there and take your
13	questions.
14	Thank you.
15	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Ms.
16	Lee.
17	We will have two members of the panel
18	posing questions. Betsy White from the Department of
19	Labor and Bud Clatanoff from the USTR.
20	MR. CLATANOFF: Good morning, Thea.
21	Thanks for coming.
22	Just briefly, you called for inclusion of

enforceable worker rights standards in the core of the agreement, and I'd sort of like to get your opinion this morning on those enforcement mechanisms.

In particular, I think you're aware that remedies or enforcements in trade agreements often are imposed upon different sectors in the violations, if you will, so that Country X imposes punitive tariffs on orange juice because Country Y improperly restricted imports of steel.

Does that bother you that something like that could happen in worker rights provisions? And if so, what do we do about it?

MS. LEE: On dispute resolution, our view has been that we'd like the labor rights provisions to be enforced by essentially the same mechanism as is available for the commercial disputes, and that, I think, begs a lot of the questions. You know, whether that's an effective or appropriate way to enforce any of the commercial provisions in the agreement I think is a much broader question.

And I guess at the end of the day the test is going to be effectiveness and whether there are

meaningful economic consequences to the violation of workers' rights and whether those are essentially the same as those that are used to enforce the commercial provisions of the agreement is, I guess, the bottom line for.

And I guess, you know, every day if you read the trade press you're always seeing -- there was one just this morning about the Andean pact and the issue that, you know, the Andean countries are being told they may lose their trade benefits because a whole number of companies are having commercial disputes and that the message to the Andean countries is very, very strong; that they need to resolve these commercial disputes, pay off the fines that are owed to companies for various breaches of contract and so on, or they may lose their trade benefits.

And I guess we've never seen the workers' rights provisions of any of our trade agreements receive the same level of priority and emphasis, where it's constantly in the headlines that trade benefits are, in fact, contingent on countries respecting basic human rights of their workers, the fundamental rights

of the work place. 1 2 And so that's, I think, more important to 3 us than whether the trade sanction happens to be in the same sector or in a different sector. I guess the 4 key issue is whether it works, whether it, in fact, 5 6 remedies the abuse of rights or not. 7 MR. CLATANOFF: As an aside, I can assure you that the Andean countries are being reminded of 8 9 the worker rights provisions. So Andean trade 10 preferences. 11 My second question is in your written testimony, where it's more lengthy you mentioned this 12 13 morning, but the fact that investment disputes are 14 settled in sequence. 15 Do you think the transparency objectives 16 in the recently enacted Trade Promotion Act are 17 adequate to address your concerns? 18 MS. LEE: No, I don't think that. I think 19 they're a step in the right direction for sure, and we 20 welcome all of the steps in the right direction. Wе

welcome the release of the draft text of the FTAA as

a big improvement over what was available under NAFTA

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when the text was leaked.

But I guess what we'd like to see is an assurance not just that, you know, the individual government positions are made available, and I know that the United States, I think, has been among the best of countries in making its own positions available to the public, but the whole dispute settlement process happening behind closed doors is actually difficult even to keep track of which cases are being brought.

There are, I guess, newspaper clippings and anecdotes and other ways of tracing the investment disputes under NAFTA, but I think it should be just as a matter of course that any time that there's a challenge that it's made public and that the dispute settlement papers and the briefs and so on are made public.

MR. CLATANOFF: Okay. Thank you.

Betsy?

MS. WHITE: Thank you.

You said that there's nothing going on in the FTAA on labor. Let me assure you it's not for

having not tried. Having sat through a lot of ministerials and TNT meetings and such, it has been to date an impossible struggle, but let's hope that things improve.

I had a question that was raised by your oral testimony as opposed to your written testimony, and that is that the emphasis you place on how the FTA affects government policy and the ability to regulate and that it becomes this huge sort of FTAA super government affecting a country's ability to regulate, but yet you call for more regulation and more bringing into the trade field labor rights issues.

And I'm wondering if you see any dichotomy in the fact that you call, on the one hand, for less FTAA overall scrutiny of individual government's rights and the need to put worker rights into the FTAA as you're proposing.

MS. LEE: I think that's a good question, and I would say I don't see it as being inconsistent and for two reasons. One is that the workers' rights that we're talking about protecting under the FTA are rights that every country in Latin America or in the

FTAA process has agreed to abide by by virtue of their membership in the international labor organizations.

So these are not rights that are being imposed by the United States or externally. These are rights that voluntarily every single country in the hemisphere has already agreed to respect, promote, and realize under their membership in the ILO.

And the second piece of the workers' rights that we're talking about is countries agreeing to effectively enforce their own laws. So, again, that doesn't seem like a trampling of sovereignty or an external imposition of new obligations; rather, a strengthening of obligations that countries have already agreed to in other areas.

And I think that's a little bit different from a question of, let's say, citing a toxic waste company and the conflict that might happen between local environmental regulation an a company's desire to sell a product; that those are different issues that haven't, in fact, been resolved by any kind of democratic debate and discussion at that level.

I had one other question in terms of

promoting worker rights and sort of accompanying the FTAA. The TPA legislation does suggest that there be consultative mechanisms, that there be technical assistance to countries to improve their worker rights laws if necessary. How do you see these kind of supportive provisions as relating to and supporting your call for improvements in the enforcement of worker rights? MS. LEE: We think the consultative and the cooperative mechanisms that the U.S. government does engage in and are called for under TPA are very, very important and should be supported. We're very supportive of all kinds of transfer or resources in order to improve enforcement of workers' rights. We think that's a good use of U.S. resources. We don't think it's something which can stand on its own, and that's been our experience in the past, is that if all you have in place

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And I think we've seen that with the NAFTA

cooperative

generally something that neither the governments nor

consultative

and

the companies take seriously.

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mechanisms,

1	labor side agreement, that the pieces of the agreement
2	that are entirely cooperative are pretty worthless,
3	and that the only time when the companies and the
4	governments really pay attention is when there is the
5	possibility of some sort of economic sanction at the
6	end of the day, and that's when they start paying
7	attention to the rules. That's when they start trying
8	to improve their enforcement and so on.
9	So the consultative and the cooperative
10	mechanisms are essential, but they're by no means
11	sufficient and, in fact, pretty meaningless on their
12	own. So they're a good supplement to enforceable
13	commitments.
14	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Does the panel
15	have any other questions?
16	(No response.)
17	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Ms.
18	Lee.
19	Our next witness is Mr. Steve Lamar,
20	Senior Vice President of the American Apparel and
21	Footwear Association.
22	MR. LAMAR: Thank you, Madame Chairman.

My name is Steve Lamar, and I'm Senior Vice President of American Apparel and Footwear Association. We're the U.S. national trade association of the apparel and non-rubber footwear industries.

On behalf of AAFA, I'm pleased to offer comments on the FTAA, and I wish to offer the following observations which I closely track many of the points that we've made in previous submissions to USTR in this process.

First and foremost, the FTAA should provide an efficient means to manufacture, distribute, and service customer demands within the Americans.

The ability to operate in a transparent and predictable business environment is paramount.

Within the FTAA, the ability to move product free of all tariffs and non-tariff barriers must be guaranteed, in addition to eliminating duties for goods that originate in the FTAA, the final agreement should require all FTAA countries to prohibit determining fees and other special and other special assessments that are imposed on eligible

shipments.

Likewise the agreement should prohibit reference pricings or customs valuation practices that discriminate against imports as well as serve no functional value other than statistical reporting.

The final agreement should explicitly provide provisions for those goods that are currently afforded duty free entry under NAFTA, CBTPA, and the recently enacted Andean Program.

Because these last two programs expire for beneficiary countries once the FTA takes effect, it's imperative that benefits conferred by those provision be captured in some sort of seamless manner by the FTAA such that companies operating under those programs do not experience gaps in market access.

Regarding rules of origin, we're dismayed to see that some countries are still contemplating special rules for of origin on textiles and apparel. By that I mean Chapters 50 through 63.

As noted previously, we strongly favor the approach taken in the so-called Holbrooke Cardin rules, which is consistent with a single tariff shift

This confers origin based on assembly. 1 approach. 2 Likewise on footwear, we support the 3 tariff shipped approach and do not favor extension of the NAFTA rule to the FTAA and particularly regarding 4 the prohibition of unformed uppers. 5 6 Our sticker rule (phonetic), while 7 appearing to promote regional input, merely imposes restraints that drive production and trade out of the 8 9 free trade area. We think that should be discouraged. 10 On safequards, the FTAA should have strict 11 limitations both on the thresholds that must be triggered before they can be used, as well as on the 12 13 duration and ability to be on the -- safequards that 14 are extended. Safeguards should sunset automatically 15 16 unless the complaining party can affirmatively prove the continuation of the injury. The process should be 17 18 both transparent and predictable. 19 Customs operations, including 20 documentation requirements, should reflect practices 21 of the trade. Companies should not be required to 22 keep or file paper work that is now kept in electronic

format or which is no longer generated for legitimate 1 2 commercial reasons. 3 Extraneous paper work providing logistical obstacles and costs can greatly undermine the gains 4 associated with the FTAA. 5 6 the same time, we strongly favor 7 harmonization of customs operations to encourage the border free environment within the hemisphere. 8 9 is a key goal of the FTAA. 10 The customs should be designed to permit 11 a 24 hours, seven day per week operation with one 12 single filing of shipment header data in order to 13 export and import the related shipments. Each member 14 country should also commit to preventing the movement 15 of illegal narcotics, illegal aliens, and tariffs, 16 weapons, and commercial cargo. 17 Sanctity of trademarks is critical to the 18 our apparel and footwear brands. health of Wе 19 strongly favor protections for trademarks as part of 20 a comprehensive IPR monitoring and enforcement regime. the 21 As AAFA favors in NAFTA, the 22 development of harmonized labeling schemes to bring the different countries' care origin, ID, and fiber content labeling practices for garments and footwear and footwear prospective origin into a single standard.

AAFA members also strive to insure that the products are produced under legal, ethical, and humane conditions. We endorse the worldwide responsible apparel productions. The acronym is WRAP, which contains 12 principles that are monitored through an independent factory inspection program.

More than a dozen other organizations in the hemisphere have endorsed this program as well. These principles reflect and promote fair labor, antinarcotics, security environment, and anti-transshipment goals.

Finally, as with the WTO agreement on government procurement, the appropriate annex, and if we can convey this to the government procurement people who I guess are not here today, the appropriate annex should note that the United States retains the right to acquire the clothing and textiles produced for the U.S. Department of Defense to be made in the

U.S. entirely of U.S. inputs. 1 2 This tracks an important national security 3 principle known as the Barry Amendment that has been a central component of U.S. procurement law for more 4 than half a century, and which was recently reendorsed 5 6 by the U.S. Congress. 7 And with that very simple statement, we'll take any questions. 8 9 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very 10 much, Mr. Lamar. 11 Questions will be asked by Andrea Malito of the Department of Commerce and Betsy White of the 12 13 Department of Labor. 14 MS. MALITO: Thank you. 15 Good morning. Thank you for your remarks, 16 Mr. Lamar. 17 I wanted to explore with you a little bit 18 your experiences through your successes in working 19 with the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Production, 20 with WRAP, and wondering from that experience what 21 recommendations you might make for insuring that 22 the United products imported into States are

manufactured responsible.

MR. LAMAR: The key to WRAP, I think, is education. It's getting different people aware of the program. The way the WRAP program works is it sort of build into the marketplace the requirements to produce garments under socially responsible conditions. It works basically by getting people at the factory manager level aware of what they need to do.

The factories put in place those processes and procedures so that when somebody wants to inspect that factory, they know that the procedures and the activities that they're doing are not things that are going to be in place that day, but are things that are backed up by record keeping, by extensive experience.

And one of the things that we've learned is when you show people a code of conduct versus -- WRAP is 12 principles. Other codes of conduct have ten, 12, 15, whatever they might be.

People will look at them and say, "Gee, this is a no-brainer. We need to do this."

But when you back it up by, well, in order to prove this, you have to be able to answer these 45

questions affirmatively. In order to be able to answer those 45 questions affirmatively, you have to be able to do these 216 things.

And pretty soon people say, "Geez, you mean I've got to keep records on this person and this person and this person and this practice and how I do this?"

And that takes a while to build some of those practices into the system, and we find that a lot of factory managers are signing up for the program. I think WRAP is about to hit 1,000 factories that have applied for the program and are doing very, very well.

But as they sign up for this program, people look at these very thick books they get and say, "Wow, that's a lot of work that we've got to go through." So then there's a little bit of reality. So part of it is training at the factory level, what they need to do.

In many cases it's documenting the practices through all that you're doing so they can prove it to an unbiased party that, in fact, they're doing these things because people have some security.

A lot of it also is making sure that more information about the program gets out. The way that our industry communicates the program is through the buyer-seller relationship. Retailers-importers are increasingly beginning to require that garments that are imported from factories or that are made in factories, whether they're made in the U.S. or whether they're made offshore, are made under WRAP principles.

Already we have to require that the garments are made in compliance with a number of other practices that might occur. Labeling practices, for example comes to mind or flammability, antiflammability for fabric, and this is just one more requirement that people will put in place.

In order to get business, you've got to meet the requirements of WRAP, and so people start signing up for WRAP, and these are just some of the ways.

What it ends up doing is that it really ends up building into the marketplace how, you know, good labor needs to be done. And as I said, it also addresses anti-narcotics, environmental issues, anti-

trans-shipment. Anti-security falls in there as well as part of the narcotics component.

MS. WHITE: I'd sort of like to build on your response to that question and just ask if you can give some examples of some tangible results in specific factories and how do factories react to the idea that there may -- I assume there are independent inspectors that come in. Has there been like a relationship between an inspection and improvements?

MR. LAMAR: Yeah. From what I understand, and I'm not privy to the reports that come in, it will go through the WRAP, which is a separate entity from our association, a separate board, and they evaluate the reports that come in.

What will happen is when reports come in that demonstrate a need for corrective action -- and as I understand it, there's actually two levels of corrective action. There was corrective action where something that's in jeopardy, you know, a worker's health is in jeopardy, environmental health is in jeopardy, and those need to be fixed immediately, and those are done sort of on the spot, and then there are

ones where it may not be an immediate requirement, but it's certainly something that has to be complied with before certification can be generated for that facility.

But as I understand it though, there are times where there have been a number of cases where individual factories have had to go and approve their activities, either put in place a procedure to demonstrate compliance with something or to start doing that in the first place.

I mean they may not have realized that the law said you can't hire anyone under a certain age. They were, you know, not aware of what that law was, and that kind of goes back to another answer to your question before.

One of the things that the folks at WRAP have been telling us is that the foreign labor departments have really been finding WRAP program very useful to them because it kind of gives them a road map. They know that when they're working with WRAP factories -- and these are factories that are used to the concept of people coming in, performing an

evaluation, making sure that things are up to code, and in some cases that may not have really been done before.

In other cases, the WRAP people have gone

In other cases, the WRAP people have gone to the labor departments, and in several cases at the labor departments' invitation, and helped train them on what the principles of the WRAP were all about.

So if the foreign labor inspectors are going to different factories, they know what standards that factory is shooting for. So they've got their own laws. They've got their WRAP codes of conduct, whatever other codes of conduct might be out there so that they have sort of a base of where they're going from.

And then thirdly, it also gives them a sense that they've got, say, 200 factories to work for, to inspect and 63 of them have been certified by WRAP or some other organization. Then maybe they can concentrate their resources on the 137 or so that are not.

It doesn't mean they're going to ignore the 63, but it gives them a place to concentrate some

their resources, where no inspection may have 1 2 occurred. And that's one of the other experiences 3 that we're finding. Steve, how would you answer 4 MR. HARMAN: the argument that the single transformation rule would 5 6 allow something of a unilateral windfall to the likes 7 of, say, China on fabric if all that has to be done is mere assembly into garments in this country? 8 9 MR. LAMAR: The more requirements you put 10 on the assembly of garments means there is more 11 documentation, and there's more hurdles and costs associated with the input, which each of those acts as 12 13 a slight disincentive to the production of 14 ultimate garment in that region. 15 The best example is our experience under 16 the Caribbean Basin. The Caribbean Basin is a U.S. 17 fabric, and the fabric itself has to be made with U.S. 18 yarn, as you know. And that supply chain has to be 19 fairly extensively documented. 20 And what we're finding is that the cost of fabric and the yard plus the supply chain 21 the

documentation sometimes eats up the duty preference

and then more that's quoted under the program.

And what that does is that chases the entire assembly out of the preference program entirely, and so people find that it's cheaper to produce the entire garment made entirely from Chinese fabric, entirely from Indonesian yarn or whatever it might be, in China or wherever it might be, brought back to the U.S. and paid full duty, will be less expensive than the garment that's produced inside the preference program with the hemisphere.

We're starting to see this in NAFTA as well. If, however, you are locating a production there, you acquire the assembly to be done, the inputs can come from a lot of different places.

Then what you see is a very strong interest in people producing there. Yeah, they won't have to use U.S. fabric or U.S. yarn. It doesn't mean they won't. It means they don't have to. They still can do that.

In fact, they may find that they want to do it, use U.S. fabric, U.S. yarn, U.S. cotton. It gives a lot of different flexibility, and the inputs

can ultimately be used. 1 2 We think that the more you can attract the 3 apparel production to this hemisphere, the more likely 4 you're going to generate a customer for some part of the textile chain, whether it's the cotton, the yarn 5 6 or the fabric, maybe all three, the trimmings, the 7 equipment makers. SURO-BREDIE: 8 CHAIRPERSON Any other 9 questions? 10 (No response.) 11 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very 12 much, Mr. Lamar. 13 Our next witness is Charlene Stocker, 14 Senior International Services Manager, American 15 Association of Exporters and Importers. 16 Good morning. 17 MS. STOCKER: Good morning. On behalf of 18 the members of the American Association of Exporters 19 Importers and the million of their employees 20 across the country, let me thank the Office of the 21 U.S. Trade Representative and the members of the Trade

Policy Staff Committee for initiating public dialogue

on the free trade area of the Americas and providing us this opportunity to provide some input.

My oral comments this morning will be brief. Although construction of a hemisphere trade agreement is an enormously complex, we believe it is important to remain focused on a few goals.

First, the United States and other countries at the negotiating table should use the FTAA to comprehensively remove trade barriers. You may be thinking, "Well, of course, free trade agreements should remove trade barriers." But, in fact, free trade agreements often leave significant barriers in place.

For example, as sweeping as the NAFTA appeared to be when it was signed, its trade benefits are subject to highly complex conditions, and many trade barriers were either dealt with superficially or kept off the table altogether.

When any party negotiating a trade agreement insists on protecting one or more of its sensitive areas, the other parties will also insist on retaining an equivalent level of protection for their

own weak players.

The aggregate of all these protections is large in the NAFTA with only three parties involved. If we repeat that in this hemisphere, the free trade agreement compromising all of the nations, the total of these carve-outs will be enormous.

Ironically, the very sectors where open competition could produce the greatest consumer benefits, there remains substantial protection.

We encourage our FTAA negotiators to depart from the tradition of seeking exemptions for our inefficient industries that we pay for by giving others at the table reciprocal exemptions that lock out our competitive exporters.

I would like to focus my remarks on three specific areas: regional value content, certification of eligibility for preference, and protection of confidential information.

We urge you to keep the rules of the agreement simple, particularly with regard to trade and goods. Free trade cannot be achieved in a regional agreement by simply eliminating the tariffs.

Tariff elimination in a regional agreement is always 1 2 conditional. 3 Ιf the cost of complying with 4 condition approaches or exceeds the cost of the duty waived, nothing is accomplished. Let me reiterate the 5 6 that we made in our written statements. 7 Government should seek to limit to the extent passable the use of regional value content as a criterion for 8 9 preferential treatment. 10 In general, value content rules under the

In general, value content rules under the NAFTA have been extremely onerous for traders. The FTAA is unlikely to reach its full potential for success if similar cumbersome value content rules are adopted in FTAA.

Therefore, AAEI urges USTR to work toward an agreement based on more straightforward tariff ship rules. A hemispheric trade agreement often potentially enormous economic and political benefits, but only if the government involved can see more of it as less than tax loopholes.

Revenue authorities have an unfortunate tendency to see themselves as losers in free trade

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agreements. They typically react by making it unnecessarily difficult and even perilous for traders to claim a tax exemption.

The tendency already is appearing in the FTAA. Our own government representatives should not give it encouragement. One of the most useful innovation in the NAFTA is that it places primary responsibility for certifying eligibility on the goods on the producers and the exporters.

This tacitly acknowledges the futility of placing that responsibility on the importer. Because the NAFTA importer may responsibly, but not recklessly rely on a certificate executed by a responsible party in another NAFTA country, the importer's risk is limited to the payment of duties. The certificate is shown to be invalid if that happens.

Barring knowledge of reckless ignorance of a certificate's flaws, there is no importer liability for penalties. That liability is placed where it belongs, on the producer and the exporter who execute invalid certificates.

Because the risk is limited, importers in

NAFTA countries are more likely to utilize the NAFTA by seeking suppliers in other NAFTA countries. Without this, the NAFTA's effect would undoubtedly have been more limited.

Unfortunately, we understand that an effort is already underway to roll back this advance in the FTAA. To revert to the previous practice of holding an importer responsible for the validity of certificates executed by foreign manufacturers could be lethal to the FTAA.

If USTR intends the FTAA to be more than merely another notch in its trade agreement belt, if it wants the FTAA to have a real effect on trade patterns within this hemisphere, and if it wants it to happen in this decade, it must design the FTAA to create an environment in which millions of people who don't know each other are willing to do business with each other and able to do so without taking unreasonable risk.

That environment cannot exist if importers are subject to penalties for the mistakes of their new foreign business partners. The United States and its

partners in the hemisphere should use the FTAA to begin to build a zone of confidence in which the high percentage of goods in trade can cross borders without inspection or special documentation.

This is desirable for a couple of reasons.

First, it reduces the time and cost involved in the transaction between FTAA partners, which makes free trade in FTA efficient and effective.

And, second, as trade grows, the part of the FTAA in the countries whose borders regulatory agencies continue to perform their mission in conventional ways will be unable to expand and keep pace. They will increasingly interfere with trade and be less effective at their important mission.

In our written statement, we suggested several ways in which the FTAA partners can begin to build a zone of confidence that goes beyond the conventional framework of trade agreements. I will not repeat those recommendations here, but I would like to mention one confidence building measure that is easy to implement and critical to my company, Proctor & Gamble and to all of the members of the

AAEI: agreement on protection of confidential information.

Once the FTAA is operational, customs administrations in the FTAA countries will have more information than they've had in the past and more information about more companies. We acknowledge the need of government to have trade information for revenue collection, health and safety protection, effective and efficient court operations, and especially border security.

However, businesses need from these governments in which they entrust this data a commitment to insure its confidentiality. There are very few companies that will risk disclosure of critical information simply to obtain the benefits that the FTAA has to offer.

The FTAA government should acknowledge and respect business' concerns that this information should not be publicly shared. The FTAA represents a huge economic opportunity for the United States. We should focus on the gain mainly because the U.S. market is already largely open to trade from other

FTAA markets. 1 2 Specifically, by the time the negotiators 3 begin in earnest in this session, 28 of our 33 FTAA trading partners will already have duty free access to 4 the U.S. trade market, while the U.S. will only have 5 6 duty free access to three. We are delighted to see 7 we're moving toward an FTAA. It has been long awaited. 8 9 We are pleased that we're taking the 10 initiative promptly, shortly after receiving 11 negotiating authority. We hope that you and your 12 counterparts in the government will use the FTAA to 13 create an FTAA which is not bound by trade hostile 14 counterparts of the past, but opens the world to the 15 free trade in this hemisphere. 16 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very 17 much, Ms. Stocker. 18 The first question will be asked 19 Bennett Harman, and then we'll turn to Andrea Malito 20 for the Commerce Department. 21 Thank you. MR. HARMAN:

You addressed the issue of where the

liability is assigned in the transaction, and in our experience there have been some challenges with holding exporters responsible in third countries when you're relying on the jurisdiction of foreign governments.

Could you speak to the argument that it should be possible for importers to build into their contracts the liability, which we would in one scenario impose on imports in the case of invalid --

MS. STOCKER: The exporter is the only person who has made and taken that good and is claiming it is of origin of that country. They're the only ones who have the information of all o their supplies and can meet the regulations with regard to the transformation or the content or whatever is necessary in that.

If you move that good or that responsibility, it has to be with that exporter, and if a contractual agreement is made between an importer that says the exporter must supply that, that is possible. However, we would like that documentation to be included in the export as it moves through the

system so that everyone in the whole chain has the information and that there won't be any question with regard to reversal and removal of that benefit one the import is finally made in the country of delivery.

MS. MALITO: Thank you.

I had a question regarding your comments about business confidential information. You said that you felt it was important that governments respect the confidentiality. I was curious whether there were any particular practices that you were aware of that caused concerns, and also whether there were any specific procedures that you might have in mind that would allay some of the concerns that you've expressed.

MS. STOCKER: Yes. Some of the issues come in regard to the accumulation of the data under the harmonized tariff codes. If the data is offered on a country-by-country basis or industry-by-industry basis, it isn't of concern. It's where this information is tied specifically to an exporter or an identification importer's number, where other companies, therefore, could look at the data and know

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what the marketing plans of a particular company are. 1 2 So as an example, with Proctor & Gamble, 3 if we would be moving X product or a soap manufactured product from Country A to Country B, they are able to 4 read or our competition is able to read that we have 5 6 marketing plans for moving special kinds of soap from 7 Country A to Country B, and then that could be circumvented by another company. 8 9 So what we like to see is an accumulation 10 and not a specific reporting by individual company 11 names and identification numbers. Some of the examples currently are in the 12 13 PEERS data that exists and that you have to 14 specifically request to not have your data be reported in the PEERS, if you're familiar with the PEERS 15 16 system. And it takes a lot to get your name and information out of PEERS, especially when you're a 17 18 company like us that are 27, 28 different EIN numbers. 19 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: As there are no 20 further questions, we thank you, Ms. Stocker. 21 MS. STOCKER: You're welcome. 22 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: We welcome back

1	to USTR our next witness, Ambassador Myles Frechette,
2	President of the Council of the Americas.
3	Good morning. We'll give a minute for
4	everybody to collect testimony.
5	Can those in the back hear the witnesses
6	and the response?
7	PARTICIPANTS: No.
8	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Could those in
9	the back move forward then? Because otherwise we
10	will have amplification this afternoon. I will also
11	ask the witnesses please to speak loudly so you can be
12	heard even though your back is turned to the public.
13	Okay. We will start now then with our
14	next witness, Ambassador Myles Frechette.
15	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: Good morning. I'm
16	Ambassador Myles Frechette, President of Council of
17	the Americas. It's a pleasure to be here to talk
18	about the free trade area of the Americas, the FTAA,
19	that we've been talking about for so long.
20	This is an undertaking that will lead to
21	the economic empowerment of 800 million people in 34
22	democratic countries currently producing some \$13

trillion in output.

I'm especially pleased to be here with you today because ten years ago I was on the other side of the microphone. From 1990 to 1993, I was Assistant USTR for Latin America, the Caribbean, and Africa.

At that time, one of my key responsibilities as the Enterprise for the Americas initiative, which helped to crystallize sentiment in the hemisphere for a free trade agreement that embraces the entire region and laid the ground work for the current effort.

I'm very pleased to be back here at USTR, this time with the Council of the Americas, as this long process moves toward a successful conclusion.

As you know, the Council of the Americas is a business organization dedicated to promoting open markets, economic integration, democracy and the rule of law in the Western Hemisphere. In a meaningful way, the free trade area of the Americas is the council's very reason for existence.

As I alluded to earlier, the concept of hemispheric free trade zone is not a new one. The

current effort is the culmination of decades, perhaps even centuries of thought, dialogue, and economic development.

Since 1965, the Council of the Americas has helped to move that dialogue forward as a leading voice for hemispheric business. We have published reports. We've hosted conferences, led lobbying campaigns, and we've brought people together around the hemisphere, all in support of hemispheric economic integration.

Through numerous administrations, the council has been at the forefront of efforts to bring this hemisphere together. We were there for the Canada-U.S. or U.S.-Canada free trade agreement. there for the North American free were We were there for the Caribbean Basin We were there for the Andean Trade initiative. Preference Act and the now ATPDEA. We were there for every day of the extensive campaign that recently resulted in the reauthorization of trade promotion authority, the TPA.

Now, as we have been since 1965, we are

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here for the FTAA, which we believe offers tremendous opportunities for the United States and its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.

The council believes that the benefits of trade and open markets are apparent and well documented. Our own series of reports on the impact of NAFTA have shown overwhelmingly positive results for the United States and for individual states.

We have often said, and we strongly believe that the FTAA holds similar benefits for the United States. And so we put our money where our mouth is. We broke our budget, and with the generous support of a number of our members, commissioned the study of the projected economic impact of a free trade area of the Americas on the United States.

Working with a trade partnership the council produced FTAA Blueprint for Prosperity. This one; I've also brought examples of earlier product in support of the NAFTA and then sort of complementing the NAFTA imports in America, the rest of the story.

This Blueprint for Prosperity is a report that maps the current trends in U.S. trade with the

Western Hemisphere, incorporates an update of the council's heralded NAFTA Delivers for America reports, and projects the impact of the elimination of tariffs and other barriers to trade on the United States.

The economic projections were performed on

The economic projections were performed on national, state-by-state, and sector-by-sector bases.

First of all, the report shows that trade with the Western Hemisphere is already important to the U.S. economy. Western Hemisphere trade accounts for 44 percent of total U.S. exports, more than with any other part of the world.

Total trade with the FTAA countries was \$784 billion in 2000, and this trade has been growing about 11 percent a year on average, again, more than any other part of the world.

To put this in perspective, FTAA trade surpasses U.S. trade with the European Union or with the Asian Pacific Rim countries combined, and as our studies note, quote, the bulk of those exports is manufactured goods, particularly high value machinery and equipment. Chemicals and related products and steel and steel products are also important, unquote.

Services trade has also been significant.

Again, the United States had greater service for its

FTAA countries than it did to Europe as a whole, or to

Africa and the Middle East and Asia and the Pacific

combined. I probably don't need to point out that

those services exports involve neither pumping gas nor

flipping burgers.

A large part of Western Hemisphere trade, of course, is accounted for by our active partners, and the NAFTA record is a fitting indicator of the likely benefits of the FTAA. In the first six years of the NAFTA, U.S. trade with Canada and Mexico increased by 124 percent, to \$656 billion comprising one third of all U.S. trade.

Under NAFTA, a number of U.S. industrial sectors have experienced export growth to Mexico and Canada of over 100 percent. As of 2000, for example, the petroleum refining sector has posted a whopping 221 percent gain.

The United States has benefitted from foreign investment as well as export growth as a result of NAFTA. In the first seven years of NAFTA,

Canadian investment in the United States increased by 144 percent to over \$126 billion. Mexican investment in the U.S., although much smaller, also increased by 20 percent.

And I would be remiss if I failed to mention the salutary effects of imports on competitiveness, inflation, and standards of living in the United States. This is the subject of an earlier council report, "Imports on America: the Rest of the Story," which I displayed for you a few moments ago, and this was produced in cooperation with the National Retail Federation.

Even without the benefit of a free trade area, in 2000 U.S. exports to non-NAFTA FTAA countries exceeded U.S. exports to Japan and were four times greater than exports to China. With the FTAA, the council study shows that the United States could enjoy further NAFTA-like benefits, increasing national income by \$6.3 billion annually with full implementation.

These gains result, in part, from projected export gains in such areas as nonelectric

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machinery and equipment, motor vehicles and parts, wearing apparel and primary food production.

In a regional breakdown, our study demonstrates that the FTAA would result in income gains for every region of the United States ranging from 1.2 billion each in the northeast and west to 1.7 billion in the midwest and topped by a 2.2 billion gain in the south.

These gains are the outgrowth of more efficient allocation of resources and lower prices to consumers, resulting from the elimination of trade and investment barriers.

While our report shows substantial and across-the-board gains for the United States from the FTAA, we believe that no study can complete capture the full gains from open trade. Trade is a dynamic factor in economic growth that generates hope, opportunity, and ultimately higher living standards for the U.S. and its neighbors.

Hemispheric trade liberalization through the FTAA also goes hand in hand with a broad array of health, education, labor, environmental, and other

initiatives that make up the Summit of the Americas' 1 2 agenda. 3 The FTAA is the central economic component of that agenda, and it can be the driver for a wide 4 5 range of social, governmental, and 6 improvements throughout the Western Hemisphere. 7 However, trade is not a panacea for the world's ills, and the success of the FTAA will depend 8 9 in large part on the success of the broader Summit of 10 the Americas' agenda. 11 The Council of the Americas has been there 12 since 1965. We will be there in the year 2005 and 13 beyond, working to secure the benefits of the FTAA and the Summit of the Americas' agenda for the United 14 15 States and all its democratic neighbors and partners 16 in the hemisphere. Thank you very much for giving me this 17 18 opportunity to share the council's views. I look 19 forward to working with you to make the FTAA a 20 reality. 21 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very 22 much, Ambassador Frechette.

1	I will ask the first question, and then I
2	will turn to Dan Leahy of the ITC.
3	I wonder if you could tell us a little bit
4	and we'll look forward to the document as part of
5	the record about the methodology of your study, how
6	you went about sort of putting it together and where
7	the sources are from.
8	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: This was done
9	before I arrived at the council. Can one of you tell
10	me more?
11	AMBASSADOR PRICE: Sure. The methodology
12	was basically we checked the statistics from a whole
13	wide variety, had an economic model. The report
14	itself gives a very detailed explanation of the
15	methodology we went through. We hired people that
16	really are very respected.
17	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: We'll submit a
18	copy of it for the record then.
19	Thank you.
20	MR. LEAHY: Ambassador, a pleasure to see
21	you.
22	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: Good to see you.

1	MR. LEAHY: As you know, the ITC also does
2	a fair amount of reporting on the impacts of trade
3	agreements. We've done extensive reporting already on
4	the FTAA and no doubt we'll do further reporting in
5	the future.
6	Your presentation talked about export
7	effects primarily in sectors that would benefit in the
8	U.S. from those exports. We often are asked to look
9	at the other side of the equation, the import effects.
10	Does your study also point out sectors where there's
11	likely to be substantial increases in imports in the
12	U.S. market?
13	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: We focus primarily
14	on the export effect on the United States.
15	MR. LEAHY: Are there sections also that
16	touch on the other?
17	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: I don't think so.
18	No, it does not.
19	MR. LEAHY: That was essentially my
20	question. I was just curious to see what you may have
21	come up with on that and how it may match up with the
22	work the ITC has been doing.

1	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: Sure.
2	MR. LEAHY: Thank you.
3	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Any other
4	questions?
5	MS. WHITE: I have a question about the
6	import effects, too, because it seems to me trade is
7	a two-way street. Sometimes goes up and something
8	might go down.
9	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: Sure, but you can
10	understand that one of the things that we're trying to
11	do is to get people in every state to focus on the
12	export effects of the FTAA. Historically that has
13	been one of the big struggles, as it was in the NAFTA.
14	I was around when we were talking to the
15	private sector about the NAFTA, and the export effect
16	was, of course, one of the key issues of interest I
17	remember at the time. That was the figure that the
18	governors of most states were really focused on, and
19	as I recall at the time, we had considerable support
20	from the governors from virtually every state in the
21	nation.
22	MS. BOWIE-WHITMAN: May I ask a question?

1	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Yes, of course.
2	MS. BOWIE-WHITMAN: Just as a follow-up
3	question to the others then, in your oh, Barbara
4	Bowie-Whitman from the Department of State.
5	As a follow-up question then, the
6	estimates that are done of these regional income gains
7	for the various regions of the country are based on
8	estimates that deal with increased exports rather than
9	some of the effects upon income that people might have
10	from consuming at lower prices.
11	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: Yes, they are based
12	primarily on that, but we're going to leave you copies
13	of these, and I hope that you will enjoy these.
14	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Any more
15	questions?
16	(No response.)
17	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: No. If not,
18	thank you very much, Ambassador Frechette.
19	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: Thank you. It's
20	good to see you all. Nice to be here.
21	There's a ten-page explanation of that.
22	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Great. Thank

1	you.
2	AMBASSADOR FRECHETTE: No, that's okay.
3	No, no. I was going to actually make a plea that on
4	the ATPA and other trade benefits of a unilateral
5	nature that will be expiring about the time that the
6	FTAA comes in, that there will be a seamless
7	communication between the two so that we don't see
8	some retrogression, but it was just an aside.
9	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: We'll see that
LO	the council helps us with that.
L1	(Laughter.)
L2	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you.
L3	Our next witness is Peter Mangione I
L4	hope I'm pronouncing this correctly of the Footwear
L5	Distributors and Retailers of America.
L6	MR. MANGIONE: Good morning.
L7	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Good morning.
L8	Did I pronounce your name correctly?
L9	MR. MANGIONE: I pronounce it Mangione in
20	Washington, but the rest of the world, it's Mangione.
21	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Well, we'll
22	pronounce it the way it's pronounced in Washington.

MR. MANGIONE: Right. 1 Thank you. 2 I am Peter Mangione, President of Footwear 3 Distributors and Retailers of America. FDRA's members account for about three 4 quarters of all footwear sold at retail in the U.S. 5 6 and for the vast bulk of imported footwear into the 7 U.S. We're pleased to appear today to urge that 8 9 imported into the U.S. all duties on footwear 10 manufactured in countries covered by the FTAA be eliminated entirely on day one of the implementation 11 12 of that agreement. 13 I make this recommendation for several 14 First, with import penetration in the reasons. 15 footwear sector at 97 percent based on 2001 data which 16 became available this week, our duties on footwear 17 have lost all relevance and have no commercial 18 significance. 19 This is so because the price of imported 20 footwear after application of MFN duties is vastly 21 cheaper than U.S. produced shoes. Indeed, the 22 differential between U.S. manufactured and imported

shoes ranges, after application of U.S. duties, from 1 2 between 60 percent lower to 40 percent lower, 3 depending on category. This is the most important thing I've said 4 and will say today: that after application of the 5 6 duties, imports are 60 to 40 percent lower priced. 7 Clearly, U.S. producers long ago lost the price battle with imports, and the price adjustment 8 9 mechanism, tariffs, are thus irrelevant and pointless. 10 Second, there is no connection between 11 continuance of tariffs and U.S. footwear manufacturing and The little remaining U.S. 12 its jobs. 13 production only survives by differentiating itself on bases other than price, such as brands, product 14 positioning, size and width strategies, and the like. 15 16 Indeed, in its most recent footwear 17 investigation involving shoe duties under NAFTA, the 18 ITC concluded, quote, domestically produced footwear 19 articles complete mostly on non-price factors, such as 20 brand names, product quality, and differentiation and 21 support services, end quote. We agree. 22 Elimination of duties will not affect

these strategies.

Third, shoe duties are a huge consumer tax. In 2001, more than \$1.6 billion was paid to the Treasury in shoe duties. This amounts to some 3.2 billion at retail applying normal mark-ups.

With only 19,000 U.S. shoe workers in the low shoe duty area, synthetic and leather footwear, this cost comes to some \$107,000 per job annually. The job cost is higher in the high duty area, the rubber footwear where there are some 2,600 U.S. shoe manufacturing jobs. The cost there is approximately \$430,000 per year per job.

Finally, it is clear that shoe manufacturing in FTAA countries is small, with the exception of Brazil, whose principal product, women's leather footwear. About 95 percent of the exports from Brazil are women's leather footwear, has long vanished from U.S. production in any meaningful way. There basically is no U.S. production of women's leather footwear.

The ten percent MFN duty on leather footwear, if zeroed in the FTAA, could help Brazilian

1	producers remain competitive with China's producers,
2	which dominate this sector.
3	I thank you for your attention.
4	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
5	much, Mr. Mangione.
6	Bennett Harman from USTR will be asking
7	questions.
8	MR. HARMAN: Are you arguing that tariffs
9	have zero effect or that they are relatively marginal
10	compared to other factors?
11	MR. MANGIONE: Tariffs only adjust price,
12	and in the case of footwear, imports are so much lower
13	priced after application of duties that they are
14	irrelevant.
15	Now, if the difference were a few points,
16	five percent, ten percent, we could argue that the
17	tariff makes some difference. But when the difference
18	is 60 percent, it is so drastically lower priced that
19	the tariffs are irrelevant.
20	And, in fact, if price were the only
21	criteria, the only criteria for determining whether to
22	buy import or domestic, there would be no U.S.

production. 1 2 The fact of the matter is there are other 3 considerations, brand being most important. A company that has its own brand that can control distribution 4 channels, marketing, has an opportunity to do what 5 6 They can produce here; they can produce 7 abroad. Ιt becomes a question of return investment. 8 9 position is crystal But our 10 Tariffs don't matter in terms of competition. The 11 tariffs are too low. They're too low. They're just 12 Even the very high tariffs are not not high even. 13 high enough. Even in the very high tariff area, 14 imports can still enter the country 40 percent lower 15 after application of the tariffs. 16 MR. HARMAN: Also, let me ask you --Can I follow up on that? 17 MS. WHITE: 18 MR. HARMAN: Okay. 19 MS. WHITE: I'm Betsy White. 20 So if tariffs don't matter, then what is 21 Why should they be lower? your concern?

MR. MANGIONE: Have you looked at the

tariff schedule on footwear? Have you ever seen it? 1 2 MS. WHITE: Yes, I have. 3 MR. MANGIONE: It is the most complicated 4 tariff schedule there is. It is a nightmare. Μy office is filled with thousands of rulings. 5 We want to eliminate all of the Mickey 6 7 Mouse activity in this sector. It inhibits design and Every shoe imported in the United States 8 marketing. 9 is done to the tariff, not because of the duty 10 necessarily, but because to meet the requirements of 11 the tariff. 12 The tariff was written over 75 years ago 13 in an entirely different environment where subtle 14 distinctions had dramatic effect on duty. 15 subtlest distinction, I could bring before you two 16 shoes you could not tell the difference. They have no 17 commercial difference whatsoever. The duty on one 18 shoe would be 67 percent, and on the other it would be 19 six percent. 20 We don't need these complications in the We want to eliminate this horrible nightmare 21 tariff. 22 of a tariff.

1	We also would like to offer these products
2	to the consumer at the best price. We sell a lot more
3	product when we can price to the market and not have
4	to deal with government's intervention. And that's
5	why we want to get rid of the tariffs, and they are a
6	huge consumer cost.
7	In fact, I think they represent something
8	on the magnitude of ten percent of all tariffs in a
9	sector which has 97 percent important penetration. In
10	2001, they had 97 percent. This year it will probably
11	be 98 percent.
12	I'm sorry. Did that respond to your
13	question?
14	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: I just wanted to
15	ask a follow-up question to that
16	MR. MANGIONE: Yes, ma'am.
17	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: question, Mr.
18	Mangione. If you had brought these two shoes in that
19	are totally identical, what does the tariff schedule
20	say about those shoes? What is the differentiation.
21	MR. MANGIONE: You're going to be sorry
22	you asked this question, but I'll try to answer.

1 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: I'm never sorry. 2 MR. MANGIONE: I will try to answer it. 3 It deals with a subject called foxing and foxing-like band, and this is a -- foxing is a term 4 well understood in the shoe business. 5 It is a strip 6 of material which connects the sole and the upper. 7 can be on a leather shoe. It can be on a synthetic It can be on a rubber shoe. 8 shoe. 9 If you think to the Converse All Star --10 I'm sorry I didn't bring any samples this morning --11 but if you think of the Converse All Star, it's that 12 strip of rubber that goes around the base. That's a 13 foxing. We all know what it is. It's a well 14 15 defined footwear term. We can all identify a foxing. 16 But in its infinite wisdom in 1964, when the Ways and Committee wrote the present 17 tariff, 18 inserted a phrase "foxing-like band." This is a band 19 that's not a foxing, but it's like a foxing. 20 And this has created untold and endless 21 amounts of dispute, litigation, rulings on what it 22 What it has basically come down to is constitutes.

the slightest overlap, the slightest overlap on an outsole for synthetic and rubber footwear can constitute a foxing, and this can change the duty from 67 or from six percent to 67 percent.

It's this feature, this foxing-like band, which is not a shoe term; it has nothing to do with the shoe industry. It was created by the Ways and Means Committee, which frankly, I don't know what they were thinking about, but it was so long ago, but this is the criteria.

And government has grappled with this concept for these last 35 years, and it has created a nightmare, and it has also inhibited design. A moon boot, for example, which was a wonderful product, had a high sheen, and I remember. We don't sell them anymore because the Customs Service decided that was a foxing-like band.

So the duty is not six percent on a normal synthetic boot. It's 67 or in this case 37 and a half percent. We don't sell them anymore.

This is why we want to get rid of these crazy rules and this crazy tariff. If it doesn't have

commercial significance -- this is what tariffs were 1 2 designed for, to equalize competition. If they no 3 longer have this capacity, chuck them because the 4 consumer is paying three and a half billion dollars a year for this privilege. 5 6 Yes, ma'am. 7 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Sorry. Just to follow up. 8 9 MR. MANGIONE: Sure. 10 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Then are you 11 saying that the effect of this in the case of your 12 moon boot, that the effect of the tariff did have an 13 effect on production? 14 MR. MANGIONE: We just no longer make moon 15 We make all kinds of rubber boots. We just 16 don't put it with that shaft. It was mostly, I think, because of science 17 18 fiction movies, and I mean, there was some interest in 19 this kind of look. Most shoes are designed for the 20 look, not the functionality. I mean, there are some 21 that are designed for functionality, but most are 22 designed for, you know, the emotional appeal that they

I mean, it's the reason women buy twice as 1 elicit. 2 many shoes as men. I mean, there's an emotional 3 content to footwear. It's a fashion item. We're not in the replacement business. 4 We're selling something on a magnitude of almost five 5 6 and a half pair per year per person. Certainly we 7 don't need five and a half pair per year to, quote, cover our feet. It deals with other things. 8 9 So we still sell lots of rubber boots, but 10 they're just not moon boots. We had to take the shaft 11 out. 12 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you. 13 MR. LEAHY: I have one question. I've dealt enough with the entire schedule to not ask you 14 15 questions about the tire schedule. So what I will ask 16 we had testimony earlier this morning about 17 domestic manufacturer making a decision to produce 18 here in the Unites States. 19 MR. MANGIONE: Yes. 20 Based on your testimony, it MR. LEAHY: 21 would be your view that that decision would be 22 completely free of any tariff implications. Otherwise

if the tariff was zero or 60 percent, it wouldn't make 1 2 any difference? 3 That's what I'm trying to get a feel for. How does it factor? 4 What's the difference 5 MR. MANGIONE: 6 between that producer and the 150 others who closed up 7 long ago? What's the difference? What's the I mean is this price is different? difference? 8 9 My answer would be no because why didn't 10 he close up ten years ago, five years ago when 150 11 others closed up? The answer is, and I'm not that familiar 12 13 with this particular company that was mentioned 14 earlier, but clearly they have survived on some basis 15 other than price, but you know, it's a question of 16 return on investment. Maybe they could continue to 17 survive in this mode, but they've decided they want to 18 take their investment and make a better return on it. 19 I remember vividly before you commission 20 about 20 years ago the President of Converse, who at 21 that time was making all of his shoes in Lumberton, 22 North Carolina, was asked by the chairman of the

1	commission, "Well, wouldn't your company make a lot
2	more money if you just made them in Korea and imported
3	them?"
4	And after he got red in the face, and he
5	had to answer, "Of course we would."
6	Well, this is a decision companies have to
7	make for themselves, how they want to deploy their
8	assets and what kind of return they want. Maybe you
9	could seek it out here with the right product
10	positioning. Maybe you can do better in Mexico. Good
11	luck. I don't know.
12	But these are decisions companies have to
12 13	But these are decisions companies have to make on their own, and our position is they make these
13	make on their own, and our position is they make these
13 14	make on their own, and our position is they make these decisions with or without the tariffs. It's not the
13 14 15	make on their own, and our position is they make these decisions with or without the tariffs. It's not the tariffs that drive these decisions. That's our
13 14 15 16	make on their own, and our position is they make these decisions with or without the tariffs. It's not the tariffs that drive these decisions. That's our position.
13 14 15 16 17	make on their own, and our position is they make these decisions with or without the tariffs. It's not the tariffs that drive these decisions. That's our position. CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr.
13 14 15 16 17	make on their own, and our position is they make these decisions with or without the tariffs. It's not the tariffs that drive these decisions. That's our position. CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr. Mangione.
13 14 15 16 17 18	make on their own, and our position is they make these decisions with or without the tariffs. It's not the tariffs that drive these decisions. That's our position. CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr. Mangione. MR. MANGIONE: Okay. My pleasure. Thank

1 MR. BAKER: Good morning.

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CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you.

MR. BAKER: For the record, my name is Brook Baker. I'm a law professor at Northeastern University in Boston, Massachusetts. I'm also a member of Health GAP, which stands for Health Global Access Project.

It's activist group that an seeks affordable medicines for people living with HIV/AIDS qlobally. At present over 40 million people are living with HIV, over 28 million in Africa. The second highest rate of incidence in the world is in the Caribbean, and we're here to testify today primarily about the intellectual property provisions of the proposed FTAA and to request, indeed, demand that the negotiating position of the U.S. change with regard to intellectual property protections, given significant advances in international understanding about the risks that the current intellectual property regime or an expanded regime would have to access to medicines worldwide.

Although the controls of the FTA seem

limited to the Western Hemisphere, there are features of the current negotiating position of the United States which would reduce access to medicines worldwide. I'd like to bring these matters to your attention so that the negotiating position of the U.S. will change in important ways.

As I'm sure all of you are aware, the current gold standard for intellectual property rights worldwide is reflected in the TRIPS agreement, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, one of the foundational agreements entered into, becoming effective in 1995. It came into existence at the same time as the WTO itself.

That agreement was the result of carefully calibrated concessions, negotiation positions, compromises to try to have a balanced intellectual regime, would property which have protections both for manufacturers and for industries that deal in intellectual property, but also for countries that need access to patented medicines for other purposes, particularly in our mind in response to public health crises.

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This past November, November 2001, there was a further negotiation at the WTO trying to clarify the interrelationship between the TRIPS agreement and public health. An important clarification was that all of the countries, member countries, at that time agreed that public health was primary. In fact, in Paragraph 4 of the agreement is, "We agree that the TRIPS agreement does not and should not prevent members from taking measures to protect public health."

Further, it says, "We affirm that the agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' rights to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all*."

to issue compulsory licenses ** deemed right by that sovereign nation.

In addition, the right of countries to comparison shop after a medicine had been placed in the stream of commerce by a patent holder or its affiliate, again, the country could comparison shop and parallel import if necessary.

The U.S. * it gave its word. It gave its word further that it would continue to negotiate this year with respect to the plight of smaller and poorer countries, particularly those that lack the industrial capacity to produce at meaningful economies of scale life saving medicines and would permit them to find a source of manufacturer outside their own boundaries.

In other words, the TRIPS provisions would be read so that a country could produce export life saving medicines to a country that lacked capacity to produce those medicines on its own.

The FTAA provisions on intellectual property were substantially drafted well in advance of the TRIPS clarification at Doha and reflect all goals of the U.S. with respect to intellectual property in light of public health.

If those goals continue to be pursued, then it is breaking its promise. It's breaking its promise to countries in Central and South America, and particularly the Caribbean, which has, as I said, the second highest rate of HIV in the world, and it breaks its promise to Africa where there are 28 to 30 million

people living with HIV, where two and a half million people will die this year.

most obvious way in which agreement breaks that promise is a provision in draft text which says that it would be unlawful for any country in the agreement to produce medicines for any other country under a compulsory if license. That is, Brazil to were issue compulsory license on grounds that were deemed permissible, it could not produce one pill for export to another country under the current draft text.

In addition, the current text of the agreement seeks to exclude compulsory licenses for anything except noncommercial governmental use, national emergencies, or to remedy anti-competitive practices.

These are perfectly valid terms upon which compulsory licenses might be granted, but the promise of Doha was that compulsory licenses could be granted on any terms deemed by the sovereign to be sufficient and particularly that they were appropriate in the context of public health.

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So in essence, through a subsequent and perhaps back door negotiation with the FTAA, the United States would be undoing the promises that it entered at Doha.

There are other provisions in the draft text which are problematic with respect to access to medicines at affordable prices for people living under a threat of death from HIV/AIDS. It seeks to and gives countries permission to extend patent terms beyond 20 years, again, rising prices.

It seeks to link the registration of medicines with the medicine's patent status, and it seeks to prevent the use of drug registration data on commercial confidentiality terms for five years, therefore preventing the use of registration data in clinical studies, for example, to prevent the registration of medicine even if that medicine is being produced under compulsory license.

In essence, if the government found itself in an emergency, it would still not necessarily have access to comparing its current product against the preexisting product and satisfying the registration

authority.

We hope that the continued draft text is merely an oversight on the part of the negotiators, that is, that having made solemn promises at Doha, that they've not gone back to the text in the FTAA, reviewed it under the new standards that insure access to medicines, and insured countries' rights to protect public health, and that there's simply some work to be done by negotiators to change that text.

I'd like to emphasize that there are other entities, the WTO and WHO, in particular, that have stated on a recent report that they interpret the Doha agreement to mean that countries should relinquish their rights to try to impose higher intellectual property standards on other countries, particularly countries that are attempting to address legitimate public health needs.

Health GAP is here today to assert that it would be unconscionable for the U.S. to go back on the promises made at Doha; that it should no longer seek maximum protection of intellectual property right for pharmaceutical companies; that lives hang in the

1	balance; that promises have been made; and that those
2	promises should be kept.
3	Thank you very much.
4	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
5	much, Professor Baker.
6	We'll turn to Kira Alvarez of USTR for our
7	first questions.
8	MS. ALVAREZ: Thank you, Professor. Thank
9	you for your comments. They were very interesting,
10	and we appreciate all of the input that we get on
11	these issues.
12	I want to ask a question concerning the
13	issues with respect to patent term extension and
14	linkage and data protection.
15	MR. BAKER: Yes.
16	MS. ALVAREZ: And particularly my question
17	is how does your proposal sort of square with current
18	U.S. law in this field.
18 19	U.S. law in this field. MR. BAKER: Well, our position squares
19	MR. BAKER: Well, our position squares

the world.

Presumably rich markets will continue to
protect IP and the profits of funds of companies will
be maintained. In poorer countries, in developing
countries, in Central and South America and in the
rest of the world, but in this case in the Western
Hemisphere, they would have some freedom to only adopt
TRIPS compliance standards, and those standards at
present do not require linkage between data
registration and excuse me between patent and
license excuse me drug registration. They do
not necessarily require patent extensions. They do
not necessarily require a five year protection of
clinical trial data.
So the countries could simply go to the
WTO standard rather than the TRIPS plus standard.
CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Questions?
MR. BAKER: We have a revised statement
I'd like to leave.
CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you.
MR. BAKER: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE:

Thank you very

1	much.
2	Our next witness is John Meakem, Manager,
3	International Trade, National Electrical Manufacturers
4	Association.
5	MR. MEAKEM: Good morning.
6	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Good morning,
7	Mr. Meakem.
8	MR. MEAKEM: I guess I'm one removed from
9	standing between you and lunch. So
LO	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Please don't let
L1	that stop you from testifying.
L2	MR. MEAKEM: Very good.
L3	Thank you for this opportunity to provide
L4	the following brief comments on the elimination of
L5	tariff and non-tariff barriers to trading goods and
L6	services through the free trade area of the Americas
L7	agreement or negotiations.
L8	NEMA, the National Electrical
L9	Manufacturers Association, is the largest trade
20	association representing the interests of U.S.
21	electric industry manufacturers. Our more than 400
22	member companies manufacture products used in the

generation, transmission, distribution, control, and use of electricity.

NEMA members, the majority of whom are

small to medium sized enterprises, very much want to increase their international sales. Many already do significant amounts of business in Europe and Canada, and they see Latin America's markets as a significant area for growth.

To help them expand in this direction,

NEMA is currently benefitting from a market

development cooperator program with the Department of

Commerce in support of our offices in Sao Palo and

Mexico City.

NEMA strongly supports establishment of a free trade area of the Americas. We have actively participated in previous Americas Business Forums, and we very much want to see the FTA or an FTA achieve NEMA priorities, such as tariff elimination.

One of our fundamental goals is the worldwide elimination of tariffs on electrical, electronic, and medical imaging equipment in our product scope. We support achievement of this

objective through, in addition to the FTAA, WTO, zero tariff elimination, regional agreements, indeed, such as the FTAA, and bilateral free trade agreements, including the U.S.-Chile agreement.

We've seen in the case of tariffs that a most prominent example is Mexico where since NAFTA our exports to Mexico have boomed, and we would very much welcome the chance to repeat that throughout the Americas.

And in FTAA we would also like to see endorsement of openness and transparency in government procurement, endorsement that there should be no governmental mutual recognition agreements for nonfederally regulated products. We'd like to see endorsement of energy services, liberalization, protection of intellectual property rights, WTO technical barriers endorsement of provisions.

We would like to see an inclusive definition of international standards, endorsement of voluntary market driven standards, as well as voluntary market driven conforming assessment, and as

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many other market opening measures as possible. 1 2 We hope that there will, of course, be 3 effective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, and we hope that the legitimate free trade benefits of the 4 FTAA would not be encumbered by, would not be blocked 5 6 or hindered by -- we would like to see as few labor 7 and environmental provisions as possible that would be serving to block or hinder legitimate free trade. 8 9 Thank you. 10 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very 11 much. Bennett Harman will ask questions for the 12 13 panel. MR. HARMAN: Could you elaborate a little 14 15 bit on the areas in the field of technical barriers to 16 trade where you think it might be useful for the FTAA 17 to build on, clarify, go beyond what already exists in 18 the WTO TBT agreement? 19 MR. MEAKEM: Well, in many ways, Bennett, 20 I think in a sense it's a little bit of a defensive We're hoping that FTA negotiations will 21 action. 22 result in anything that will tamper with what's

already on the books, and through our offices in Sao

Palo and Mexico City, we are working to make sure that
the practice lives up to the principles.

And we are hoping that the eventual FTAA

will fall in line and endorse what's already on the

books.

In terms of should there be any further advances on the WTO TBT, that's something which in a sense is a valid topic, but in many ways I'm looking to make sure that what's being negotiated now doesn't play around with what's already out there, and in terms of the draft that was made public last year with all of the many proposals, we look forward to working with you to week through them all and make sure there's nothing there that really tampers with what's already out on the books.

MR. HARMAN: By way of follow-up, do I interpret that some effort might be directed towards making sure that there is effective implementation in the region of the WTO TBT agreement, that there's more work to be done in that at a minimum?

MR. MEAKEM: I think that's something

1	we'll always be pursuing around the world.
2	MR. SMITH: I'm Russell Smith. I'm with
3	USTR.
4	Unfortunately our government procurement
5	negotiators are down negotiating or perhaps it's
6	fortunate that they're actually working on the
7	negotiation of this agreement, but one question that
8	came to their mind was that your testimony on
9	government procurement issues reflects an emphasis on
10	transparency.
11	Is it NEMA's view that focusing on
12	transparency is preferable to focusing on the
13	establishment of a rules based system, looking at the
14	market access components as well?
15	I mean is it just transparency that we
16	need or do we need more in the government procurement
17	area?
18	MR. MEAKEM: Well, I apologize if the way
19	we worded things diminished the value that we place on
20	having a rules based system. Clearly the two go hand
21	in hand.
22	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very

1	much, Mr. Meakem.
2	MR. MEAKEM: I have a revised version.
3	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
4	much.
5	MR. MEAKEM: Thank you.
6	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: We have been
7	told that Jean Hooloran, who was to testify, will not
8	be testifying and, therefore, this hearing is
9	adjourned until 1:45 in the same room.
LO	Thank you.
L1	(Whereupon, at 2:07 p.m., the hearing was
L2	recessed for lunch, to reconvene at 1:45 p.m., the
L3	same day.)
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1	A-F-T-E-R-N-O-O-N S-E-S-S-I-O-N
2	(1:50 p.m.)
3	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: This hearing
4	will come to order.
5	The first witness is Ellen Shaffer,
6	Director of the Center for Policy Analysis on Trade
7	and Health.
8	Dr. Shaffer.
9	DR. SHAFFER: Thank you for the microphone
10	and thank you for pure tap, unbottled water at the
11	table. I appreciate that.
12	And I will have some updated comments or
13	at least corrected comments.
14	Thank you for the opportunity to speak
15	with you today. I'm with the Center for Policy
16	Analysis on Trade and Health. We're a nonprofit
17	organization dedicated to improving population health
18	and expanding access to public health and vital human
19	services through research, policy analysis, and
20	advocacy.
21	We'd like to present a number of concerns
22	with a draft agreement from the perspective of public

health. I'd like to make a few summary comments and then talk about some of the justifications that are offered for expanding privatization and deregulation of health services and water, in particular, and of course, I'd love to hear your comments.

Defining vital human services, such as health care in water is tradable commodities, is relatively new and in conflict with an array of international accords that construe access to health care and water a basic public health and rights issues, as well as being essential to sustainable economic development.

The draft FTA agreement would facilitate further privatization and deregulation of vital human services, including health care and water. It proposes new powers for trade tribunals to override public health protections if they conflict with the interests of private corporations and thereby undermines the ability of public bodies to safeguard population health.

These provisions approach a range of public protections as barriers to trade, which

therefore warrant elimination. From a public health perspective, the evidence suggests that the reverse may be the case, that further privatization and deregulation presents a barrier to population health and requires greater scrutiny.

We, therefore, recommend the effects. The effects, of course, vary greatly between countries and within countries, given the vast disparities of wealth among and between nations. Just looking at the infant mortality rates in the U.S., which are seven per 1,000, and then in metropolitan Peru, which are in the range of 17 per 1,000, and then in rural Peru which are 84 per 1,000 live births.

Clearly, there are tremendous disparities that need to be taken account of and remedied.

Our recommendation is to exclude vital human services, such as water and health care, from the FTA negotiations.

A couple of additional points. There are clearly many pressing international health issues facing the world, and national and international bodies are only beginning to figure out how to

coordinate and grapple with effective methods for dealing with these critical health care threats.

The National Academy of Sciences and others have enumerated what some of these are. I heard this morning there is an outbreak of malaria in the Washington, D.C. area, certainly an issue that's endemic in much of the developing world, as is cholera, both preventable by clean water and sanitation methods.

Tuberculosis and AIDS, emerging drug resistant diseases, and of course, biohazards.

We don't yet have a common international language to measure and discuss health status, health care systems, trade in health services, or the effects of these on economic and personal well-being. It's not clear how the FTA or related WTO panels will define important terms related to public health, such as necessary, burdensome, and services.

In this context, imposing trade disciplines in the area of vital human services, such as health care and water, is misguided and likely to deter real solutions.

the justifications 1 Some of that are 2 offered for extending privatization and deregulation 3 and imposing trade disciplines include the issue that trade improves economic wealth and, therefore, health. 4 Certainly economic growth and wealth are 5 important underpinnings of population health and well-6 7 Under the currently rules, however, global being. trade has not improved economic growth or increased 8 9 wealth for most people in Latin America. Secondly, protecting population health 10 11 requires adequate funding for public health systems and universal coverage for individual medical care. 12 13 Deregulation and privatization of health care have 14 weakened public systems and accountability. 15 Again, there are new preventable and fatal 16 illnesses, such as Dinghy, hemorrhagic fever, which are emerging in the Americas, which require careful 17 18 necessarily addressed attention, not trade 19 disciplines. 20 I'm just going to go through three other 21 discussions. One is the trade and health care

opportunities

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presents

economic

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developing

countries. In fact, the net impact of globalization on population health will depend not necessarily just on economic activity, but the ability of each country to manage trade, including its regulatory environment.

And this point was emphasized on the joint WHO-WTO report that came out after you August 28th first deadline, but that really emphasized the importance of stable regulatory environments in order for population health to benefit from economic activity.

And in the case both of niche markets and migration of health care personnel, that point is well made.

Another argument is that private health insurance can reduce public expenditures for health, making health care systems more efficient. Again, without going into detail, which you'll find in my testimony, there's been pretty extensive experience with private insurance in Latin America, and the result has been increases in user fees and further growths in inequality and access to health care and a diminution of health status.

Finally, there's the discussion that privatization of water can expand access to water in developing countries and control costs in developing countries, such as the U.S. Multi-disciplinary fact-finding missions and in-depth case studies have concluded that privatization and deregulation of water generally result in harm to population health, increase costs, and decrease access to water and increase water related diseases, again, such as cholera and diarrheal diseases.

Privatization does not resolve crises associated with access to water.

In conclusion, we'd like to just reiterate two things: first of all, that we believe vital human services such as health care and water should be excluded from these negotiations. Certainly there's room for international cooperation, including health services and health professional organizations, in resolving these important issues about trade disciplines. Imposing trade disciplines on a time line of FTAA doesn't seem to be the way to proceed.

And I guess, secondly, we just want to ask

1	that since testimony is now being submitted
2	electronically, that the Joint Staff and the USTR
3	would consider making testimony publicly available on
4	the Net.
5	Thank you.
6	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: We're trying.
7	DR. SHAFFER: Good. Thank you.
8	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
9	much for your testimony, Dr. Shaffer.
10	Kimberly Claman, USTR, would like to ask
11	a question, and then other members of our panel,
12	including, I think, Barbara that's right. That's
13	the place to be.
14	DR. SHAFFER: And you're with USTR as
15	well?
16	MS. McLEOD: No, the Environmental
17	Protection Agency.
18	DR. SHAFFER: Thank you.
19	MS. CLAMAN: Thank you.
20	You raised the concern that the FTA could
21	result in deregulation of services. However, the text
22	does not so provide, and in fact, anticipates that

governments will need to regulate many services.

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I was wondering if you could just clarify.

SHAFFER: Sure. Well, it's, of course, not very well stated in Chapter 7. There are other chapters of the agreement that would tend to lead towards regulation. The ability of tribunals to question whether regulation necessary, whether it's as burdensome, whether it's more burdensome than necessary, taking those decisions out of the hands of public health authorities and allowing private corporations or corporations through their governments the ability to challenge the use of beef hormones, the use of MTBEs.

The experience that we've had both through NAFTA and through other trade agreements suggest that there can be direct monetary effects that can be leveled against governments, corporations for enacting and enforcing public health regulations. But there can also be a chilling effect.

So I think that's the connection with deregulation, and certainly -- well, you asked that question about privatization. So sure.

1	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Barbara.
2	MS. McLEOD: Thank you for your
3	testimony.
4	So people would say that instead of
5	excluding water services from the trade agreement, a
6	better way resolve the problem is to focus on capacity
7	building for regulatory systems that would allow the
8	countries to address in a direct way the concerns of
9	access to water and price.
10	How do you respond to that?
11	DR. SHAFFER: Absolutely
12	MS. McLEOD: Instead of excluding water
13	services.
14	DR. SHAFFER: Well, I guess the question,
15	you know, and maybe you can help me understand your
16	perspective on that, but certainly I guess it's not
17	clear to me how including water in the FTAA
18	contributes to capacity building.
19	Certainly I think that capacity building
20	and improving the regulatory environment, as well as
21	direct funding for water projects, as well as debt
22	cancellation for countries that need to pursue these

1	objectives, are very important.
2	It so far as not been clear how these
3	kinds of trade disciplines, whether through structural
4	adjustment programs or through trade agreements
5	contribute to capacity building, but certainly it's a
6	discussion to have.
7	I'm happy to be informed and educated.
8	MS. McLEOD: Thank you.
9	MR. LEAHY: Well, Dr. Shaffer, thank you
10	for your testimony.
11	I just had a request actually. You
12	mentioned in your testimony a World Health
13	Organization study that had been done after the
14	deadline and also some studies on privatizing water
15	services. Could you submit some of those for the
16	record or have you already done that?
17	DR. SHAFFER: I have not, and I would be
18	pleased to. Absolutely. I thought I included the Web
19	site here. I see I haven't, but, sure, I'd be glad to
20	do that.
21	MR. LEAHY: Thanks.
22	DR. SHAFFER: Sure.

1	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: I'm sorry.
2	Could you do that for us electronically?
3	DR. SHAFFER: Yes. You'll let me know
4	where.
5	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Right. It
6	should be sent to gblue@ustr.gov.
7	DR. SHAFFER: I'm in touch with Ms. Blue,
8	and I'd be happy to.
9	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you.
10	DR. SHAFFER: Yeah, sure.
11	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: We'll send it to
12	the members of the panel and the negotiators.
13	DR. SHAFFER: Good.
14	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: If there are no
15	further questions, thank you very much.
16	Our next witness is Mr. Steve Beckman,
17	from the United Automotive, Aerospace, and
18	Agricultural Implement Workers of America.
19	Mr. Beckman, before you testify, I think
20	if the panel could identify themselves it will help
21	the transcriber. I'm sorry. We should have done this
22	to start.

1	Shall we start with you, Barbara?
2	MS. McLEOD: Sure. Barbara McLeod with
3	the Environmental Protection Agency.
4	MR. CLATANOFF: Bud Clatanoff with USTR.
5	MS. HESTER: Janie Hester with the
6	Department of Labor.
7	MS. MALITO: Andrea Malito with the
8	Commerce Department.
9	MS. BROWN: Karen Brown with the State
10	Department.
11	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Carmen Suro-
12	Bredie, USTR.
13	MS. CLAMAN: Kimberly Claman, USTR.
14	MR. LEAHY: Dan Leahy, USITC.
15	MR. KARAWA: Omar Karawa, USTR.
16	MR. FRITZ: Jonathan Fritz, USTR.
17	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
18	much.
19	Mr. Beckman, the floor is yours.
20	MR. BECKMAN: Thank you. Thank you for
21	the opportunity to appear before the TPSC.
22	The UAW has provided advice on the FTAA

talks to the administration directly through submitted statements, including this one, and through three submissions to the committee of government representatives on the participation of civil society.

Despite this apparent interest in the views of the UAW and others representing workers and other citizens, the agenda and drafts of the FTAA, as well as the U.S. government proposals, remain mired in a failed model of economic integration and approach to trade police.

The UAW statement raised several issues in the areas of market access and investment that are being discussed in the FTAA negotiations. We oppose the development of any proposal that would result in the elimination of U.S. tariffs on motor vehicles and parts until a thorough analysis of auto trade and investment in the region has been undertaken and analyzed.

You may recall that analyses of the impact of NAFTA on U.S.-Mexico auto trade by different researchers produced different projections for improvement in the U.S. trade balance in motor

vehicles and in automotive parts.

In fact, NAFTA has produced a large increase in U.S. deficits with Mexico in both vehicles and parts. Clearly, a new approach to analyzing the impact of regional integration in the auto industry is needed.

We urge the TPSC to keep in mind that the companies in the auto industry, assemblers and parts producers, are multi-national. Their economic and financial interests cover the whole region, and their assessments of the impact of alternative trading regimes are based on their corporate interests, not on the interests of American workers, American production, American value added, or American skills and technology enhancement.

If you're truly concerned with the overall U.S. economic interest, you will develop auto related proposals that rely on our perspective.

We also believe that a review of the language on safeguards is essential. The NAFTA language is simply not adequate. I'm sure that discussions about safeguards received a surge of

energy from the Section 201 steel decision. So it should be possible for the U.S. government to not only defend its action on steel, but also to examine new approaches to truly effective action on behalf of workers and industries injured by regional trade.

In our statement we've made numerous points regarding the investment negotiations, but I'd like to emphasize one in particular. The corporations that push for including investment rules in trade agreements have vehemently opposed the imposition of requirements on their operations by governments. They argue that governments should not skew marketplace competition.

However, these same companies are equally vehement in their opposition to restrictions on the involvement of governments in market distorting involve offering huge practices that advantages to one company at the expense of all others, including the expenditure of hundreds millions of dollars for land and its development, for worker training, for tax holidays, and for a variety of other cost reducing benefits.

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The hypocrisy of the corporations on the issue of government intervention in the market is nothing less than staggering.

an interest in how economic development takes place and in the need to support some kinds of corporate behavior and discourage others. But the use of fantastic sums of money to entice firms to produce in one location over another must be controlled. In most instances, taxpayers are the losers in the bidding wars for investment. The economic benefits often fail to reach promised levels.

Corporations which would make the investments anyway and in many cases do not even need subsidies to make their investments profitable are the winners. Shameful give-aways of taxes paid by working people to corporations with billions of dollars in the bank must be addressed.

Finally, I must state as the UAW has in every statement made about the FTAA or any other trade negotiations that the inclusion of worker rights protections in the core of the agreement enforced in

the same manner as other provisions incorporating the core labor standards defined by conventions of the international labor organization is an absolute necessity in order to promote equitable, sustainable development in any process of regional economic integration.

The conditions of work are imbedded in products and services trade between countries in the region.

Failing to meet internationally recognized standards for worker rights contributes to a downward spiral for workers' incomes and working conditions that undermines development rather than stimulating it.

The goal of the FTAA process is to improve living standards and promote prosperity in the region. This cannot be achieved unless the fundamental rights of workers are assured. The absence of any activity on workers' rights in the FTAA negotiating groups demonstrates the contempt of the FTAA process for the interest of workers and helps to explain the popular opposition that the FTAA faces in the region,

1	including in the United States.
2	We share that opposition with our
3	colleagues in the labor movement across the hemisphere
4	and with organizations of citizens concerned with the
5	environment and sustainable development, with farmers,
6	human rights activists, and millions of others.
7	We appreciate the opportunity to present
8	the UAW's testimony to the TPSC, and I look forward to
9	hearing your questions and comment.
10	Thank you.
11	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
12	much, Mr. Beckman.
13	The first question will be posed by Bud
14	Clatanoff of USTR.
15	MR. CLATANOFF: Steve, I note, and of
16	course, we're very much aware of your request for
17	enforceable worker rights provisions within the FTAA.
18	That is something that has been the U.S. government
19	position and will continue to be the U.S. government
20	position in the FTAA negotiations.
21	I want to ask you a question thought.
22	It's something that was in your written testimony

which you gave us, and I want to quote it here.

"The balance between corporate rights and responsibilities has swung overwhelmingly in the direction of rights, and it is time to demand far greater responsibilities."

How do you fashion clauses in trade agreements, such as the FTAA, that would strengthen, encourage, if not require, this greater corporate responsibilities that you talk about?

MR. BECKMAN: I think there are a variety of areas in which responsibilities on corporations can be incorporated. One of course, is respect for worker rights, and we've been very strongly supportive of emphasizing that in all trade agreements.

There are a variety of regulatory issues, some of which were just discussed, regulatory powers of governments have been undermined in the areas of public safety and health through provisions providing investor rights in trade structure of the and the investment agreements provisions in NAFTA, in particular, provide a very strong set of rights for corporations, including the

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ability to go directly to dispute settlement with the 1 government which in the United States American 2 3 citizens do not have. 4 а court system to People have to go through that court system 5 6 in order to address their problems with the government 7 policy. Foreign investors don't have to do that. So there are balances in the investment 8 9 provisions themselves in the agreement and recognition 10 of areas of government responsibility that should not 11 be covered by trade agreements. 12 So excluding elements of public policy 13 from trade agreements is another way of encouraging 14 governments to take responsibility for establishing 15 criteria for corporate behavior that meet public 16 support. 17 I mean, those are some of the examples. 18 I mean, in our view the whole starting point of a 19 discussion of regional economic integration would be 20 from a different point of view than the specific 21 negotiating groups that have been established in the

and would recognize other

FTAA process

objectives as essential elements of the negotiations and of regional integration.

So we would support a much longer, broader set of discussions that addressed a whole set of issues related to the imposition of investment requirements on companies that want to invest. I mean, I think that should apply to domestic investors as well as foreign investors.

discussion of what does comprise adequate social responsibility on the part of corporations and participants in the economy, and I think there's a very large discussion that needs to take place, as has been pointed out in other testimony.

The publication of the draft of the FTAA language provided some basis for people to discuss that, but it's still a very limited segment of the population of the region that is engaged in this process, and increasingly when people find out about different pieces, they are surprised and shocked at what areas of their public life are all of a sudden subject to some international discussion and potential

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rules. 1 2 The areas in which international 3 agreements need to take precedence and government policy needs to take precedence, those are fundamental 4 discussions that need to take place before you go 5 6 establishing a single set of rules 7 governments commit themselves to abiding by. MR. CLATANOFF: 8 Thank you. 9 MS. HESTER: Thank you for your testimony, 10 Steve. 11 Based on your testimony, you foresee largely increased in imports as a result of the FTAA. 12 13 However, can you foresee any possibility of export increases as well in terms of motor vehicles and parts 14 15 from the U.S. into the FTAA countries? 16 MR. BECKMAN: What we said when NAFTA was 17 being negotiated was, yes, there will be 18 increases in exports, but the increase in imports will 19 be far greater than the increase in exports, 20 that's exactly what's happened. 21 And we would see the same situation taking

place in the context of an FTAA that looks similar to

the NAFTA agreement. I mean, there were particular structural elements of the negotiations in NAFTA, such as the very rapid elimination of the 25 percent tariff on light trucks that was particularly offensive and has had significant, very significant trade effects.

I mean, those kind of specific things can be altered in some respect, but our experience is that the United States market is the focus of investments It has been the focus of investments in the region. in Mexico, would become more of focus for investments in the hemisphere, and that for a variety of reasons, including a history of local content requirements and a variety of other restrictions that promote local producers in many of the significant auto producing countries in the region, that they have built up a significant local base of production that would then be directed at exports to the United States market.

They already supply the local market.

There is not any burning need for, you know, new sources of parts production for increased growth in production in Brazil and Argentina and Venezuela and

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companies Colombia. 1 U.S. are there; Japanese 2 companies are there; European companies are there. 3 The U.S. assemblers in the region are not looking for exports in the United States to supply 4 that market, whereas our experience is that the United 5 States is a huge importer of parts and vehicles, and 6 7 that a significant portion of production in the region could easily be redirected at the U.S. market. 8 9 I had one other question MS. HESTER: 10 concerning your proposal for review of auto trade in 11 the region. Do you or your organization plan to 12 submit anything along these lines to us that we'd be 13 able to look at? Well, it's traditionally 14 MR. BECKMAN: 15 been our view that it's the job of the experts in the 16 government to develop these kinds of analyses. 17 are lots of staff people in the various agencies of 18 the government that have some expertise 19 industry and have the responsibility to 20 analyses that evaluate the potential impact of trade 21 agreements on the U.S. economy. 22 Т advising have been U.S. trade

negotiators for more than 20 years, and a significant amount of my time has been spent educating those negotiators about the difference between the interest of multinational U.S. companies and American workers and American producers.

And unfortunately, a lot of the review that comes out of U.S. government analyses is based on the perspective of multinational companies rather than domestic interests that are concerned about the impact of what takes place on the U.S. economy rather than on the bottom line of companies that have operations all over the world.

So we will certainly be providing analyses of what we think would take place under particular regimes, trade regimes, that are proposed in the course of negotiations, and we do that on a regular basis.

But in terms of providing, you know, one of those fancy bound 300 page studies using a particular model for evaluating the analyses, I wouldn't expect that. But there are people who do such studies, academics and consulting groups. We

evaluate those studies when they are done. 1 We will 2 continue to do so. 3 And we certainly would ask that government negotiators consult us about any studies 4 that are not public that we would not be able to 5 6 otherwise have access to analyze. 7 Thank you, Mr. Beckman. MS. CLAMAN: Your testimony indicates that investment 8 9 rules should not prevent governments from establishing 10 policies for employment technology and other purposes. 11 Can you describe what kinds of employment 12 technology programs should not be affected 13 investment disciplines? 14 For example, is it government incentives 15 attract technology or expand employment 16 operations? MR. BECKMAN: Well, I think what we would 17 18 like to see in these kinds of negotiations are fairly 19 broad discussions of the impact of those kinds of 20 guarantees or requirements of companies on trade 21 rather than outlawing them per se, as has been done in

part in the WTO and in NAFTA.

There are specific, you know, demands that governments are not allowed to make. We think the true test of whether those demands are appropriate or not is a domestic political process, and then we can argue about the impact of those decisions and how they affect other trading partners.

If requiring a company that's going to invest in Argentina anyway to hire Argentineans to provide certain kinds of research functions or to be employed for certain technical skilled positions, I mean, that's something that's unlikely to have a major impact on U.S. economic activity or U.S. trade.

If that's the case, then fine, let them do it. There shouldn't be any broad rule that says, "No, this is a violation."

So our test would be the impact of such actions, not proscriptions. So the kinds of issues that we'd be concerned about cover all of those areas. We're concerned when governments do that, and if it's done with the intent of transferring investment from one location, like the United States, to another, that's obviously a problem for us, and we want to be

able to take action if that's the case.

But we think that the mere existence of such activities on the part of government is not in itself the problem. So those should be areas of discussion, but not areas of immediate action and proscription.

The companies are willing to do that if they're given \$100 million to locate someplace. They don't mind doing it as a quid pro quo. Where it becomes a sort of game of blackmailing, you know, we'll invest here; you know, we'll meet this requirement if you give us X, Y, and Z, if you give us training money, if you give us free land, if you give us a 20-year tax holiday.

Well, those ar not necessarily appropriate areas for economic activity to be determined, you know, not the criteria you want for economic activity to be determined. It's okay if the companies don't complain if the government gives the money, but if the government doesn't give the money, the governments can't do that. That seems to me just sort of a hypocritical view of appropriate government policy and

what role the government should play in their economic situation.

CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Mr. Leahy.

MR. LEAHY: Mr. Beckman, on the issue of safeguard protections that you raised, if you haven't already done so, could you perhaps provide us with some specific ideas about how we could come up with a more effective safeguard?

MR. BECKMAN: Well, one of the issues that's most problematic is that the remedy under NAFTA is restoration of the tariff. The United States has very low tariffs. It really has no impact, and so it doesn't accomplish the objective of remedying the injury that's been sustained.

It's also problematic, as I mentioned in the testimony, that very often the imports come from the very same company that's displacing the American workers, and so the remedy in that case is not available. The company is not going to rehire those workers. There are no circumstances under which a border action would restore the investment in the United States at the expense of the investment that's

1	been made abroad that's supplying those imports.
2	Those are company decisions, and I don't
3	have a specific answer to that. I do think that in
4	many cases with respect to NAFTA we need to limit the
5	purview of the regional trade agreement so that the
6	global safeguard provisions become more available.
7	That's one area where I think it's important to make
8	some changes.
9	But I think it's an important issue that
LO	needs a lot more discussion internationally. It has
L1	been a controversial issue obviously, and I think a
L2	broader discussion, a longer discussion would be
L3	advisable.
L4	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr.
L5	Beckman.
L6	Our next witness is Mr. Jim Thomas,
L7	President of ASTM International.
L8	We've been joined by Bennett Harman, our
L9	market access negotiator at USTR.
20	MR. THOMAS: It's good to see you,
21	Bennett. Thank you for joining us.
22	As you know, my name is Jim Thomas, and

I'm the President of ASTM International, which is one 1 2 of the largest standards developing organizations in 3 the world. Since the subject of standards in trade 4 agreements is a complex one and cannot be fully 5 6 explored in the amount of time we'll have together, 7 I've asked permission of the panel to allow me to attach two additional documents that are a written 8 9 statement. 10 One is a letter that was sent to 11 Ambassador Zoellick, signed by ten major 12 standards developing organizations with a combined worldwide membership of over 300,000 scientists and 13 14 engineers. The letter supports what I will say here 15 today. 16 The second document is an exploration of 17 the WTO-TBT agreement and its relationship to the 18 standards development processes in the United States 19 as compared to others. 20 Well, let me concentrate my comments on 21 the views of ASTM at this session today. ASTM is an

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from

countries develop standards. Thousands of these standards are global in scope and use. They are developed according to principles set down by the World Trade Organization. They appear in the national portfolios and regulations of many countries around the world. Their effect on trade is significant. Their value to the U.S. economy and the economies of many of the other FTAA countries is incalculable.

The simple message I have come to deliver today is this. There is language in the FTAA draft document still bracketed that effectively precludes their use and use of standards like them, and that language must be changed.

At present the draft agreement section on market access and technical barriers to trade contains a definition that would limit international standard solutions and place some U.S. industry sectors at a used to define an disadvantage. The language international standardization body makes specific reference to European based private sector two voluntary standards organizations: the International Organization Standardization, ISO, for and

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International Electrotechnical Commission, IEC, pointedly excluding all others.

The definition with its references to the ISO and IEC is a virtual recommendation. It is certainly an endorsement, and it suggests that the standards that issue from these two bodies are somehow endowed with a presumption of conformity with the terms of the agreement.

This is an erroneous assumption commonly reached by the uninitiated and the unaffected. No standards body comprised of national bodies which tend to operate as political and economic blocks can insure that the standards they issue will not act as barriers to trade.

But more importantly, these references taint the definition with bias and exclusivity. Implicitly and by omission, this definition suggests that thousands of technically advanced international standards that are developed in U.S. based organizations are either, one, not credible or, two, present barriers to trade. Neither of these is true.

There are those among our trading partners

who adhere to the notion when it is to their advantage that the development of voluntary international standards is within the sole purview of these two European based organizations. Because of the great diversity that exists in the U.S., some industries are able to apply these standards, access markets, and remain competitive.

But there are many who cannot. For them the appropriate standard may not exist there or it may exist on a technical level that is not sufficiently advanced.

The standard in question may even lend itself to the interest and regulatory agenda of a competitive economic region. Dynamic sectors, such as the ones represented in ASTM and other U.S. based standards organizations, must be able to seek international standard solutions that do not thwart their ability to trade.

The U.S. government is also entitled to international standards that will suit their regulatory needs, standards in which its interests are represented. It should not have to choose between

quality and relevance in a trade agreement.

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The position taken by the USTR within the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade has been that bodies which operate with open and transparent procedures and that afford an opportunity for consensus among all interested parties will result in standards which are relevant on a global basis and prevent unnecessary barriers to trade.

In other words, the position of the USTR has been that the process of international standardization and the relevance and fair trade aspects of the resulting standards are related more to principles than to the structure of the institutions that produce them. And with we agree wholeheartedly.

These principles are articulated in the second triennial review of the operation and implementation of the WTO-TBT agreement and Annex IV of that review. It is the view of ASTM International that these principles go to the heart and spirit of the TBT agreement and can be and should be applied to any agreement that has as its aim the elimination of

technical barriers to trade, in particular, the FTAA agreement.

We also assert that the position articulated in Annex IV is representative of the full range of processes that support an advanced U.S. trade.

To that end, we propose that the FTAA draft language in brackets be replaced by the following:

The parties recognize that international standards, guides, or recommendations must have been elaborated following the set of principles set forth in the WTO Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade, decisions and recommendations adopted by the committee since 1 January 1995. That's a decision of the Committee on Principles for the development of international standards, guides, and recommendations with relation to Articles II, V, and Annex III of the agreement, which is contained in their Annex IV.

The acceptance of these principles in the WTO-TBT committee was a significant step forward for those who hold the view that there are multiple paths

1	to international trade.
2	ASTM supports the objectives of the WTO-
3	TBT agreement, abides by its principles, and will
4	support every effort to replace the bracketed FTAA
5	draft agreement language with language that is
6	inclusive of U.S. practices and trade interests.
7	I'd like to thank you for your time, your
8	consideration, and if you'd have any questions, I will
9	make an attempt to answer those questions.
10	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr.
11	Thomas.
12	We'll ask Bennett Harman to lead the
13	questioning.
14	MR. THOMAS: Brought the heavy hitter in
15	just for my questioning, huh?
16	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: We didn't want
17	you to go away feeling
18	MR. THOMAS: I didn't want to feel empty.
19	MR. HARMAN: Thank you, Mr. Thomas.
20	As you've indicated, we've wholly
21	internalized the concept that we should not accept an
22	inappropriately narrow definition of an international

standards organization. Your suggestion is for a cross-reference to the WTO work that's already been done to embrace that principle.

I guess my question is: beyond that, is there anything else that you would propose that we seek in the area of standards and technical barriers to trade that would be a TBT plus or WTO-TBT plus?

MR. THOMAS: I think that right now what we're looking to do is to move away from the practice of listing of organizations, which tends to give preference and actually precludes utilization of standards that meet all the conditions, but do not have the appropriate acronym associated with it.

We think moving in the direction of having the general principles apply and to maintain some continuity among all the various negotiations that are going on between various regions or very direct negotiations between the U.S. and other individuals countries, that the more we can try to stay within these fundamental principles, the better off we're going to be in the long term.

MR. HARMAN: Thank you.

CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr.
Thomas.
MR. THOMAS: Thank you very much for your
time. I appreciate it.
CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Our next witness
is Andrew Wechsler, who will be speaking on behalf of
the government of the U.S. Virgin Islands, the Virgin
Island rum industry and the government of the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
I understand that Mr. Wechsler will be
introduced by Peter Hiebert.
MR. HIEBERT: Ladies and gentlemen,
members of the Trade Police Staff Committee, my name
is Peter Hiebert, and I'm a partner in the law firm of
Winston & Strawn.
Winston & Strawn serves as outside counsel
to the governments of the United States' Virgin
Islands and also to the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Mr. Wechsler is not able to be here this
afternoon, and I will be introducing his colleague,
Andrew Szamosszegi of LECG.
But before introducing Andrew, who will

provide a summary of the probable economic effects analysis conducted by LECG, a further tariff liberalization of the rum industry under the proposed FTAA, I would like to provide a brief overview of the critical importance of this industry to the economic and fiscal foundations of the governments of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico.

Under longstanding principles governing the tax relationship between the United States and these island jurisdictions, the U.S. has returned back to the respective treasuries the federal excise taxes collected on Virgin Islands and Puerto Rican rum.

In the case of the Virgin Islands, this amounts to some \$75 million a year, or approximately 15 percent of the government's total budget.

In the case of Puerto Rico, rum taxes exceed one third of a billion dollars a year.

Any trade decision that might impair these revenues thus could have disastrous consequences for both island jurisdictions. This is especially so in the case of the Virgin Islands, which securitizes its outstanding debt with these rum tax revenues and which

finances its essential public infrastructure with rum tax bonds.

In addition, the government of the Virgin Islands has just negotiated a series of agreements with the U.S. Department of Justice and with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency under which the construction of new waste water treatment facilities and future compliance with the Clean Water Act are tied to future rum tax revenues.

In consideration of the unique role that rum plays in the economies of the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico, as well as the other island economies in the Caribbean under the CBI, the U.S. government in 1997 negotiated a Solomonic framework for the treatment of rum in the Singapore zero for zero agreement on distilled spirits.

Under that accord reached by the U.S., the European Union, Canada, and Japan, duties on high valued branded rum would be removed, while maintaining tariff treatment of low valued commodity rum, which is highly price and import sensitive.

I note for the record that Congress has

just reaffirmed this policy in its reauthorization of 1 2 the Andean Trade Preferences Act, approved this past 3 summer, by voting to exclude low valued rum from further tariff liberalization. I respectfully submit 4 that this should remain the policy of the United 5 6 States in negotiating the FTAA. 7 And I would be pleased to answer questions after Mr. Szamosszegi has finished his 8 9 presentation. 10 Thank you. 11 MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Thanks, Peter. 12 This testimony has been Good afternoon. 13 prepared by Andrew Wechsler and me, Andrew 14 Szamosszegi. Mr. Wechsler is the Managing Director of 15 International Trade Practices at LECG, LLC, and a 16 professional economist with more than 20 17 experience in the public and private sectors. 18 I am a managing consultant at LECG. 19 Drew and I have been asked to examine the 20 probable economic effect extending duty free status to 21 low valued rum under the free trade area of the

On the basis

Americas initiative.

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of applying

objective economic analysis to the statutory criteria, 1 2 this testimony concludes that it would be inadvisable 3 to extend duty free status to low valued rum as part of the FTAA. 4 1992, Mr. Wechsler 5 In examined the 6 probable economic effects of extending duty free 7 status of low valued rum to Mexico as part of the That study reached the following conclusions. 8 NAFTA. 9 One, rum production was important to the economies of the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. 10 11 Two, the existing duties on imported rum 12 critical cost advantages for insular were 13 producers, especially in the production of low valued 14 rum. 15 Three, the removal of the duties would 16 erase the current competitive advantage of the U.S. 17 Virgin Islands and Puerto Rican producers in supplying 18 the U.S. rum market. 19 In 2001, we were asked to revisit the 20 question of the probable economic effect of expanding 21 duty free status on rum imports to Latin American 22 countries as part of the FTAA and/or removing the rum

exclusion from the Andean Trade Preferences Act.

Applying updated data, we found that producers, such as Brazil, Colombia, have the capacity and resources to respond to such a fundamental change in their relative cost positions. Removing the existing duty would transform them from high cost to low cost suppliers of low valued rum to the U.S. market.

What follows is the rationale for our conclusions. Rum is an alcoholic distillate from the fermented juice of sugar cane, sugar cane molasses or other sugar cane byproducts. It is a major product of the insular economies in the Caribbean Basin initiative countries and historically have been the major supplies to the U.S. market.

Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands accounted for almost 89 percent of U.S. apparent supply in 2000.

The overall rum market is segmented into low valued, commodity-like rum, and high valued, branded rum. The highest valued rum is shipped in bottles, has strong brand identity, and is not

2 There are daunting barriers to entry at
3 the high end of the market, such as substantial
4 advertising expenditures necessary to establish brand
5 identity. Low valued rum is shipped in bulk in
6 bottles. It is a price sensitive commodity item whose

Firms that produce low valued rum cannot easily match the expenditure levels necessary to enter the more lucrative market segments.

country of origin is not very important to the

The cost of producing rum depends on whether the rum is bulk or bottled and aged or unaged. Unaged bulk rum is the least costly to produce. Its two key inputs are molasses and fuel oil. The bottling of rum requires additional labor, bottles, and packaging material.

The production of aged rum requires storage facilities for aging the rum in barrels.

Inventory financing costs are also incurred.

Producers in the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico are faced with many cost disadvantages

consumer.

compared to producers in Latin America, and because of 1 2 this, the current duty structure is critical to the 3 competitiveness of the insular rum producers. The U.S. Virgin Islands rum industry has 4 one major player, VIRIL, which concentrates on the 5 6 lowest value commodity segment of the market. 7 shipments to the United States are almost entirely in bulk. 8 9 With current duties on low valued rum, the 10 U.S. Virgin Islands is currently the low cost supplier 11 to the U.S. market. Compared to producers from South America, VIRIL has many cost disadvantages, such as 12 13 high energy and labor costs, and it has no domestic 14 sugar industry to provide cheaper molasses. 15 Unlike Brazil and Colombia, all fuel oil 16 must be imported, putting VIRIL at a distinct cost 17 Data from the international labor disadvantage. 18 organizations suggest that wages in the U.S. Virgin 19 Islands are two to three times higher than wages in 20 Brazil and Colombia.

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extremely vulnerable to a surge in bulk rum imports to

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the United States. More than 90 percent of its bulk 1 2 shipments to the United States are of low valued rum. 3 VIRIL has little mitigating factors on which to fall Its higher valued products are still under 4 development. 5 6 Moreover, there are already well 7 established participants within the high valued So entry will be difficult. 8 segments. 9 The Puerto Rican industry has four major 10 players: Serralles, Edmundo Fernandez, Bacardi and 11 Trigo. Puerto Rican producers sell into the bulk and 12 bottled segments of the U.S. market, but they are most active in the bulk and low valued bottle segments. 13 The latter also benefits from a 90 cent 14 15 per proof gallon tariff on U.S. imports from non-CBI 16 and non-NAFTA countries. Puerto Rico is currently the dominant 17 18 player in the overall rum market here, accounting for 19 72 percent of bulk and 88 percent of bottled shipments 20 to the mainland market. Yet it is also vulnerable 21 because it operates in the lower price end of the

spectrum, imports molasses, and pays relatively high

wages and energy costs compared to rum producing countries in South America.

Like their counterparts in the U.S. Virgin Islands, Puerto Rican distillers pay wages that are significantly higher than the wages paid by their competitors in South America.

The U.S. government has in the past recognized the sensitivity of the insular rum industry to imports. Rum was excluded from the list of products that received duty free treatment through the generalized system of preferences program and the Andean Trade Preferences Act.

As part of the NAFTA, it was decided to phase out tariffs on Mexican rum over ten years. Most recently, the United States and Europe agreed to zero for zero tariff reductions on high valued rum, but agreed to keep duties on low valued imports unchanged.

The impact of duty elimination on the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rican rum industries depend on the production costs of potential competitors and their ability to meet U.S. demand. If the production costs of these potential competitors are sufficiently

low, the removal of a tariff could transform them from 1 2 high cost to low cost producers in the U.S. market. 3 Both Colombia and Brazil possess capacity to take full advantage of duty elimination. 4 the world's largest producer of 5 Brazil is 6 spirits, accounting for 73 percent 7 consumption in 1999. Suchacca (phonetic), product 8 а 9 similar to rum, is the national drink of Brazil. 10 Colombia is the world's eighth largest consumer of 11 rum, and La Guardiente (phonetic) is a signature 12 alcoholic beverage and is also a cane based spirit. 13 Both countries have favorable cost 14 structures relative to the Virgin Islands and Puerto 15 Rico. Brazil and Colombia producers pay less for 16 labor, raw materials, and energy. Not only do they 17 produce their own molasses. They are net exporters of 18 the product. 19 Producers in these countries reportedly 20 also use the begas from sugar cane production as 21 replacement for fuel oil in the production process. 22 Moreover, currency depreciation of recent

times has magnified these cost advantages. Duties are
currently the largest single cost factor for any
potential exporter to the United States. As shown in
the attached figures, absent the duty, Colombia and
Brazil could undercut U.S. Virgin Islands and, thus,
Puerto Rican rum in the U.S. market for low valued
bulk rum and could become extremely competitive with
Puerto Rico and the low valued bottled segment of the
market.
The existing duty on low valued rum is the
only factor preventing Brazil and Colombia from
becoming the low cost producers for U.S. rum.
Note that even under the current regime
Venezuela, Colombia, and Peru exported bulk rum to the
United States in the first half of 2002, while Brazil,
Colombia and Venezuela exported bottled rum.
CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: I'm sorry. You
are out of time now. So if you could just summarize.
MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Sure, sure.
CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: In one sentence.
MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Rum production has been
an extremely important part of the heritage of the

1	U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rican rum industry, and
2	reducing or eliminating the tariff on rum at this time
3	would be a location tipping event which would probably
4	result in severe harm to the U.S. Virgin Islands rum
5	industry and to the Puerto Rican rum industry as well.
6	Thank you.
7	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
8	much, Mr. Szamosszegi.
9	MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Szamosszegi.
10	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Szamosszegi.
11	We will now turn to question by the panel.
12	Bennett Harman.
13	MR. HARMAN: Can I just start with one
14	question?
15	You indicated I believe it was in the
16	Virgin Islands that there's the beginning of a
17	transition towards the more high value added
18	production, and you indicated it's not an easy path to
19	follow, but that work has begun.
20	Does that hold out some promise for both
21	industries in the long run as a potential strategy to
22	survive in a highly competitive area?

MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Really based on the cost 1 2 factors, it's just about the only strategy. The only 3 problem is it costs a tremendous amount of money not only to develop the product, but to market the 4 5 product. 6 I mean, Bacardi rum has lots of money that 7 If you compare the amount of it can throw around. advertising of somebody like VIRIL with the amount of 8 9 advertising by Bacardi, you cannot even put them on 10 the same map or in the same graph. 11 So I think that it's their only strategy 12 for survival, but whether they can muster the 13 resources to do it is another matter entirely. 14 MR. HIEBERT: I would also add from the 15 government's point of view, the industry might 16 survive, but it would survive at a much smaller version of its current self, and in the government's 17 18 point of view we would use the excise tax revenues. 19 Over the last five or ten years, 20 industry has made a major push towards establishing 21 name brand identity, but notwithstanding that, 85

percent of what is produced in the Virgin Islands is

1	still low valued bulk rum, which depends entirely on
2	the current tariff levels, 85 percent of total excise
3	tax revenues.
4	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Do you have an
5	additional question? The Department of Commerce,
6	Andrea Malito.
7	MS. MALITO: Thank you for your testimony.
8	I was wondering if you might be able to
9	comment as well on the state of modernization or
10	efficiency of the rum industry, the production in
11	Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands as they might
12	compare to some of the other countries that you
13	referenced in your testimony.
14	MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Well, we have not
15	visited, performed any plant visits. All that we've
16	been able to do is estimate the various costs
17	comparing them to other producers in Brazil and
18	Colombia.
19	We had some access to proprietary data
20	from the Virgin Islands and from Puerto Rico, and that
21	was the basis of our decision.
22	In terms of modernization, in Puerto Rico,

I think you have very modern production processes. In the Virgin Islands, since the product is bulk rum, the production processes, as far as we can tell, reflect the ultimate output just like they do in other countries.

But I think the key thing to keep in mind is if you compare plants of similar technological sophistication across countries and including the insular economies. You will find that that's not the main cost factor, especially in the low valued bulk segment of the market, and that what is extremely important here are their relative costs.

And the fact that the Virgin Islands is able to be the leading supplier to the U.S. market, despite having facilities that equal in are technological sophistication to other rum producing countries, I think that's a strong sign that the current duty regime is the current cost advantage that's keeping production there opposed as somewhere else.

CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you.

Thank you very much.

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1	Our will we retain you as our next
2	witness then?
3	MR. HIEBERT: Actually I've had my say.
4	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Okay. And you
5	will be introduced by Ramon Cantero-Frau, the
6	Secretary of Commerce and Economic Development. The
7	testimony is on behalf of the Commonwealth of Puerto
8	Rico.
9	Welcome.
LO	MR. CANTERO-FRAU: Ladies and gentlemen,
L1	members of the Trade Policy Staff Committee, my name
L2	is Ramon Cantero-Frau, and I'm Secretary of Commerce
L3	and Economic Development for the Commonwealth of
L4	Puerto Rico.
L5	On behalf of the Governor, Sila M.
L6	Calderon, I'm pleased to have this opportunity to
L7	present the views of the government of Puerto Rico on
L8	the negotiation of the free trade area of the
L9	Americas.
20	As an island, Puerto Rico is dependent
21	upon trade for our continued prosperity. We are the
22	fifth largest trade in the Western Hemisphere, with

over \$75 billion in exports and imports, including \$54 billion with the U.S. mainland. Because we see great opportunities for companies operating in Puerto Rico, if we are able to expand our trade with other countries in the Americas, we applaud the President's efforts to make this agreement a reality.

While Puerto Rico does believe in the principles of free trade, we also believe in the requirements for fair trade. And while we recognize that different products will be treated differently in any trade agreement, we ask that Puerto Rico's interests be fully considered by the TPSC in negotiating the FTAA, particularly with respect to the import-sensitive sectors of rum and canned tuna.

I make this request because it is often easy to overlook the fact that policies intended to benefit the mainland economy may sometimes have unintended and disparate consequences for an island economy of four million U.S. citizens 1,000 miles away from the U.S. mainland.

In developing the negotiating position of the U.S. government, it is important to remember that

Puerto Rico is part of the United States and, through our factories, as well as our four million consumers, the Puerto Rican economy supports thousands of U.S. jobs on the mainland.

Indeed, Puerto Rico is the eighth largest trading partner of the U.S., of the United States, and the 13th largest market for U.S. products. But as an subject to U.S. insular economy minimum environmental and regulatory laws, as well as high shipping costs, we must compete with low wage and low cost countries in Central America and South America have superior advantages that also in natural resources that we lack.

In these circumstances, current tariff treatment is often the difference between economic viability and industrial relocation. Indeed, it is essential to note that in the last six years, Puerto Rico has lost over 26,000 manufacturing jobs, proportionally more than any other U.S. jurisdiction, to low wage countries around the world.

In particular, I ask you to take into consideration the decisions of the U.S. Congress in

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reauthorizing the Andean Trade Preferences Act this past summer with respect to the tariff treatment of rum and canned tuna. Recognizing the critical importance of the rum industry to the Puerto Rican economy, Congress reaffirmed the longstanding U.S. policy by voting to exclude low valued rum for tariff preferences under the Andean bill, while continuing trade liberalization in the higher valued segments of the rum market not dependent on price sensitivity.

Similarly, Congress recognized, based on a study by the U.S. International Trade Commission, that tariff liberalization in the canned tuna sector would quickly lead to the demise of the U.S. canned tuna industry in Puerto Rico, California and American Samoa.

Accordingly, Congress wisely decided to maintain existing tariff treatment of canned tuna in the Andean bill, while permitting duty free treatment of pouched tuna which is a separate and distinct product and not directly competitive with canned tuna.

Congress reached these decisions after

1	careful deliberation and consideration. The
2	government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico
3	respectfully requests that the TPSC carefully weigh
4	these judgments, and the evidence on which Congress
5	relied in making them, as it helps to develop the U.S.
6	negotiating positions in these sectors.
7	And now I would like to introduce Andrew
8	Szamosszegi of LECG, who will recount in more detail
9	the probable economic effects of further tariff
10	liberalization with respect to canned tuna under the
11	FRAA.
12	I would be pleased to answer any questions
13	after his presentation.
14	Thank you very much.
15	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
16	much.
17	We're ready for your testimony, but I
18	think it will have to be largely abridged, if you
19	could help us with that.
20	MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Okay.
21	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you.
22	MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Sure. Good afternoon.

As you know, we've been asked to examine the probable economic effects of extending duty free status to canned tuna as part of the FTAA.

Our study of the tuna industry proceeded along the same lines as our study of the rum industry. We found that the canned tuna industry is vital to the American Samoan economy and also important to Puerto Rico and California.

We found the existing duties on imported and canned tuna provide critical cost advantages for domestic canneries, and that under the current tariff regime, Ecuador, Colombia, and Peru are already increasing activity, especially Ecuador. And we found that the removal of duties would increase the current competitive edge to the U.S. insular economies in supplying the U.S. canned tuna market and provide decisive benefits for foreign competitors.

The product market, as you know, is dominated by three companies. Starkist, Bumblebee, and Chicken of the Sea together have about 80 percent of the market. There's a small share that is taken by private label brands.

The U.S. tuna industry is concentrated in the insular economies of the American Samoa, Puerto Rico, and California, which is formerly the tuna cannery capital of the world. It is now home to just scaled down canneries.

We see that employment is extremely important to American Samoa. The tuna industry employs 5,000 Samoans, maybe a little more, about 1,000 in total in the United States, I mean, in California and in Puerto Rico.

The Puerto Rican canning industry has been suffering for the past decade with a lot of closures. In 2001, Starkist shut a plant in Mayaguez, which was a major cannot center in the western coast of Puerto Rico. This cost Puerto Rico about 1,300 jobs of direct employment.

Rico disadvantages Puerto has many compared to potential competitors in South America. They include high wages of \$6.50 an hour in comparison with \$3.75 in American Samoa, which is one of the reasons American Samoa is competitive, so but especially the wage differentials with South American

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countries are huge. Wages in Ecuador and Colombia and the other major potential cannery countries are about 77 cents to a dollar. So there's a huge, huge wage disparity there.

Puerto Rico also has a disadvantage in cost because they must have extra transportation costs, and so that's also a significant disadvantage.

sensitive to the plight of the insular canning industry. They adopted a 15-year phase-in for the elimination of tariffs on Mexican tuna. Canned tuna is not among the products that received duty free treatment under the GSP, and note canned tuna is among the 1,800 products that receive duty free treatment if imported by the least developed GSP countries. None of these countries is a significant tuna producer.

The high mobility of tuna production is testament to the cost sensitivity of the tuna canning industry. Countries that lost competitiveness in the past due to rising wages, market entry by low wage countries and tariff changes have quickly lost market share and production facilities.

One only has to look at the impact of the 1 2 EU's version of the APPA which provides duty free 3 status to canned tuna. This resulted in large market 4 share gains for APPA nations at the expense of the European processing sector and producers in Southeast 5 6 Asia. 7 Ecuador and Colombia are the only South American countries to have exported tuna to the United 8 9 States in recent years, but Colombia's industry has 10 not shipped canned tuna to the United States since 11 1999. Ecuador has received substantial foreign direct 12 investment and other assistance in growing its tuna 13 industry and has benefitted greatly from the tariff 14 regime that's currently in place. 15 They also have access to the Eastern 16 United States which is one of the main advantages of 17 Puerto Rico. 18 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: If you could, 19 sum up. 20 MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: Sure. Canned tuna 21 produced in American Samoa and Puerto Rico is 22 competitive in the U.S. market owing to this current

1	tariff regime. This regime has also enabled the
2	Ecudorian industry to prosper. If you look at the
3	trade data for the past year, Ecuador has moved up to
4	the number two position as a source of imports, and it
5	is already doing very well.
6	In the final analysis, if we look at the
7	jobs gained and the jobs lost by removing duty free
8	status, we already see from the ITC report that
9	Ecuador would gain about 1,000 jobs, and the U.S.
10	could potentially lose two thirds of its jobs.
11	So I think it's clear that duty removal as
12	part of the FTAA would be a location tipping event in
13	tuna just as it was with rum.
14	Thank you.
15	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Dan Leahy will
16	ask questions for the panel.
17	MR. LEAHY: Thank you, gentlemen.
18	As you noted in your testimony, the
19	commission did, in fact, get involved in this issue in
20	the TPA legislation. We did do a number of different
21	analyses as part of that.
22	If I take your testimony correctly, the

solution that was come up with in the legislation for dealing with Ecuador has essentially done its job. It has taken care of what were perceived as issues for Ecuador, but it hasn't really affected the canned tuna market. Is that accurate?

MR. CANTERO-FRAU: Let me. When Starkist closed the plant in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico last year, I went to see the President of Heintz that was in the decision to the director. What Congress has done is basically has excluded the poached tuna, and basically poached is a highly labor intensive process, and for this person to manufacture that in Puerto Rico, the cost per man per hour without counting all other fair regulations, shipping costs, nor anything, our benefit was something like \$8.56 per man per hour.

In Ecuador, the same process was \$1.50 per man per hour with major benefit. So as you can see there, what Congress has done basically is maintain that professional tuna for poached tuna that we cannot compete and then maintain the import restriction, the tariff for the canned tuna.

Canned tuna, right now we're surviving in

Puerto Rico because certain tax grants that the 1 2 government has given the tuna canned factory, and the 3 reason that already you have about 1,500 more jobs 4 dependent upon that industry. So if you take the imports out with the 5 6 structure that we have in Puerto Rico, we have to kiss 7 goodbye to the 1,500 jobs that we have on the tuna canned industry because we cannot compete, and the 8 9 same case will happen with American Samoa. 10 American Samoa was \$3.50 per man per hour. 11 It will not be able to compete. 12 MR. LEAHY: Thank you. 13 MR. HIEBERT: Peter Hiebert. 14 I would like to just elaborate on that 15 answer, too. After the Andean legislation was 16 approved by the Congress and signed by the President, 17 Bumblebee, which owns and operates the remaining 18 facility in Puerto Rico indicated that they would stay 19 in Puerto Rico, and of course, they were on the fence 20 up until the final compromise that was reached by the 21 Congress. 22 Okay. Thank you for that MR. LEAHY:

elaboration.

One other question I had, although you didn't go into it in your abridged testimony, you did raise what I thought was interesting. The commission was pessimistic, but overly optimistic at the same time, which is not an easy thing for us to do, but apparently we achieved that in our analysis.

I'm curious about this movement to the Western Pacific as a source of tuna for Ecuador and others. Do you have any information on how much is coming from Ecuador at the moment or that Ecuador is bringing from the western tropical Pacific at the moment and how easy it is for them to increase that over time?

MR. SZAMOSSZEGI: The only information I have is that they are doing so now, and I do not know how much they are bringing in from the Western Pacific. All I know is that they are doing it now and that it's part of a policy of source diversification.

And they would probably increase it as necessary. Whether there's a point that it becomes uneconomic and what that point is I don't know.

1	MR. LEAHY: If you did have any other or
2	were able to come up with any other information on
3	that point, it would be useful to us.
4	That's all the questions I have.
5	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Do we have any
6	more questions?
7	(No response.)
8	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: No. Then thank
9	you very much for your testimony, Mr. Cantero-Frau and
10	also to you.
11	Our next witness will be Jake Caldwell of
12	the National Wildlife Federation.
13	We'll give people a minute to gather the
14	testimony.
14 15	testimony. I think we can begin now. Thank you, Mr.
15	I think we can begin now. Thank you, Mr.
15 16	I think we can begin now. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell.
15 16 17	I think we can begin now. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell. MR. CALDWELL: Thank you, Madame Chair.
15 16 17 18	I think we can begin now. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell. MR. CALDWELL: Thank you, Madame Chair. Thank you to the TPSC for this
15 16 17 18 19	I think we can begin now. Thank you, Mr. Caldwell. MR. CALDWELL: Thank you, Madame Chair. Thank you to the TPSC for this opportunity to comment. It comes at an important time

I am Jake Caldwell. 1 I'm an attorney in 2 Globalization and Environment Program at the 3 National Wildlife Federation here in Washington, D.C. active in 4 NWF has been trade liberalization and environmental cooperation for over 5 6 ten years. As most of the panel knows, and I know 7 Madame Chair remembers NWF supported NAFTA. creative and cooperative partner in the NAFTA 8 9 negotiations, and I think the NAFTA negotiations are 10 instructive for the FTAA and progress on the FTAA. 11 sense that the environmental the 12 community as a whole was not hostile to NAFTA, there 13 were some disagreements in the environmental 14 community, but in general, the environmental community 15 was there to be a partner in trade liberalization, and 16 I think if we want to move forward on the FTAA, it 17 would behoove us all to try and reengage with the 18 environmental community to move both the environment 19 forward in the hemisphere and trade. 20 We have an historic opportunity here to demonstrate leadership on building a new consensus for 21

trade and the environment. Without that consensus, I

fear that the FTA will not earn the support of the U.S. public and the support of the public throughout the hemisphere.

I want to emphasize that word "consensus" because I think the bottom line comes down to sort of a choice in the road, and we have two ways we can do this. We can go one way, which is sort of damn the torpedoes, keep the environment on the sidelines, and sort of bully forward and end up, I think, with a fairly fractious and fragile result that will make it difficult to secure FTAA approval here in the U.S. and throughout the hemisphere.

Or we can go the consensus approach. We can take a page out of the NAFTA debate and seek partnership and seek cooperation to move both the environment and trade forward. I think we have an opportunity to do the latter.

As a starting point on the road to consensus, the National Wildlife Federation has put forward three principles that are in my written testimony. I just want to highlight them briefly and then get to your questions.

Number one would be trade liberalization should support and not undermine environmental protection. Expanding trade and protection for the environment can be compatible, but on an issue like investment and the investor to state dispute settlement mechanism, we have seen that there can be some problems as they affect the domestic environmental laws and the environmental laws of our trading partners in the hemisphere.

FTAA negotiations should insure that private investors do not receive rights that enable them to undermine U.S. environmental laws, but those of other countries.

The problems with Chapter 11 of NAFTA should not be replicated or duplicated in the FTAA. Specifically we're asking that those bringing expropriation challenges under investment rules will not be granted rights greater than those provided under takings jurisprudence of the U.S. Constitution.

We're asking that there be limits on the terms or definitions of the terms "expropriation" or "fair and minimum" or "fair and minimum treatment,"

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which I believe the latest fast track trade promotion 1 2 authority does call for a clarification of those 3 terms. We're looking for a general safe harbor 4 environmental issues, environmental measures, 5 6 rather, including the possibility of an exception. 7 The possibility of home government, not the where the alleged violation 8 government 9 investment regulations is taking place, but the home 10 government have the authority to sort of say to an 11 investor, "We don't think this claim holds salt, holds 12 water, and we think it should -- you should not bring 13 this claim." 14 So home government authority to disapprove 15 investor claims, improve transparency, opportunity for 16 amicus brief submissions, and appellate review. And as I said, fast track TPA makes some 17 18 progress in these areas. 19 More generally, we're looking for trade 20 agreements that must recognize legitimate national and 21 international environmental standards. We're looking 22 for agreements to insure the nations can enforce their

environmental laws and that they not derogate from their environmental laws.

And, again, fast track TPA recently passed does provide some high standards for these efforts, and we're looking for progress in order to secure our support for an FTAA.

Our second principle involves the United States promoting global consensus. As you know, there's still quite a bit of disagreement amongst our trading partners in exactly what the role of the environment should be in the FTAA negotiations. Wе think the U.S. can demonstrate quite a bit of leadership in promoting capacity building, а systematic program to assess the needs of our trading partners on the environment and move forward.

In this sense, the lessons of NAFTA, again, can be very instructive in terms of what we can do in the area of international environmental cooperation.

My colleagues report from Johannesburg that USTR did put forward a piece on capacity building and trade. Regrettably it had nothing of the -- the

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word "environment" was not a part of that capacity building piece. It's a bit of concern to us that the environmental component of trade was not addressed in capacity building or is not often thought of out of this agency in terms of capacity building.

Our third principle would be the trade negotiations and dispute procedures should be open to the public and made more transparent. We applaud USTR's recent efforts in Geneva at the WTO in opening up or at least seeking to have the dispute settlement procedures opened up a little bit more to the public.

We would hope and expect that similar things could be done in the FTAA process.

In conclusion I just would sign off by saying that I think it's in the interest of all those who support furthering trade and furthering the environment to bring these two together in a forceful manner, with U.S. leadership throughout the hemisphere, and we'll build an FTAA and build a hemisphere that we all can be proud of.

Thanks. I'll be happy to take your questions.

CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: 1 Thank you very 2 much, Mr. Caldwell. 3 Barbara McLeod from EPA will ask the first 4 question. 5 MS. McLEOD: In your suggestions for 6 improvements to the Chapter 11 investor state process, 7 you suggested а safe harbor for environmental provisions. Could you describe a little bit more what 8 9 you mean by the safe harbor? 10 MR. CALDWELL: Sure. I don't think it 11 obviously is open to some exploration and deserves 12 exploration amongst all stakeholders, both government 13 and nongovernmental business, private sector, but I think it's not as hostile or sinister as it sounds. 14 15 It's not a blanket safe harbor for environmental 16 It essentially would take its cue from some 17 of the Article XX exceptions that were well known to 18 the panel in traditional trade law and the WTO and 19 GATT law. 20 And it would essentially put some capacity 21 for a state, local, federal government agency that's 22 come under or has received a threatening letter, a

threatening challenge 1 or а movement towards an 2 international arbitration. It would provide them some 3 avenue to say to folks that, no, we believe that this action on behalf of the environment was 4 interest of the environment, and here's why. 5 6 And sort of as it's traditionally done 7 under U.S. jurisprudence domestically lay out the case for why this was done for environmental reasons, and 8 9 if the environmental measure does not hold water, 10 again, you know, in terms of measuring up to being 11 legitimately for the environment, then potentially it should be deemed a violation of the investment rules. 12 13 But at least anchor some of the 14 jurisprudence that's been going on in the Chapter 11 15 arbitrations to some standards that would allow the 16 environment measure to at least have an opportunity to 17 present the environmental characteristics of 18 measure. 19 So something along Article XX. 20 MS. McLEOD: Thank you. 21 Also, with respect to institutions in the 22 FTAA, you suggest that the U.S. should strengthen, and

I'm quoting from your prepared material, strengthen 1 2 and extend its commitment to environmental cooperation 3 institutions under the NAFTA and beyond. And we were wondering if you had a 4 particular sort of institutional arrangement in mind. 5 6 MR. CALDWELL: I don't have a magic bullet 7 solution. I think we're most interested in what would be the most effective thing for the hemisphere. 8 9 Obviously, NAFTA is not the FTAA in all direct We've got several other countries to 10 comparisons. 11 deal with, several other relationships disproportions on many different levels. So we're not 12 13 wed to one model or the other in any sense. 14 What we're looking for is what would be 15 the most effective way to move forward on both an 16 international environmental cooperation and on trade 17 liberalization. NAFTA is instructive in that there are 18 19 things -- this question is often put as was it better 20 to have environmental provisions in the agreement or 21 in a side agreement. In NAFTA we pursued a side

agreement model with some environmental provisions

actually in the agreement as well.

That should be something that should be looked at in the FTAA context. I'm not saying it should be all in the agreement or all in a side agreement, but I think there should be a healthy mix of institutions and capacity building that could be achieved and that might be more palatable to our trading partners.

So no specific institution in mind, but I think some of the more important efforts and lessons that have been learned from NAFTA should be brought forward, such as citizen submission on failure to enforce, nonderrogation from environmental laws, and some strong transparency measures.

MS. BROWN: Thank you.

With this many countries participating in the FTAA, do you have any concerns about overlap in environmental institution with UNEP and other multilateral arrangements that exist in the hemisphere?

Now I'm speaking about the institution itself, not the structure of the trade agreement.

MR. CALDWELL: Right. I don't have significant concerns about that. I'm not a fan of redundancy either, as most people. So I think perhaps there is a cue there to look at existing institutions, like the OAS and others that could potentially lead the way here in promoting some sort of institutional arrangement that a lot of governments would feel comfortable with.

But I would hope that as we move forward on the environmental piece of the FTAA negotiations we are in close contact with our friends at UNEP, at the OAS, UNCTAD, World Bank, IMF, the whole list, and try and make progress on defining a unique and flexible institutional arrangement for the hemisphere.

MS. BROWN: Last question, and thank you.

We're working very hard on the FRAA, but we also have a couple of other bilateral trade agreements that are coming along quickly. So I'd like to ask whether your recommendation for appellate review, while it, I think, is in trade promotion authority for multilateral agreements, how do you think it would apply to bilateral trade agreements,

1	given the resource constraints that would exist?
2	MR. CALDWELL: In the context of the
3	investment issues or any?
4	MS. BROWN: No, overall, across the board.
5	MR. CALDWELL: Dispute settlement?
6	MS. BROWN: Dispute settlement.
7	MR. CALDWELL: I think I may be alone in
8	my views on this, but I don't think so in those that
9	follow trade matters in believing that the WTO's
10	development of an appellate body mechanism has brought
11	a lot of sanity and a lot of stability to the system,
12	to the rules of the WTO and has brought with it a
13	great deal more confidence on behalf of the
14	environmental community in the functioning of the WTO,
15	and a great deal more confidence, I think, even
16	amongst if I can speak for members of the business
17	community and the private sector as well.
18	So I don't see any reason not to pursue on
19	appellate review type mechanism in the bilaterals with
20	Chile and Singapore. I think that can be done, and I
21	think that would be achievable.
22	If there are resource issues, let's get

those out in the open and let's try and talk about 1 2 those and try and address that problem. 3 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: One additional 4 question from USTR? Jonathan Fritz, please. Thank you very much for your 5 MR. FRITZ: 6 testimony. 7 One thing that you included in the written recommendation that environmental 8 remarks was а 9 reviews be performed, and as you are now aware, we 10 have actually been working on those since the '99 11 executive order, and now it's mandated by TPA. And we certainly look forward to getting NWF's input on the 12 FTAA environmental review. 13 I was just wondering if you folks at NWF 14 15 have already identified environmental issues that are 16 particularly relevant or do you think that merit 17 particular emphasis as far as the FTA negotiations go? 18 You know, I don't think MR. CALDWELL: 19 anything that would be news to you guys or to anyone 20 else in the hemisphere. I would defer actually to a 21 lot of my colleagues down in the countries throughout 22 the hemisphere for their input on that.

But I must say in terms of the overall environmental review process, we've been slightly disappointed in that it doesn't appear to be living up to either the guidelines, I think, or the executive order in the sense that our hope for the environmental review process, and I can't over emphasize how important we feel the environmental review process is to the future of the trade environment linkage and also just the future of the economic integration either in the Western Hemisphere or throughout the world.

This is an important thing to get right, and it's an important thing to do well in order to build trust on so many different levels, and we feel that in many ways the environmental review process to date is still suffering from a bit of the where's the -- we're going forward with trade liberalization. Where's the environmental problems that are associated with that?

It's sort of a post hoc look at the issues, and we would prefer to see a little more aggressive stance on some of the positive things that

1	might come out of trade liberalization for the
2	environment, some ways that suggest, okay, we're going
3	to attempt to integrate the economies of these
4	countries. What are some of the gains we can get for
5	the environment on these issues?
6	There does still seem to be a bit of a
7	sense that these are sort of done in a back room by
8	someone locked in, some unfortunate person locked in
9	the room and pounding away on them and not a whole lot
10	of real world experience to that.
11	But we will do our best to get not only
12	our input into you, but also our colleagues throughout
13	the hemisphere on specific issues that might be of
14	concern to you.
15	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
16	much, Mr. Caldwell.
17	Did you have another question? No, you're
18	done.
19	Thank you very much.
20	MR. CALDWELL: Thank you.
21	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Our next witness
22	is Maureen Heffern Ponicki of the American Friends

1	Service Committee, U.S. Gender in Trade Network.
2	Good afternoon.
3	MS. PONICKI: Good afternoon. I want to
4	thank you all, as well, for giving us the opportunity
5	to testify.
6	I work for the American Friends Service
7	Committee, which is a Quaker organization that works
8	both abroad and in the U.S., and I'm also here
9	representing the U.S. Gender in Trade Network.
10	And I decided to just talk specifically
11	about a few issues. There are other issues with
12	respect to the FTAA that the FSC has concerns about,
13	but specifically we're going to just touch on a few
14	today.
15	The first is we request that U.S.
16	negotiators demand more clarity in the language that
17	exempts public services from the FTAA. Currently the
18	draft tax relies on exemption as outlined in the GATS
19	agreement, which states that an exemption applies when
20	a service is supplied neither on a commercial basis
21	nor in competition with one or more service suppliers.
22	This definition would not guarantee the

exemption of our public education system, nor of our social services. Most governments have farmed out services to nonprofits who compete with other nonprofits and many government services nowadays include fees. Therefore, this exemption would hardly protect these critical services.

Furthermore, and I think this is one of the important points, privatization of human services, such as education and social services, should be determined at a local level by the diverse stakeholders in that community.

Local communities, as we know, have been tackling this contentious issue of privatization for many years with many differing opinions, and I think the important thing is that we not take that decision away from them by leaving in language that is vague, open to loopholes which could be eroded in future negotiations, and which would be close to impossible to reverse.

The national treatment rule contained in the agreement could entitle private foreign companies to equal rights to compete against local public

providers for funds to perform 1 service public 2 services. This clause also has implications for water 3 collection and water delivery. If private service provision of water 4 causes prices to spike, as they did in Bolivia after 5 6 the Bechtel Corporation privatized Cochabamba's water 7 system, as is happening in Nicaragua currently, there will be a detrimental impact on poor families, and 8 9 especially women and children in developing countries. 10 And think sometimes that may 11 redundant, but important to kind of point out. For example, if the price is too high for 12 13 poor families as a result of privatization, women will be faced with rationing water for their families or 14 15 substituting unsanitary water for clean water when 16 necessary. 17 Therefore, our recommendation would be 18 that the U.S. government exclude public education, 19 especially K through 12, social services, 20 critical human services, and water from the FTAA 21 agreement through the use of carve-outs.

Secondly, the U.S. government

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should

negotiate limits on the number of service providers in 1 2 a certain sector or region and allow each country some 3 flexibility to protect local businesses that are vital to the national economy. 4 In addition, local governments should not 5 be prohibited from limiting the number of ecologically 6 7 damaging service activity in a certain area like toxic waste processing, mining, oil drilling, et cetera. 8 9 Currently the draft text prohibits limits 10 on the number of private education, health care, 11 prison, water supply, and other companies that can operate in a given community, and that's a concern for 12 13 us. With respect to domestic regulation, the 14 15 U.S. government should not curtail the ability of 16 national and local jurisdictions to protect 17 residents. Limitations on domestic regulation through 18 the no more burdensome than necessary language would 19 limit local governments from doing that. 20 Service rules would put worker health and

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safety laws on staffing, professional

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licensing,

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standards,

education

curriculum, and other public interest regulations at risk.

The U.S. government should inform the public of how they intend to protect domestic regulations, and we don't see that as prohibiting any type of fair trade.

Fourth, with respect to government procurement, the U.S. should be able to use government contracts as a means to promote equity. Currently the draft text would prevent governments from giving preferences to local firms in granting contracts and would ban governments from setting qualifications other than price and quality and consider other kinds of criteria as, quote, unnecessary barriers to trade.

Many small, women owned, and other minority owned businesses have been able to benefit from government set-asides and incentives. Workers and concerned citizens across the country have fought hard for the passage of living wage legislation. An agreement being negotiated at the international level should not be able to impact the democratic decisions that are being made at the local level.

The inclusion of these protections, again, 1 2 will not inhibit fair trade. There is support for the 3 use of government purchasing decisions to promote goals of equity across this country, and we urge the 4 U.S. negotiators not to undermine these democratically 5 6 made decisions. 7 And lastly, impact assessments. Complete evaluations of the social gender and environmental 8 9 impacts of a possible FTAA must be conducted. 10 assessments are a necessary intermediate step in the 11 process of educating the public, as well 12 prerequisite for negotiating just policies 13 benefit the majority of people. At a minimum, we request that the U.S. 14 15 conduct these assessments. We would also expect the 16 U.S. to then advocate for assessments to be conducted 17 by other FTAA countries and at a hemispheric level. 18 Lastly, a critical component which I know 19 has been a contentious component of a legitimate 20 assessment would be a wide and diverse consultation 21 with civil society.

Thank you.

1	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
2	much, Ms. Ponicki.
3	We have a question from Kimberly Claman
4	and then questions? Mr. Clatanoff.
5	MS. CLAMAN: Thank you.
6	Thank you for coming today.
7	Could you please tell us what your
8	definition of social services is and what is your
9	definition of other critical human services?
10	MS. PONICKI: I think that could be
11	discussed in terms of what the carve-out would be, but
12	for the most part the concern is essential public
13	services that if they weren't protected and provided
14	by the public sector, that there would be problems or
15	risks of access depending on different income levels.
16	So, for example, the provision of welfare
17	right now and the basic income support safety net.
18	That has been, quote, unquote, privatized to the
19	extent that there are different nonprofits, and
20	there's where our concern is.
21	I, for one, used to work for a nonprofit
22	that did some of this work, and so very much there was

a competitive element and where our concern is that in 1 2 reading the language of the law, the devil be in the 3 details and how it's interpreted. But anyway, I think the essential services 4 where there would be a concern that somebody of lower 5 6 income would be eliminated from access, and that's why 7 we also include water as being such an important commodity that all people need access to. 8 9 But some people would also argue for 10 minimal public health system so that there is still 11 equity of access to health services. 12 Thank you. 13 MS. CLAMAN: You're welcome. 14 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: 15 MR. CLATANOFF: I'm going to start 16 backwards on your testimony. Your last point on this 17 complete evaluation of, quote, social, gender, and environmental impact, you're aware, I'm sure, that 18 19 since Executive Order 12141 put out in 1999, there 20 have been environmental impacts. Recently enacted 21 trade promotion authority legislation now requires

employment impact analysis.

Is this enough? 1 2 MS. PONICKI: No. 3 MR. CLATANOFF: No. Do you have, or not 4 today, but could you give us a methodology or procedure on how we would do a, quote, social impact 5 6 analysis? 7 MS. PONICKI: Yes, yes. And I recognize that that is a difficult thing to do, and I think just 8 9 to state that our concern is especially in the U.S. 10 when we've looked at the impact of trade, we look in 11 terms of employment and wages, and that's important. But trade has changed from what it was 30 12 13 years ago, and as we look at different things, it 14 includes different aspects that will have a different 15 impact on women and on different sectors of society. 16 So even the trade negotiation process and 17 your ability to influence that, if you were in labor, 18 environment, or by industry, you have a formal seat at 19 the table. But if somebody, let's say a community 20 based organization that has been fighting for the 21 living wage and they have no formal route of access 22 and at the same time we're not formally assessing,

1	what would be the impact on somebody like that?
2	And I think that the important thing about
3	assessments is saying trade has changed, and we think
4	trade is important, but as we go forward and as we
5	amplify it to include many more sectors, to include
6	services and not just goods, we need to take a good
7	look at all of these different levels of impacts.
8	So to answer the second question, Women's
9	Edge, which is an organization that looks at gender in
10	trade, they have put together a draft legislation that
11	outlines in extensive detail a methodology for how to
12	go about a social and gender impact assessment, and I
13	can get that on to whoever.
14	MR. CLATANOFF: Okay. Appreciate it.
15	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Would you send
16	it by E-mail to gblue@ustr?
17	MS. PONICKI: G?
18	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: G.
19	MS. PONICKI: G?
20	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Blue, b-l-u-e,
21	one word, @ustr.gov.
22	MR. CLATANOFF: Frankly, which I don't

understand here, your goal, "the U.S. government 1 2 should negotiate limits on the number of service 3 providers in certain sector." In particular I see 4 this in your social services again. As I understand what we're talking about 5 6 in FTAA, if you're -- that's one sector that you 7 mentioned, K through 12. Okay? We're not saying that -- nothing that I 8 9 have seen proposed with brackets or not would say that 10 you can't have this as a government provision of K 11 through 12, and we're not saying you can't say it's 12 only a government provision. But if you allow private provision of 13 primary education services, you can't exclude foreign 14 15 investors from it. 16 What's the logic of putting a ceiling, a 17 limit on the number of service providers? Well, I think it would 18 MS. PONICKI: 19 depend on the sector and depend on the concrete 20 situation, but the danger of not providing or making 21 it trade illegal to put a limit is that that decision 22 then gets taken away from a local area who there may be good reason to provide a limit.

I think it's probably a little bit easier to see when you look at something like toxic waste processing or other things that may have ecological damage, and if you have more than one service provider, there could be damage.

So I think it would depend on each sector. With education, that's a hard one to answer, and I think what the concern is that take Philadelphia, for example. There's been a hard, you know, fight going on there in terms of who should be allocating education services, and we know that the state hasn't done a phenomenal job of that, and there's incredible disparity with our public education system, but that's to be determined at the local level.

Let them fight it out. Let's talk about whether the state or private provision of those services.

MR. CLATANOFF: That's exactly right.

Those should be local decisions. Why then in a multilateral, multilateral trade agreement do you want to mandate a ceiling?

1	MS. PONICKI: No, we want
2	MR. CLATANOFF: That's what your statement
3	says. We should negotiate limits on the number of
4	service providers.
5	MS. PONICKI: The alternate says there
6	shall be no limit. So what the language of the trade
7	agreement is saying is if you put a limit on, that's
8	not all right. So what we're asking for is the
9	flexibility that if you see fit that a limit is right,
10	then go ahead.
11	Then if somebody else says a limit isn't
12	and that jurisdiction wants to let more service
13	provides for whatever service, then they let that be.
14	So it's the flexibility to leave that open, so to not
15	mandate that you can't do that.
16	MR. CLATANOFF: Okay. It's an important
17	clarification.
18	MS. McLEOD: Actually there are exceptions
19	to the performance requirement limitations for
20	environmental and other regulatory systems. So it may
21	not be enough, but we've tried to take that into
22	account.

1	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
2	much, Ms. Ponicki.
3	MS. PONICKI: Thank you.
4	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: We have joining
5	us on the panel now Barbara Chattin, our market access
6	negotiator for agriculture.
7	Welcome, Barbara. You can sit here.
8	Our next witness will be Jaime Castenada.
9	I hope I'm pronouncing that right, of the National
10	Milk Producers Federation.
11	MR. CASTENADA: Good afternoon, Madame
12	Chairman and you did pronounce it correctly. I
13	appreciate it and committee member.
14	My name is Jaime Castenada. I'm Vice
15	President of the National Milk Producers Federation
16	and a senior advisor to the U.S. Dairy Export Council.
17	I am pleased to appear before you today to
18	testify on the topic of the free trade area of the
19	Americas and the potential economic impact to the
20	dairy industry and, in particular to U.S. dairy
21	producers.
22	The National Milk Producers Federation

represents the large majority of dairy farmers in the United States and the co-ops that they own, and the U.S. Dairy Export Council is a membership organization that represents processors, producers, and exporters in assisting them to expand U.S. exports.

Madame Chairman, as is stated in our written comments, an initial view of the economics of supply and demand suggest that the U.S. dairy industry has an incentive to support an FTAA that includes all Western Hemisphere nations.

In fact, every Latin American country except Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Nicaragua is a net importer of dairy products. The region as a whole imports three and a half times as much dairy products as it exports.

The United States produced more milk, cheese, milk powder, whey and lactose than all of the other 34 countries in the hemisphere combined. These economic opportunities in Latin America will be hugely complemented by eliminating current trade barriers in our largest trading partner just to the north, Canada.

Madame Chairman, the potential economic benefits from the FTAA are real, but they can only exceed the cost for the U.S. dairy industry if the agreement properly addresses several issues of critical importance to us. Today I will discuss three of the most important.

First, rules of origin. As a regional trade agreement, it is imperative that the FTAA does not provide windfall benefits to known parties. Consequently, the first and foremost objectives of the FTAA need to be the specific rules of origin that insures dairy trade benefits to only the member countries.

We, therefore, strongly the FTAA include the same rules of origin for daily products and products containing dairy components, including the minimum rules that are included in the North American Free Trade Agreement.

The second critical element, third party export subsidies. FTAA negotiators must also address the issue of export subsidies. If the United States agreed to stop using export subsidies, we must then

insure that our trading partners do not accept subsidized product from outside the hemisphere. As an example of how critical this element is, in the most recent year of subsidy notification to the WTO, the EU has spent more than 100 times what the United States has spent.

A third key element of the economic viability of the FTAA for the U.S. dairy industry and extremely important is the inclusion of the Canadian dairy industry in the agreement. There is a consensus that the failure to bring Canada on board could be the most serious barrier to dairy negotiations.

In the past, with the U.S.-Canada free trade agreement, with NAFTA, and with recent trade agreements with Chile and Costa Rica, Canada has been able to keep dairy off the bargaining table. The real challenge for FTAA negotiators will be finding a way to bring the Canadian dairy industry into the agreement.

Unfortunately, if Canada wins and it stays out, the U.S. dairy industry may also reject participation in the FTAA.

Because of the urgency of this matter, it is inexplicable that a 1998 ERS study on the economic impacts of FTAA assumed that Canada would again exempt its dairy from the agreement, but not the United States.

In conclusion, our own estimates would indicate that the range of economic outcomes from the FTAA for the U.S. dairy industry could range from a loss for U.S. dairy producers and U.S. dairy industry in general of well over \$1 billion annually from a badly fought agreement to a gain of over \$400 million per year from an agreement that fully addresses the issues and concerns we have raised in this testimony.

Madame Chairman, let me reiterate that we believe that the overall economic net benefits to the U.S. dairy industry would be positive from an FTAA agreement that properly addresses the issues discussed above. But if not, several thousand dairy farmers and small dairy companies will be forced out of business.

Therefore, the devil is truly in the details, and the support or position of our industry depends on the type of agreement that is negotiated.

1	Thank you for the opportunity to testify.
2	I'll be happy to answer any questions.
3	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
4	much.
5	MR. KARAWA: Mr. Castenada, thank you very
6	much for your eloquent testimony.
7	As you noted in your testimony, the first
8	critical issue regarding rules of origin or specific
9	rules of origin, and you mentioned that the foremost
10	objective of the FTAA needs to be the specific rules
11	of origin that insure data trade benefits only to the
12	member countries.
13	Have you had an opportunity to review and
14	comment on the proposed FTAA specific rules of origin
15	which are in the original rule at USTR?
16	MR. CASTENADA: We are in the process. I
17	think we're still on time to provide the specific
18	details on the rules of origin, but, yes, we are
19	working on it, and will have specific details on that
20	issue.
21	MR. KARAWA: Thank you. We wanted to make
22	sure that we noted that.

1 MR. CASTENADA: Let me state, Mr. Karawa, 2 that I appreciate very much what you and Ms. Barbara 3 Chattin are doing in the FTAA. Thank you for your kind 4 MR. KARAWA: words. 5 6 I have one more question. In your written 7 testimony, you mentioned that you have indicated that you estimate the U.S. imports in milk equivalent units 8 9 will increase by four million pounds annually without 10 adequate rules of origin. 11 Could you please elaborate how you arrive at these figures? 12 13 MR. CASTENADA: Yes. What we did is we 14 assume what the possibility of New Zealand, Australia, 15 European dairy exports could actually be going to 16 specific countries in Latin America primarily, and how 17 new plants will be placed there, and what we simply 18 did is try to see how fast they could actually spend 19 and with certain limitations on the amount of product. 20 But obviously Europe has plenty 21 product. Australia is still growing. New Zealand is 22 still growing, and we can see as an example just Chile

and other agreements between New Zealand and Nestle, for instance, in the Americas, that could easily expand their ability to export product here, and the only thing they have to do is, for instance, to produce cheese is import nonfat dried milk or milk proteins, a little bit of fat, mix it, and then just send that product here.

MS. CHATTIN: You also mentioned in your testimony the importance of addressing third party export subsidies into the hemisphere, and this is something, you know, the leaders or trade ministers agree that we want to aim for the objective of a hemisphere free of agricultural export subsidies, and certainly getting a handle on EU and other users of export subsidies in the hemisphere is a very important aspect of that.

It's also a very technically and legally difficult challenge just in terms of developing mechanisms that are consistent with the WTO and that can be applied by FTAA members, and I just wondered if you had any more specific thoughts in terms of possible mechanisms to do that or if at a later time

1	your industry has thoughts, you could communicate
2	those to us because it's something that we're all
3	aiming for.
4	But it is kind of a technical challenge to
5	come up with the best mechanisms in the hemisphere to
6	accomplish this.
7	MR. CASTENADA: Yes. No, I couldn't agree
8	more with you, and I share your frustration of finding
9	a true key mechanism, and to be honest, I mean, the
10	only thing we could ever think about is to actually as
11	you're doing, go for elimination of export subsidies
12	in a multilateral context in the WTO.
13	And in the meantime, make sure that if
14	other countries have access to the markets using
15	export subsidies, we will be able to also use export
16	subsidies as it is in the NAFTA.
17	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr.
18	Castenada.
19	MR. CASTENADA: Thank you.
20	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Our next witness
21	is Richard Hudgins of the California Cling Peach
22	Board.

The floor is yours, sir. 1 2 MR. HUDGINS: Thank you. 3 Good afternoon, Madame Chair, members of My name is Richard Hudgins. 4 the committee. President of the California Canning Peach Association, 5 here today on behalf of the California Cling Peach 6 7 Board. With me also is Carolyn Gleason, with the firm McDermott, Will & Emory. She is the board's 8 9 Washington counsel here in D.C. 10 The board represents all 750 growers and 11 four processors of cling peaches in California. Its membership represents more than 98 percent of the 12 13 entire U.S. cling peach industry. 14 Cling peaches are used primarily 15 produce canned peaches and canned fruit mixtures. 16 As the committee may remember from the 17 board's past appearances on FTAA and other trade 18 initiatives, industry, more than most our 19 agriculture sectors, is highly import sensitive. 20 growers and processors stand to lose in important ways 21 tariffs peach products if U.S. on canned 22 eliminated or even reduced in favor of competitive

producers in Chile, Argentina, and other Latin

American countries.

The board is, therefore, asking that our principal cling peach products be excluded from tariff reductions in the FTAA. We are seeking that same treatment for cling peach products in the U.S.-Chile FTA talks. A list of our products and their corresponding U.S. tariffs are included as an attachment to the board's written comments.

Our industry's most important products and corresponding tariffs are the 17 percent U.S. tariff on canned peaches, the 14.9 percent tariff on canned fruit mixtures, and the 14 and a half percent tariff on frozen peaches. All three have been identified as import sensitive agricultural products in the trade promotion authority legislation for purposes of trade negotiations, including the FTAA.

Moreover, there are products that have repeatedly been shielded from GSP requests because of their trade sensitivity.

Our industry's import sensitivity derives principally from a 20 year old dispute with Europe

over excessive EU canned peach subsidies. This year's national trade estimate report confirms that EU shipments of heavily subsidized canned peaches continue to distort world markets to the detriment of U.S. producers.

Because of the EU subsidies, you will see in Attachment 2 of our written submission that we have lost our entire market in Europe, most of our market in Japan, and more recently, large parts of our markets in Canada and Mexico.

This marketing year, U.S. canned peach exports fell to their lowest level in the last 40 years, down 40 percent from a year ago. These losses are occurring because we cannot compete with the low subsidized prices of our competitors despite the high quality of our product.

Our inability to match subsidized prices has essentially forced us to sell either in the U.S. market or not at all. Unfortunately, even our U.S. market, which has relatively good tariff production, is at risk. Low price imports are entering from Greece, Spain, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, China,

Thailand, and other foreign sources.

As shown in Attachment 3 of our written submission, U.S. imports of canned peaches increased again this marketing year, ended last May, reaching a record three million cases, or more than 15 percent of total U.S. canned peach production. This is the equivalent of \$54 million in lost sales based on an average selling price of \$18 a case.

Since the U.S. market is mature and dominated by institutional sales, these low priced imports in all instances prevent the sale of U.S. produced canned peaches and severely depress the U.S. market price.

Our losses in the U.S. market are on top of other turbulent industry pressures. We continue, for example, to suffer fallout from the bankruptcy two years ago of Tri-Valley Growers, which at the time was the industry's largest processor and grower owned cooperative.

This year one of the three processing plants remaining from the Tri-Valley bankruptcy closed its doors. An immediate effect of the closure is that

some 1,000 seasonal workers are out of a job.

With that closing, the industry has gone from 20 processing plants canning peaches to just seven in the space of only ten years. Once again, the principal reason for the closure is the growing competition from low priced imports.

Moreover, this year, we face a large cling peach crop and the prospect of larger carryover stocks next year. Since the U.S. market is now our only outlet for most of this production, our growers and processors cannot afford further losses in U.S. sales.

Both the industry and the U.S. government are working hard to stabilize the U.S. market and return U.S. growers and processors to profitability. Our efforts include several industry funded tree pull programs and a record level U.S. government purchase surplus canned peaches this year for school lunch and other federal programs.

The industry and the USDA are also jointly funding export promotion programs to try to increase our lagging exports. These efforts to restore profitability cannot succeed, however, if our sales

and price structure in the U.S. market are further eroded.

Simply put, without adequate protections, further erosion is inevitable under the FTAA. Chile and Argentina are already competitive producers and exporters of canned peaches and other cling peach products. We have heard directly from producers in both Chile and Argentina that they intend to export more canned peaches to the U.S. market if our U.S. tariffs are eliminated or even reduced under that or other trade initiatives.

There are no reciprocal opportunities in the Latin American markets for U.S. canned peaches even with duty free access. Chile, Argentina and other FTAA countries are small canned peach markets, primarily for low priced product, and are fully supplied by Latin American producers under regional trade agreements.

Thus, for our industry, FTAA will not be welcomed. Because the U.S. market is so critical to our industry's recovery, we cannot return to being a profitable U.S. agriculture sector unless our U.S.

duties are maintained. 1 2 We need the U.S. government's support to 3 insure that canned peaches and other import sensitive 4 peach products are exempted from reductions in the FTAA. If exemptions from tariff 5 6 elimination are not granted on any products, then our 7 industry needs assurance that our import sensitive products will be granted the longest phaseout period 8 9 permitted under FTAA. Members of the committee, our industry 10 11 appreciates this opportunity to discuss our FTAA 12 concerns with you. I would be happy to respond to any 13 questions you may have. 14 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very 15 much. 16 We'll turn to you, Barbara. Do you have 17 any questions? 18 We appreciate you MS. CHATTIN: Yes. 19 coming here to testify, and I think we all recognize 20 the sensitivity of the cling peach industry in these 21 negotiations. 22 I would just point out something I'm sure

you already know, that the ministers have agreed that a basic principle of the negotiation is that all tariffs are subject to negotiation. That doesn't preclude where you end up, but in terms of an approach to the negotiations, all countries have agreed that all of their tariffs will be subject to negotiation.

One question I had was I listened very carefully to what you said about having the longest possible phaseout time if all products end up being phased out. I was just wondering if it would be of any value to your industry during that usually -- I mean staged elimination of tariffs is certainly something that's a very standard part of any kind of tariff negotiation. So that's an idea that we clearly can work with your industry on.

But if, in addition, there would be a value to your industry in terms of thinking of transitional safeguard measures, measures in the context of the FTAA -- I'm not talking about changing any of the fundamental legislation or changing fundamental WTO provisions -- but some sort of safeguard mechanisms developed in the context strictly

the FTAA might be something that might be of 1 2 interest to your industry. 3 MR. HUDGINS: Remember that our industry comes from a background of nearly 20 years of dispute 4 with regard to the canned peach subsidies in Greece, 5 6 and so understandably, we are somewhat leery for a 7 theoretical based adjustment program. What we do understand are tariffs, and we 8 9 do understand that we need the maximum protection 10 afforded to us in a phaseout of tariffs, backloading 11 any reduction to the maximum extent possible so that 12 we are afforded the minimal impact on the front end of 13 any tariff reduction. 14 Certainly, I recognize that we have just 15 come off a record year of cling peach imports, and we cannot stand any further import pressure from anywhere 16 17 in the globe. I would like to reiterate 18 MR. KARAWA: 19 what Barbara just mentioned about that do 20 understand your concerns, and we do also share your 21 frustrations, especially with the EU subsidizing

imports.

However, I would like to ask you if you could elaborate further. You said you had some economic adjustment programs which are underway. Could you give us more? How do you foresee that these programs are going to work out? And what kind of results are you getting so far?

MR. HUDGINS: Most recently we have been working with the USDA under the market access program to try to expand the limited export sales opportunities that are available to our industry. As I said, we have essentially lost the entire market in Europe, essentially all of Japan. We have been reduced to essentially focusing on the neighboring countries, Canada and Mexico.

We have put grower funds to go with the USDA MAP monies into both Mexico and to Canada. In addition, the Cling Peach Board has put additional grower funding into Mexico to try to expand our export sales into Mexico for the current crop year.

At this point we have seen a small measure of success in Mexico, have seen no incremental sales to date in Canada. So, again, it's an ongoing

It is one where we are continuing to try to 1 process. 2 maintain those markets that do not require us to put 3 product on the water, but know that we are up against 4 foreign competition that can undercut in essentially any market in the world in which they 5 6 choose to enter. 7 CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Mr. Leahy from the ITC. 8 9 MR. LEAHY: Okay. Just one quick 10 question, and I'll probably to my chagrin find out 11 that you've already given the ITC this information at 12 some point in time. 13 But you mentioned Chile and Argentina as 14 being some of the countries that have been part of the 15 big increase to imports. Can you give me some idea of just how they compare to the Europeans and others in 16 17 the market? MR. HUDGINS: The real players for us with 18 19 regard to imports coming into the U.S. obviously are 20 the EU. The EU would account for about 75 percent of 21 the import volume coming into the country this past 22 year.

Chile would account for less than five 1 2 percent of the total imports coming into the country. 3 Argentina, a small number as well. Bear in mind though that the Chileans and 4 to a lesser degree the Argentineans are also supplies 5 the market in Mexico, and as such, we 6 7 additional opportunities to export into Mexico as a result. 8 9 MR. LEAHY: If Chile and Argentina were to benefit from liberalized tariffs in the U.S. market, 10 11 would that help them in their competition with the EU? 12 if the Chileans and the MR. HUDGINS: 13 Argentineans were to receive duty reductions coming 14 into the U.S. market, there is no doubt in my mind 15 that we will see more imports from those countries 16 entering the U.S. market. 17 They have the frustrations same 18 competing with the low priced Greek product in other 19 markets around the world. The U.S. market is still a 20 very attractive market for all of the players, and we 21 will see more product entering what is already a

burdensome domestic industry from Chile and Argentina.

1	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
2	much.
3	Our next witness is Dennis McDonald on
4	behalf of the Ranchers-Cattlemen Action Legal Fund,
5	United Stockgrowers of America.
6	Welcome, Mr. McDonald.
7	MR. McDONALD: Hello, Madame Chairman,
8	ladies and gentlemen. I'm Dennis McDonald. My wife
9	Sharon and our four children live and ranch in south
10	central Montana. We operate a cow-calf operation.
11	I traveled from Montana to here to give my
12	comments this afternoon and to hopefully make use of
13	your valuable time. I have done so because I have a
14	profound love and passion for ranching, our heritage
15	and our culture.
16	In addition to being associated with
17	RCALF-USA, I am the Montana Cattlemen's Association
18	Vice President and have served on the ATAC Committee
19	for the last four years.
20	I travel to Argentina, Brazil, and Uruguay
21	in connection with the Sixth Business Forum of the
22	Americas last year, and I'm schedule to travel to

Ecuador in October.

I come before you at a time when the live cattle industry and the family grassroots level in this country is in a state of crisis. We have been producing the best tasting, the most nutritious, the cleanest, healthiest cattle in the world, and we are in the eighth year of marketing our product at or below cost of production.

Recently USDA has reported that we have lost 72,000 family ranching operations in the country, and more recently we have lost 14,000 family feeding operations in feedlots across the country.

The recent U.S. calf crop as reported in 2001 was the smallest since the 1950s. U.S. producers have not produced enough cattle to meet our domestic beef demands since the late 1940s.

However, between 1996 and 2000, cattle imports into the U.S. have increased by 11 percent and live finished cattle prices have declined 20 percent.

My family just finished feeding a pen of excellent cattle. The cattle graded 85 percent choice or better. They were all natural cattle, that is, no

antibiotics, raised 1 hormones, no in the most 2 environmentally prudent manner. 3 We lost \$140 per head over our cost. suffer this lost against the backdrop of the U.S. 4 importing nearly 2.6 million head of live cattle from 5 6 Mexico and Canada. 7 Increased imports of beef have also reduced returns to U.S. cattle producers. 8 The rule of 9 thumb within the industry is that a one percent 10 increase in beef supplies decreases prices of live 11 cattle by one and a half to two percent. 12 I am aware that the cause of our economic 13 stress is multifaceted. Concentration in the packing 14 industry and lack of marketing power by family 15 producers certainly contributes to the losses we're 16 suffering. 17 But cheap beef imports often controlled by 18 these same market forces exaggerate the ultimate 19 downward effect on producers' bottom line. 20 Currency fluctuations, of course, are also a factor, but the ultimate result cannot be mistaken. 21 22 It manifests itself in the boarding up of our rural

main streets, the closing of our rural schools. It threatens our culture, our heritage, and our way of life.

I believe ranching in the rural United States has a contribution to make to American values and actually contributes to the moral compass of our country.

The market results of increased cheap foreign beef and life cattle have not benefitted the consumer. In the face of record imports and record availability of beef, consumer prices have risen to historic highs, while family producers continue to receive a smaller portion of the retail dollar, 70 percent in the late 1970s, 40 percent today.

In 2001, retail prices were nine percent above 2000 levels. Beef imports reached historic levels. Australia, for example, reached its end quota limit and will dos o again this year, as will New Zealand.

While fed cattle prices were 14 per hundredweight lower, resulting in losses to finished cattle producers of approximately \$160 per animal, I

conclude, therefore, that changes in tariffs which result in lower cattle prices will not necessarily also reduce retail beef prices for consumers.

In my written submission I have discussed the effect of imports on the historic cattle site. I won't take time to repeat these remarks other than to say the cycle has been disrupted and elongated. Presently the live cattle industry is contracting, and liquidation is in full swing.

It is exasperated by areas of severe and prolonged drought throughout the country and grasshopper infestations.

Under the Trade Promotion Act of 2002, all agriculture products that are subject to a TRQ are deemed import sensitive agriculture products. Given the close connection between changes in beef supplies and live cattle prices, it is entirely appropriate for USTR to consider cattle to also be an import sensitive agriculture product.

Senators Grassley, Harkin, Baucus,
Daschle, and others in their colloquy attached to the
TPA legislation categories cattle as such. This

categorization is particularly important 1 in the 2 proposed FTAA. 3 Brazil's cow herd exceeds 165 million head Argentina has another 55 million head. 4 of cattle. Add Uruquay, Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, and on and 5 6 on, and pretty soon you're talking real numbers. 7 The U.S. cow herd, by the way, in comparison is 96 million head, and you can see that 8 9 the potential is there to overrun and ruin our 10 domestic live cattle industry. 11 Last year in Brazil I was there. A 750 12 pound calf off grass was selling for the equivalent of 13 35 cents per pound. Our cost of production for the same weight calf as reported by USDA is 76 cents, 14 higher in the northern tier states because of winter 15 16 feed costs, lower in the South, but that's the 17 average. 18 Recently finished cattle in Argentina was 19 selling for as low as 18 cents a pound U.S. Presently 20 finished cattle prices in the U.S. were in the mid-

60s, and I've covered the losses being sustained as a

result thereof.

21

It's probably not appropriate here 1 2 discuss health concerns associated with South American 3 beef and cattle. That's for another day. But it's an issue on every U.S. producer's mind. 4 Often the effects of health problems are 5 6 borne by innocent producers who never benefit from the 7 imports. I'm thinking of the bovine TB problem presently in and the 8 Texas enormous cost that 9 producers in Texas may realize as a result of losing 10 their TB free status. 11 I know my time is about up, but in view of 12 the few thoughts I've shared with you, I urge you to 13 consider the impact on family cattle producers as we 14 launch FTAA negotiations and the inevitable lowering 15 of tariffs and perhaps eliminating tariff rate quotas 16 on beef, hopefully over some prolonged period of time. 17 Remember your actions which may benefit 18 the large, global conglomerates may not necessarily 19 benefit family producers of live cattle across rural 20 America. 21 Finally, one last comment on country of 22 origin matters. I've had the opportunity recently to

1	travel across 12 states and speak to many cattle
2	organizations. No issue is more important to
3	producers than country of origin labeling.
4	Producers felt we won a tremendous victory
5	by having Senator Johnson's consumer's right to know
6	legislation incorporated into the farm bill, which our
7	President signed. We are greatly concerned that
8	perhaps USTR may undertake to use a different
9	definition other than that which is now the law of the
10	land.
11	Thank you, and I'd be happy to answer any
12	questions you might pose.
13	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you for
14	traveling so far to give your testimony.
15	Do you have questions, Barbara? Shall we
16	go first to Omar?
17	MS. CHATTIN: Yeah.
18	MR. KARAWA: Thank you, Mr. McDonald, for
19	your testimony.
20	I have one question. This is regarding to
21	your written testimony. You suggested in testimony
22	that special rules should be developed for the

treatment of perishable and cyclical agriculture 1 2 products. 3 In order to understand better, could you provide us what kind of ideas you have or what kind of 4 special rules are you contemplating? 5 6 MR. McDONALD: First, to put it in proper 7 context, the industry is concerned with the situation that we experienced in 1998 with collapse in commodity 8 9 cattle prices and rising imports. So we have 10 suggested a snap-back formula that might encompass the 11 ten-year average, the last ten-year average on cattle 12 prices and relate that to either tariff rate quotas or 13 tariffs sufficient to realize that ten-year average on 14 cattle prices. 15 I've heard other suggestions. There may 16 be other formulas. You know, we're not married to 17 that concept, but we do feel strongly that we need 18 some protection in those instances, again, 19 collapsing commodity prices and rising imports to 20 protect the industry. 21 You had mentioned in your MS. CHATTIN: 22 oral statements about the relative cost of production

1	of live cattle in various countries. Do you have any
2	estimate in terms of transportation costs what it
3	would cost like to transport cattle from like Brazil
4	or Argentina to the U.S.?
5	MR. McDONALD: I do, Barbara. A year or
6	so ago I was feeding cattle at Grand Island, Nebraska,
7	and that entity had calculated that that 35 cent calf,
8	750 pound calf, that they could purchase in Brazil,
9	they could unload it in Houston for an additional 25
10	cents, which put that calf in Houston at around 60
11	cents, still 16 cents below our cost of production of
12	the same animal.
13	MS. CHATTIN: Okay. Thank you.
13	MS. CHATTIN: Okay. Thank you. CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Anymore
14	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Anymore
14 15	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Anymore questions?
14 15 16	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Anymore questions? (No response.)
14 15 16 17	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Anymore questions? (No response.) CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr.
14 15 16 17 18	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Anymore questions? (No response.) CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr. McDonald.
14 15 16 17 18 19	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Anymore questions? (No response.) CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr. McDonald. Our next witness is Susan Brauner,

afternoon and to discuss the importance of negotiating 1 2 an agreement to create a free trade area of the 3 We certainly support this effort, and we look forward to its completion. 4 With me this afternoon is our counsel, Julian Herrin. 6 7 I am testifying today as a representative of Blue Diamond Growers. We're located in Sacramento, 8 9 California. Blue Diamond is a nonprofit, farmer owned 10 marketing cooperative. It markets almonds for its 11 members. The almonds are grown exclusively in 12 California and are the largest tree nut crop in the 13 state. Almonds are the number one agricultural 14 15 export from California. They rank in the top three 16 consumer food items in this country. 17 Blue Diamond Growers exports for 18 majority of the almond growers in the State of 19 California. Production continues to expand in order 20 to supply the world. 21 Over 75 percent of the world's supply of 22 almonds is produced in the State of California.

products covered by this submission on almonds are as follows: in shell, 0802.11.00; shelled, 0802.12.00; prepared or preserved, 2008.19.40.

The primary objective for almonds during the upcoming negotiations should be to eliminate all almond tariffs within the FTAA. This objective is consistent with Blue Diamond's objective for the WTO negotiations.

Almonds lend themselves well to accomplishing this. Over 75 percent of the world's production is produced in California. There's very little almond production in the FTAA countries. Only Chile is recognized as a minor producer.

Nevertheless, Chile imports almonds from the United States. Because of the trade patterns for almonds, it should be possible to achieve a zero duty within the FTAA. All FTAA countries and their consumers would benefit from the elimination of the existing duties.

It is urged that careful consideration and attention be given to eliminating all duties on almonds. This is especially true since all of the

major countries have duty rates below 15 percent. 1 2 Our two biggest FTAA trading partners, 3 Canada and Mexico, are both already at zero duty. You have before you my complete testimony. 4 So I will not repeat all of it at this time with the 5 understanding that it will be studied carefully. Your 6 7 attention is directed to the countries which are most important to the almond trade. 8 9 Argentina imports almonds from California. 10 Last year imports totaled over \$382,000. The current 11 tariff is 12 and a half percent for both shelled and 12 in shell almonds. It is believed that with a zero duty 13 almond exports from California would reach the level 14 15 of \$500,000 in five years. Brazil imports almonds 16 from California. Last year its imports totaled almost The current tariff is 12 and a half 17 \$1 million. 18 percent for both shelled and in shell almonds. 19 believed that with a zero duty almond exports from 20 California would reach a level of \$2 million within 21 five years. 22 Brazil just recently has imposed

significant nontariff barrier in the form of an import requirement requiring certification from local authorities as to the safety of the product and various other similar requirements.

The United States has recently sent a demarche on this issue. The U.S. has asked that this issue be placed on the agenda for the November meeting in Geneva of the WTO sanitary and phytosanitary code working group. This issue should be addressed if it has not been previously resolved.

Chile imports almonds from California even though it is a small producers. Last year its imports totaled almost \$840,000. The current tariff is eight percent for both shelled and in shell almonds. It is believed that with a zero duty, almond exports from California would reach the level of \$2 million in five years.

Colombia imports almonds from California.

Last year its imports totaled over \$100,000. The current tariff is 15 percent for both shelled and in shell almonds. It is believed with a zero duty, almond exports from California would reach the level

1	of \$200,000 in five years.
2	Venezuela imports almonds from California.
3	Last year its imports totaled over \$1.7 million. The
4	current tariff is 15 percent for both shelled and in
5	shell almonds. It is believed that with a zero duty,
6	almond exports from California would reach the level
7	of \$4 million in five years.
8	It is hoped that this helps explain why
9	the U.S. should make obtaining a zero duty for almonds
10	a priority during these negotiations. We are prepared
11	to provide any information, assistance or support
12	necessary to achieve this goal.
13	Thank you very much for your close
14	attention. It would be a pleasure to answer any
15	questions that you may have.
16	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
17	much, Ms. Brauner.
18	Shall I start with you, Omar?
19	MR. KARAWA: Thank you, Ms. Brauner. I
20	promise we'll study it very carefully.
21	MS. BRAUNER: Thank you very much.
22	MR. KARAWA: I have two questions. One,

1	you note in your testimony that the primary objective
2	is tariff elimination. Are there any other objectives
3	under your organization?
4	MS. BRAUNER: Other than cheating the zero
5	for zero?
6	MR. KARAWA: Yes.
7	MS. BRAUNER: That's our prime objective.
8	MS. CHATTIN: Can I just follow up on
9	that?
10	You've mentioned one problem in Brazil on
11	this certification issue. I just wondered if not now,
12	if you could be thinking about are there technical
13	barriers to almonds. Are there SPS issues involving
14	almonds in these countries?
15	I think that's kind of what Omar was
16	trying to get at, was if we have zero duties, let's
17	try our best to insure that that really does mean
18	unfettered access and that, you know, barriers that
19	tariffs provided aren't just offset by some other
20	kinds of mischief.
21	MS. BRAUNER: Phytosanitary and other sort
22	of distortions continue to be a problem around the

1	world, but for the moment in South America, it's this
2	particular problem in Brazil.
3	But thank you for your interest in that
4	area.
5	MR. KARAWA: The other question is you
6	note in your written testimony some countries which
7	you consider very high priority in tariff elimination.
8	Could you provide not now, maybe in the future a list
9	how you rank these countries as to importance of
10	priority?
11	MS. BRAUNER: Yes, we can. They pretty
12	much rank themselves in my testimony with Venezuela
13	being at the top. They are currently the top
14	importers of U.S. almonds at about the \$2 million
15	level, which we think would double. So that would be,
16	but we can do that.
17	Thank you.
18	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: A question from
19	Dan Leahy.
20	MR. LEAHY: One quick question. Given the
21	lack of almond production in the other FTAA countries,
22	if you achieved a zero for zero, who would you be

1	competing with in those markets for this increased
2	access?
3	MS. BRAUNER: Well, the fact that
4	California produces 75 percent of the world's supply
5	and this year we have a record production of 980
6	million pounds in California; we think the Chilean
7	supply is somewhere around four million. So we really
8	see very little problem with any almonds being grown
9	as Chile, you know, as competition. They're already
LO	a net importer of California almonds. So we're very
L1	lucky in that we have most of the world's supply and
L2	going upwards.
L3	MR. LEAHY: I won't ask you the question
L4	of what you compete with in that market because then
L5	we'll get into a very long discussion of what's like
L6	and directly competitive with almonds.
L7	MS. BRAUNER: Thank you very much.
L8	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Our next witness
L9	is Wythe Willey of the National
20	MR. WILLEY: Wythe Willey.
21	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: I'm sorry. I'll
22	try that again. Would you correct it for the record?

1	MR. WILLEY: Wythe Willey.
2	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Wythe Willey of
3	the National Cattlemen's Beef Association.
4	MR. WILLEY: Thank you, Madame Chairman.
5	With me is Chuck Lambert, who is with the
6	National Cattlemen's Beef Association staff. He's our
7	chief economist.
8	We don't have a corner on the world's beef
9	supply. So we have some different problems for you.
10	I'm the elected President of the National
11	Cattlemen. I'm a farmer. I live near Cedar Rapids,
12	Iowa, eastern Iowa.
12	Iowa, eastern Iowa. Cedar Rapids as a community is sometimes
13	Cedar Rapids as a community is sometimes
13	Cedar Rapids as a community is sometimes called the community that has the largest export per
13 14 15	Cedar Rapids as a community is sometimes called the community that has the largest export per capita of any city in the nation. So we do a lot of
13 14 15 16	Cedar Rapids as a community is sometimes called the community that has the largest export per capita of any city in the nation. So we do a lot of exporting in addition to agricultural exports.
13 14 15 16 17	Cedar Rapids as a community is sometimes called the community that has the largest export per capita of any city in the nation. So we do a lot of exporting in addition to agricultural exports. Generally, let me say thank you for giving
13 14 15 16 17 18	Cedar Rapids as a community is sometimes called the community that has the largest export per capita of any city in the nation. So we do a lot of exporting in addition to agricultural exports. Generally, let me say thank you for giving us some time. With all of the hard work, you've been
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	Cedar Rapids as a community is sometimes called the community that has the largest export per capita of any city in the nation. So we do a lot of exporting in addition to agricultural exports. Generally, let me say thank you for giving us some time. With all of the hard work, you've been sitting here a long time today.

Johnson and Secretary Venneman and all of the other 1 2 members of the administration that you represent. 3 have worked tirelessly for 4 promotion authority. We support that agenda because riaht thing do for the nation's 5 it's to 6 agriculture, cattle producers, and for the country. 7 I must tell you, as you've seen from some of the other testimony given here, we are facing a 8 9 growing suspicion of groundswell of trade 10 strengthening isolationist and protectionist movement 11 in some parts of the country, the heartland and some 12 of the West. 13 Any agreements negotiated under TPA must be favorable for U.S. agriculture and its products or 14 the administration or those who support trade as 15 16 strongly as we do run the risk of being criticized and 17 abandoned by some of our constituencies. 18

In other words, we need a big pro trade win for U.S. agriculture at the negotiating table. I'm a lot of responsibility on you all, but that is important, and frankly, we cannot support approval of any agreement that delivers less.

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In that vein, we were concerned to read recent press accounts from Ambassador Zoellick that we may have zero tariffs, that those may be imminent. If the ambassador's request is anything more than a request for an evaluation, there could be extreme political consequences for us all.

For example, the European Union has a current tariff at 57 percent, with a 20 percent in quota tariff. Even if those tariffs were reduced to zero tomorrow, we would not be able to sell U.S. beef to European customers. The WTO illegal ban imposed by the economic union because we use scientifically proven production technology is still unresolved, and even the so-called hormone free beef to Europe, we have no access to Europe. We have one little plant that's qualified.

They simply block all of our production and all of our exports.

A reduction in U.S. beef tariffs or expansion of tariff free quotas would only be acceptable as an overall trade package favorable to the U.S. beef industry.

In addition, we are concerned that the 1 2 beef industry is protected from surges in imports, 3 predatory pricing activities, especially when unfair trade business practices are contributing factors. 4 A system of tariffs and TROs provides that 5 6 safety net. A good example of an advance in trade, 7 the WTO accession agreement with China established an aggressive target for beef tariffs by reducing most 8 9 beef tariffs in China from 45 percent to 12 percent by 2004. 10 11 We believe that the 12 percent is a worthy target and should be the objective for global beef 12 13 tariffs. And that objective is consistent with the 14 administration's proposal for OTW agricultural 15 negotiations and can be supported by the nation's beef 16 producers if it's part of a comprehensive package that 17 supports increased access for U.S. beef. If China can reduce their tariffs from 45 18 19 to 12, certainly other countries could do the same. 20 To set the stage a little bit, the U.S. is 21 the world's largest beef market, in part, because of

the promotion and self-help efforts by cattlemen to

promote their own product. We're also the largest importer and the world's second largest beef exporter. We're in a unique position.

Due to that, we must consider balance, equity, and fairness of any proposed trade initiative to insure that any agreements to provide as much or more access for U.S. beef as we give for our imported beef.

Perceptions, and you've heard some of them, are that this has not always been the case. But we do have the most open, least restrictive major beef market in the world.

On the other hand, we've had some tremendous successes and have witnessed first hand the value of market opening trade agreements. As a direct result of NAFTA and related political reforms, the Mexico economy has grown. Disposal income has increased among an expanding middle class. Exports of beef and beef variety meats to Mexico have increased more than fivefold from 163 million in 1993 to 775 million in 2001.

The first six months of the year, they

increased another 13 percent. It's a real success story.

In a world of unlimited trade issues and limited negotiating resources and time, our organization would strongly prefer that you all focus efforts on the world trade organization's multilateral initiative. That fits with our goal of not supporting increased access to U.S. beef market meaningful piecemeal until access and tariff reductions is achieved in other major beef importing countries.

Because several South American countries obviously export beef and many of the major importers are in Asia and Europe, this balance objective can only be achieved through the WTO negotiations.

A couple of other comments for you. We do not outright oppose free trade agreement of the Americas, but we want it to be on a parallel track with the WTO.

We're very concerned about science based regulations to protect U.S. herd health, and any trade agreement must obviously include those overriding

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concerns about herd health and biosecurity. 1 2 We've witnessed first hand the tremendous 3 economic and governmental cost of foot and mouth disease and BSE in Europe and in England, and our 4 country is free. We've got an excellent track record, 5 but we know the problems would arise from allowing 6 7 imports, would cause a problem. And I must tell you that our cattlemen are 8 9 extremely sensitive to the health of their herd and 10 the reputation of their beef safety programs. 11 A number of South American countries are 12 now not sending anything other than foot product here. 13 They will probably be achieving foot and mouth disease 14 safety soon, and so that will be an issue. 15 resume exporting to us. 16 Export subsidies. Our industry does not 17 export subsidies. We strongly support

The European Union and other countries seem to be excess with U.S. export credits. From our standpoint, we would be willing to go to zero if the

proposal to

phase

out

administration's

subsidies within five years.

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European Union went to zero also.

Domestic supports. Our industry, the beef industry, that is, is not directly supported by the farm bill, and we are among the least subsidized of any international beef industry. We would be willing to work with the administration to develop strategies to reduce overall domestic support.

The U.S. intends to live up to its WTO commitments that circuit breakers in the 2000 farm bill will be triggered if the U.S. exceeds those commitments.

We support the administration's proposal to reduce those domestic supports to five percent of the value of total agricultural production.

We would be interested in domestic supports in the global beef industry, particularly the European Union and those countries that want to become part of the European Union be minimized, and we would consider a zero for zero proposal or proposal for substantial reduction in domestic supports in the meat sector.

Access issues. We have the least

restricted and largest beef market in the world. markets in other developed countries are virtually closed to U.S. beef or protected by relatively high We have granted, the U.S., that is, other countries almost 700,000 metric tons of TRQ at zero duty with a 26 percent tariff becoming effective when the countries fill their quota. Of that, Australia gets 54 percent, New The remaining 15 percent is Zealand 31 percent. allocated to countries primarily in South America. We would support continued movement toward reduced tariffs and expanded TROs, but only as a comprehensive package that addressed export subsidies, production subsidies and continuing and growth lists of sanitary, phytosanitary, and technical barriers to trade issues. In summary, I'll be glad to answer any questions you might have. I appreciate the chance to come and talk with you a while. We wish you good luck in the world trade and FTAA negotiations. CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr. Willey.

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Questions?

MS. CHATTIN: I had a couple of questions. In the context of the FTAA negotiations, you had alluded very generally to SPS issues. We're very aware of the concern that the industry has on foot and mouth disease and on BSE and we're not going to lower our standards in the FTAA negotiation.

But one of the things that would be very helpful to us is either now or perhaps you could tell us later: are there specific SPS or inspection type issues, barriers to our beef exports in some of the Latin American countries?

We're working on some of those problems in the context of Chile, but one of the things that we would like to do in the context of the FTAA is try our best to address, you know, issues other than tariffs.

So if you had any observations now or in the future, we'd really be willing to and would like very much to work with you on that.

MR. WILLEY: And we do maintain an office here, as you probably know, in Washington, and we have a very competent staff that works with APHIS and the

Department of Agriculture.

We met with the Uruguayan ambassador this morning and talked about their hoof and mouth status and under a vaccination program, and frankly, the problem does not seem to be in the Americas. The problem is generally with Europe and those countries.

So I don't think that should be that big an issue, the free trade area of the Americas.

MS. CHATTIN: And also just to clarify my understanding, I know you were talking and sometimes in a more general basis than just the FTAA talking about domestic support, export subsidies, issues like that, which are very important in the WTO negotiations, but what is your position in terms of negotiating disciplines on like domestic support in the FTAA?

That's something that we're being pressured by, to be honest, a lot of our trading partners who very much want to negotiate those commitments in the FTAA. I think Secretary Venneman, Ambassador Zoellick have been very unequivocal that we think that belongs in the WTO, and we've tabled a very

1	ambitious WTO proposal.
2	But I just would appreciate knowing the
3	position of the Cattlemen's Association in terms of
4	that particular issue.
5	MR. WILLEY: Frankly, we're probably at
6	some odds with other agricultural commodities. We're
7	simply not supported by any government programs.
8	Cattlemen, most of them, are a pretty independent lot,
9	and so we don't worry about that, and we would give on
10	those points for some other things.
11	MS. CHATTIN: Other people's subsidies for
12	some other things.
13	MR. WILLEY: Well, we'll give up the rice
14	and corn subsidies for access for beef.
15	(Laughter.)
16	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: There's no other
17	questions?
18	MS. CHATTIN: No.
19	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Mr. Willey?
20	MR. WILLEY: I might say, you know,
21	basically most American farmers and ranchers believe
22	in free trade, and we're not afraid to compete on a

world market, and I think given a level playing field, 1 2 American agriculture and the cattle industry, 3 particular, do very well with more trade. 4 Thank you very much. CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Our next witness 5 6 is Gary Broyles, President of the National Association 7 of Wheat Growers. Thank you. 8 MR. BROYLES: 9 Madame Chairman Good afternoon, and 10 members of the committee. Joining me this afternoon 11 is Barbara Spangler, who is the Executive Director of the Wheat Export Trade Education Committee. 12 13 My name is Gary Broyles, and I am a wheat 14 producer from Rapelje, Montana and currently serve as 15 the President of the National Association of Wheat 16 Growers, and today I do represent the National 17 Association of Wheat Growers, the Wheat Export Trade 18 Education Committee, and U.S. Wheat Associates. 19 On average, nearly 50 percent o four total 20 wheat production is exported. Our success or failure 21 hinges on the ability of U.S. wheat to be exported

around the globe.

The wheat industry strongly supports aggressive action to liberalize trade in both the WTO and the free trade areas of the Americas negotiations. The FTAA negotiations have the potential to extend beyond the level of liberalization achieved in the WTO, and the U.S. must take full advantage of this opportunity.

Additionally, a key element in the FTAA process is the potential to foster hemispheric alliances in such a way that they can carry over to the WTO negotiations where differences on a number of issues are extremely contentious, and we believe that a strong commitment in the hemisphere will be very positive for us against the protectionist positions promoted primarily by the EU.

The U.S. must refrain from negotiating on domestic supports within the context of the FTAA. It would be unwise for us to unilaterally disarm within the hemisphere while leaving the EU and other competition to continue subsidizing their producers at high levels.

We concur with the U.S. position to

encourage the countries within the hemisphere to work together in the WTO to substantially reduce and more tightly discipline trade distorting domestic support. Negotiations on areas such as market access, state trading enterprises, export subsidies, and sanitary and phytosanitary issues must result in freer and fairer trade.

The reduction of high tariffs must be a priority of the FTAA discussions to insure greater market access for U.S. products. Action must be taken to address problems in the administration of tariff rate quotas and to eliminate price ban systems.

The FTAA must achieve and give us access on par with Argentina and Canada to insure access to the hemisphere and to the growing economies of about 800 million people. Brazil alone imports 7.9 million metric ton of wheat. Despite a U.S. logistical advantage to northern Brazil, Argentina dominates this lucrative market.

This pattern is repeated throughout the South American region. The U.S. wheat industry has also faced difficulties in export markets to

Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, and Venezuela primarily as a result of the Canadian Wheat Board.

The Canadian Wheat Board consistently and intentionally under prices U.S. wheat in these markets. The U.S. wheat industry is encouraged by the U.S. position to eliminate export state trading enterprises within this hemisphere.

The Canada-U.S. free trade agreement of 1998 resulted in maintaining the trade inequities between the U.S. and Canadian farmers. We must not allow these to be carried forward into the FTAA as we level the playing field within the hemisphere.

Last year, the North Dakota Wheat Commission filed a Section 301 petition with the Office of the USTR, and the affirmative finding of that investigation by the USTR indicated that the Canadian Wheat Board's monopolistic characteristics clearly disadvantaged U.S. wheat producers.

At the time of the affirmative finding,
Ambassador Zoellick announced, and I quote, the United
States will pursue multiple avenues to seek relief for
U.S. wheat farmers from the trading practices of the

Canadian Wheat Board, a government monopoly trading enterprise, end quote.

We in the wheat industry strongly urge the administration to move quickly to self-initiate dumping investigation against the Canadian Wheat Board and to file a complaint against the board under Article 19 of the WTO.

The U.S. wheat industry agrees with the U.S. position to eliminate all trade distorting export subsidies within the hemisphere and supports the establishment of a mechanism that would prohibit agricultural products from being exported to the hemisphere with the aid of export subsidies.

The inconsistent application of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations has resulted in some slowing of trade to the Central and Latin America regions. A hemispheric agreement must be established that sets a risk assessment framework as well as the creation of an accepted and expedited procedure for addressing sanitary and phytosanitary disputes.

And we also believe that trade in new technologies is adequately addressed in the World

Trade Organization negotiations and probably should not be revisited in these.

The FTAA negotiations represent, I believe, and we believe, a great opportunity for the advancement of free and fair trade within our hemisphere for the U.S. wheat producers, and we encourage you to insure that although we are very concerned about environmental labor issues, that they not be allowed to hinder this opportunity.

In closing I would offer that the wheat industry is very pleased by the U.S. trade position on agriculture, and however, the work towards consensus will not be easy on several important issues, and most notably one of those for us is the Canadian Wheat Board, and it must be addressed.

I thank you for the opportunity to appear before you this afternoon, and I want to assure you that the wheat industry stands ready to work with you and kind of shoulder to shoulder toward a successful outcome of these negotiations.

I thank you for this time and would do my best to answer any questions that you might have.

1	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you, Mr.
2	Broyles.
3	MR. KARAWA: Thank you, Mr. Broyles.
4	I have one question. Barbara had raised
5	this with another testimony. In your written
6	testimony you had mentioned export competition. You
7	support the establishment of a mechanism that will
8	prohibit agricultural products from being exported to
9	the FTAA by non-FTAA countries with the aid of export
10	subsidies.
11	Could you help us understand or give us
12	some ideas of what you think that kind of mechanism
13	will be like or you contemplate?
14	MR. BROYLES: Well, I would defer to my
15	partner here. However, I'm going to offer this from
16	a producer's standpoint because I think it's
17	important.
18	The wheat industry, much like the cattle
19	industry, feels that we can compete very well in the
20	world market if we have some sort of a level playing
21	field. If we unilaterally try to disarm ourselves
22	from export subsidies, but we allow other countries,

primarily the European Union to continue to use that, 1 2 then all we have done is essentially neutered 3 ourselves in the world market, and we don't want that 4 to happen. As we move to that, and we think that will 5 6 probably be handled very well by the U.S. position in 7 the WTO talks. We are very supportive of that. is why we think that maybe we should leave that alone 8 9 and let that become part of the WTO and set up kind of 10 a restrictive, if you will, that we can eliminate our 11 export subsidies amongst ourselves and at the same 12 time not allow export subsidies to be brought into 13 this country. 14 That way that puts us together as a 15 hemisphere, I think puts us in some position in the 16 WTO to achieve our overall position as a country and 17 as an industry. 18 Do you follow me? 19 MR. KARAWA: Yes. 20 MR. BROYLES: Okay. 21 MS. SPANGLER: I don't think we have a 22 structure for doing that. There has been discussed at

1	length in the Business Forum of the FTAA in the
2	agricultural section for the last several years
3	finding a workable solution to that proposal is not
4	going to be easy, but probably it would send a
5	stronger message if we could come up with something
6	that wouldn't be trade distorting for the whole world
7	to address what Europe is doing. That's the main
8	objective in that.
9	MS. CHATTIN: You also mentioned risk
10	assessment and NSPS measures in your testimony. I had
11	a couple of questions.
12	One is either now or later on if there are
13	particular problems in terms of particular SPS
14	measures in markets in the FTAA, we would be very
15	interested in knowing the specifics of the problems
16	that you face in other markets.
17	But you also mentioned something about
18	establishing in maybe I misunderstood in the
19	FTAA a unique risk assessment framework outside what
20	is in the WTO or did I misunderstand what your intent
21	was in that testimony?
22	Because many of the U.S. delegation I

think we want to make sure the SPS is enforced, and there is from some countries some pressure to lower standards, which is unacceptable to us.

But if you could just maybe explain to me a little bit more what you meant by risk assessment procedures or if it's in your testimony, I haven't had time to read all of it in detail.

MR. BROYLES: Actually, this position within the FTA would be in support of what's being done in the WTO negotiations, and really what we're wanting is some ability to benchmark, if there is a risk or if it's being used as some sort of kind of an unsubstantiated trade sanctions to limit us when there really is no evidence of a problem or an issue.

And two other things. The one I'm the most familiar with is TCK Smut in which we have been closed out of some markets with absolutely no scientific foundation for it, but it was out there. There was some discussion about it. So we can just say, "Well, we're going to cut off U.S. access to this because of that."

I think that there is a strong move within

the WTO to address that. We want it to be consistent 1 2 with that so that, you know, we're concerned about 3 disease and health, but let's make sure that it is truly founded and not just used against us kind of as 4 a phantom export restriction. 5 6 MS. SPANGLER: I think an additional part 7 of that would be an efficient method to quickly establish whether there's a true risk or not, not to 8 9 let it drag on for great lengths of time while they 10 banter us around, as the Europeans are so good at. 11 If we can establish something in the hemisphere that is sufficient and addresses these 12 13 issues in a very timely manner, then we have a better 14 chance of moving it forward in the big round, which is 15 the ultimate. 16 And it may not happen in this round, but at least the discussions could begin and we could 17 18 build the relationships in the hemisphere to support 19 what we need to do. 20 We do not want to change the SPS or open We firmly believe that the 21 that or go anywhere.

in place that will work for all

system is

1	technologies, as positive as the current problems that
2	we have.
3	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you.
4	Thank you, Mr. Broyles.
5	MR. BROYLES: Thank you very much.
6	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Our last witness
7	is Rachel Cohen, U.S. Advocacy Liaison, Doctors
8	Without Borders.
9	Ms. Cohen.
10	MS. COHEN: Is this working?
11	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Yes.
12	MS. COHEN: Okay. Last but not least, I
13	hope you're awake enough to hear what I have to say
14	today. Thank you so much for having me.
15	I'm pleased to provide this brief
16	testimony which focuses entirely on the potential
17	negative consequences of the free trade area of the
18	Americas, on access to essential medicines in
19	developing countries and the Americas, on behalf of
20	Doctors Without Borders, Medecins Sans Frontieres, or
21	MSF, an international medical humanitarian
22	organization with field operations in nearly 90

countries.

Too often in the countries where MSF works we have been forced to watch our patients die simply because the drugs that they need that could improve, extend, or save their lives are not available and not affordable. For us this is simply unacceptable. It is a violation of our fundamental medical ethics.

In the Americas, this has been particularly true for our teams providing AIDS care and treatment in places like Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Peru who have witnessed countless unnecessary deaths due to the lack of access to antiretroviral therapy and other essential AIDS medications.

There are currently 1.8 million people living with HIV/AIDS in Latin America and the Caribbean and 110 AIDS deaths were recorded in the region in 2001. The Caribbean is the second most affected region in the world after Subsaharan Africa.

Hundreds of thousands of people with HIV/AIDS in developing countries in the Americas do not have access to antiretroviral therapy simply

because they cannot afford it. Just two years ago, the average cost of а triple combination of antiretrovirals, which is what is required effective treatment, was between ten and 15,000 U.S. and today it dollars per patient per year, available for under \$300 per patient per year.

These price reductions were the direct results of international public pressure from activists and other non-governmental organizations like MSF and due to generic competition, particularly from Indian and Brazilian manufacturers.

Generic competition was possible only because of the lack of patent protection in those countries on pharmaceuticals. In the coming years, such competition will not be possible due to the filing of patents on pharmaceuticals in key developing countries with manufacturing capacity unless flexible conditions for granting compulsory licenses are available and compulsory licenses are routinely issued to address public health concerns.

Compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals is widely acknowledged to be one of the most important

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policy tools for insuring generic competition which will be key to improving access to HIV/AIDS medicines in Latin America and the Caribbean.

One hundred and forty-two countries adopted the Doha declaration on the TRIPS agreement in public health in November of 2001. Public health needs were firmly placed above commercial interests, and much needed clarifications about the key flexibilities in the TRIPS agreement were offered.

The very fact that public health and, in particular, access to medicines has been singled out as an issue needing special attention in TRIPS implementation acknowledges that health care and health care technologies must be treated differently from other commodities and give countries leeway for taking measures to counter the negative effects of excessive intellectual property protection on health.

The FTAA threatens to undermine the achievements in Doha in many key ways. In particular, USTR's negotiating position in FTAA gives rise to serious questions for us about the U.S. government's true motives in agreeing to the Doha declaration.

The Doha declaration must remain a ceiling for FTAA negotiations on intellectual property rights as they relate to public health technologies, and the U.S. government must not renege on the commitments it made in Doha.

It is clear in information about the U.S.'

FTAA negotiating objectives that the U.S. is pushing to impose standards on pharmaceuticals that far exceed requirements set forth in the TRIPS agreement and that in some cases these standards directly contradict both the spirit and the letter of the Doha declaration, which clearly recognized concerns about the effects of patents on prices and stated unambiguously that TRIPS should be interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO members' right to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all.

I would like to cite just four examples of this. The first are dramatic limitations on the circumstances under which compulsory licenses on pharmaceuticals may be issued.

Although the Doha declaration has

reaffirmed the right of WTO members to issue a compulsory license for whatever reason, not only in cases of national emergency, the U.S. proposal explicitly provides the compulsory licenses shall be granted only in four limited circumstances, that is, public noncommercial use, situations of a declared national emergency, other situations of extreme urgency, or declared anti-competitive practices, and solely for purposes of government use.

Should such a provision be adopted, it would cancel the possibility of granting compulsory licenses to remedy patent abuses, such as excessive pricing and to foster competition in the private sector to increase access to patented essential medicines.

The second major concern that we have is with regard to extensions of patent terms of pharmaceuticals beyond the 20 year minimum that's set forth in the TRIPS agreement.

The U.S. proposes to extend the term of a patent in exchange for a, quote, early registration of generics, also known as Bolar exemptions, and to

compensate for unreasonable administrative or regulatory delays that occurred while granting the patent.

This is not required by the TRIPS agreement, and a WTO panel expressly stated that such patent extensions do not constitute a, quote, legitimate interest of patent owners.

Thirdly, we're concerned about abuse of powers to regulatory authorities to enforce patents. The U.S. proposes that drug regulatory authorities notify the patent owner of the identity of any company that is seeking approval to market a generic version of the patented invention while the patent is in effect.

This effectively means that drug regulatory authorities will function as sort of de facto patent enforcement agencies and is likely to result in unjustified patent extensions. Such a proposal can only serve to protect invalid patent claims as valid claims receive adequate protection through normal judicial processes.

And finally, we are concerned about

exclusive rights over pharmaceutical data. Although the TRIPS agreement only requires WTO members to protect undisclosed tests or data against unfair commercial use and disclosure in the framework of unfair competition law, the U.S. is proposing to grant exclusive rights on pharmaceutical data for at least five years. Such a proposal will result in delaying and limiting generic competition in cases where a patent does not exist or a compulsory license has been granted.

The U.S. negotiating objectives for FTAA aim to strengthen patent rights beyond what is required in trips and reduce the extent of the safeguards to the detriment of public health. They are clearly TRIPS plus and have been acknowledged as such by a member of a number of experts.

objectives, FTAA will negate the achievements of the Doha declaration and could have devastating consequences in terms of access to medicines for millions of people in low and middle income countries in the Americas who are living with HIV/AIDS, malaria,

1	tuberculosis, Chagash (phonetic) disease,
2	leishmaniasis, and a number of other neglected
3	diseases.
4	For them this is a matter of life and
5	death, and we, therefore, urge the U.S. government in
6	the strongest possible terms to abandon TRIPS plus
7	negotiating objectives and instead negotiate FTAA in
8	keeping with the spirit and letter of the Doha
9	declaration.
LO	Thank you for your attention.
L1	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thank you very
L2	much, Ms. Cohen.
L3	All of us have great respect for your
L4	institution and for its winning the Nobel Peace Prize.
L5	Our questioner will be Kira Alvarez from
L6	the USTR office.
L7	MS. ALVAREZ: Thank you for your statement
L8	and for your testimony. It's very helpful as we sit
L9	here and look at our negotiating positions.
20	I only have one question this morning or
21	this afternoon actually this evening. It concerns
22	with respect to sort of linkage and the patent term

1	extension and the data protection.
2	Could you sort of explain to us how you
3	see this or your proposals or your views on that and
4	whether these are consistent with U.S. law and where
5	U.S. law on these positions is?
6	MS. COHEN: Is this working?
7	I'm not sure that it has any impact or any
8	implications in terms of U.S. law. What we're talking
9	about are strictly the ways in which these proposals
10	are going to affect developing countries, that is to
11	say low and middle income countries.
12	So I'm not a legal expert, but I don't
12	So I'm not a legal expert, but I don't believe this will in any way affect U.S. law. Of
13	believe this will in any way affect U.S. law. Of
13	believe this will in any way affect U.S. law. Of course, every nation will have their own sovereign
13 14 15	believe this will in any way affect U.S. law. Of course, every nation will have their own sovereign national legislation which, should FTAA be negotiated
13 14 15 16	believe this will in any way affect U.S. law. Of course, every nation will have their own sovereign national legislation which, should FTAA be negotiated successfully and signed to, would need to be developed
13 14 15 16 17	believe this will in any way affect U.S. law. Of course, every nation will have their own sovereign national legislation which, should FTAA be negotiated successfully and signed to, would need to be developed and implemented nationally.
13 14 15 16 17 18	believe this will in any way affect U.S. law. Of course, every nation will have their own sovereign national legislation which, should FTAA be negotiated successfully and signed to, would need to be developed and implemented nationally. So that would not, I don't think, have any
13 14 15 16 17 18 19	believe this will in any way affect U.S. law. Of course, every nation will have their own sovereign national legislation which, should FTAA be negotiated successfully and signed to, would need to be developed and implemented nationally. So that would not, I don't think, have any implications whatsoever for U.S. law.

other countries or is it still a domestic industry? 1 2 MS. COHEN: At the moment the Brazilian 3 industry, which is a state sponsored pharmaceutical organization -- the main one is Pharamninos -- is 4 producing almost exclusively for the domestic market. 5 6 So at the moment they're not exporting. 7 One of the things I've just been in a meeting with, an interagency task force that's working 8 9 on sort of the implementation of the Doha declaration, 10 and in particular working out a solution to what's 11 known as Paragraph 6 in the Doha declaration, which is 12 the production for export question. 13 What didn't get resolved in Doha 14 unfortunately was what are countries to do if they 15 have limited or insufficient manufacturing capacity 16 themselves. They cannot issue a compulsory license to 17 export. You can only at this stage issue a compulsory 18 license to import or produce locally. 19 So an exporting country would have to 20 essentially issue a compulsory license to export. 21 Brazilian government has said many times they're not

necessarily every interested in exporting.

encouraging them to, indeed, begin exploring ways to increase their own manufacturing capacity so that they can export.

It's a very important resource for the rest of the region, and for other countries in the rest of the world, certainly in the developing world. In one limited exception, MSF has been importing generic antiretrovirals from Brazil in a special agreement that we have with Pharmaninos in South Africa for use in our project there, where we're treating about 400 people living with HIV with antiretrovirals.

Initially we were treating 180 people, and by importing the Brazilian generics under a special agreement with the Brazilians and with the full knowledge and authorization of the Medicines Control Council in South Africa, which is their equivalent of the FDA, we've been able to double the enrollment capacity of our program on basically the same budget because the drugs are half as expensive, even as those patented medicines that have been reduced, where the prices have been reduced by GlaxoSmithKline and a

1	number of other pharmaceutical companies. At the
2	moment they're not exporting.
3	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: Thanks you, Ms.
4	Cohen.
5	MS. COHEN: Thank you very much.
6	CHAIRPERSON SURO-BREDIE: This hearing is
7	adjourned until tomorrow morning at ten o'clock.
8	Thank you.
9	(Whereupon, at 5:08 p.m., the hearing in
10	the above-entitled matter was adjourned, to reconvene
11	at 10:00 a.m., September 10, 2002.)
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